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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Education policymaking in the United States has been aptly described as a 
“marble cake” (Bailey & Mosher, 1968) of interwoven elements, with barely discernible 
boundaries between the federal, state, and local levels of government.  Beginning with 
the historic Elementary and Secondary Education Act  of 1965 attempt to ensure equality 
of educational opportunity and continuing with the present push to maximize academic 
outcomes, both federal and state government have worked to advance policy changes.  
Yet, while reform efforts at the federal level and their impact on states are well 
documented (see Berman & McLaughlin, 1976, 1978; Debray-Pelot &McGuinn, 2009; 
Fusarelli, 2005; Manna, 2001; McGuinn, 2006), state initiatives to improve education 
remain under-examined (Mazzoni, 1994).  However, the recent Race to the Top initiative 
sparked a flurry of state-led education reform as states competed against each other for 
federal dollars.  This complex policy environment presents a unique opportunity for 
studying state and political influence on education reform in a federalist system.   
 
Emerging Policy Lever 
Though traditionally dominated by local control, more recently authority for 
educational governance has become a struggle among the federal, state, and local levels 
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of government.  Commonly used policy levers have included mandates and inducements.  
However, both have been criticized because the costs can outweigh the proposed benefits 
(McDonnell & Elmore, 1987).  In 2009, a new policy lever emerged in the form of a 
competitive grant program, Race to the Top.     
  Race to the Top was the first major education policy advanced at the federal level 
since No Child Left Behind.  Although it extended the emphasis on student and teacher 
accountability established by No Child Left Behind, it is not a reauthorization of the 
legislation and departs from earlier education reform efforts in several ways.  First, Race 
to the Top is not a federal mandate, but instead, extended an invitation to states to 
participate.  Second, the program was a competition: Participation did not guarantee 
funding.  States had to demonstrate their commitment to implementing the program’s 
priorities in an extensive application, and fewer than half of the states that applied 
became winners.  While mandates are criticized for provoking the minimum response 
necessary, a competition has the opposite effect: Contestants do all they can to win.  
Thus, one effect of this new policy lever was to raise the bar for education reform and 
incite state-level policymaking efforts.   
Further, a key element of a state’s application was demonstrating buy-in from 
different education stakeholders, including districts and teacher unions.  Previous reforms 
had not sought this cooperation.  In order to win, local districts had to develop their own 
plans in support of the state’s application.  Accordingly, this type of policy lever appears 
to address several of the shortcomings presented by mandates and incentives.  It 
encourages inter-government cooperation often absent in mandates, and permits states to 
advance school reform tailored to their state’s needs, a challenge to inducements.   
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Perhaps one unanticipated consequence of this new approach was the emergence 
of new participants in the policymaking process.  As states began implementing the 
ambitious reforms outlined in their Race to the Top applications, several pursued an 
innovative method: policy development by a diverse committee of education 
stakeholders.  An inquiry into the progression of events in one state, a first round winner 
in the competition, informs our understanding of the relationship between the different 
levels of governance in a federalist system, and specifically state-led policy innovations.  
In particular, it documents both the promises and pitfalls of this latest approach to 
education reform.  
The next section presents a brief historical overview of education policymaking 
since the latter half of the twentieth century.  Following this overview, the chapter closes 
with a more detailed description of Race to the Top and Tennessee’s efforts to win the 
competition.   
 
The Marble Cake of Education Policy 
 
Early efforts  
The struggle to reallocate authority in educational governance is a relatively 
recent development. Before the 1950s, the federal government’s involvement was limited 
to construction of new schools and teacher salaries (Bailey & Mosher, 1968).  Further, 
while the Constitution bestowed authority in education to the states, they in turn largely 
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allocated this power to local districts (Cohen & Spillane, 1992).  However, in response to 
growing concerns about national security and segregated schools, the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 signified a departure from this pattern.   
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act was predicated on the idea that 
reducing inequities in education would solve many challenges confronting the system.  
To accomplish this, the ESEA focused on inputs in the form of federal funding.  Among 
the programs it established, Title I, aimed at improving the education of disadvantaged 
students, represented the first time the federal government offered funding to help low-
income students (Debray, McDermott, & Wohlstetter, 2005).  Although money was 
distributed to schools under Title I, accountability requirements for schools were 
minimal.  For over a decade this piece of federal legislation was the primary means 
through which the governance of education was shifting. 
Several events in the 1980s, including the publication of A Nation at Risk (1983) 
and the increased role of state governors in education, led to what McGuinn (2005) 
describes as a change in regimes from equity to accountability, simultaneously 
weakening local autonomy of education (Brady, 2009), and expanding state-level 
participation in educational governance.  A Nation at Risk (1983) exposed American 
students’ failure to keep up with, let alone surpass, their international counterparts and 
warned that national security was in jeopardy unless comprehensive reform efforts were 
undertaken.  As public concern grew, policymakers focused their attention on education 
reform. McDermott (2009) describes three waves of reform that spanned the next two 
decades.  She characterizes the first wave as centered on the actions of governors and the 
increased role of the state in education.  During this time, states began imposing 
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requirements on districts, the emphasis on curriculum standards emerged, and just as 
there was a thematic shift from equity to accountability, there was a parallel shift in focus 
from inputs to outputs (McDermott, 2009).    
 
Moving forward 
The second wave of reform expanded governors’ increased presence in education 
with the development of National Education Goals, but also foreshadowed the rise of the 
federal role with the 1990 legislation, Goals 2000 (McDermott, 2009).  By the conclusion 
of the third wave of reform, the federal role in education was firmly entrenched, 
exemplified by the successful passage of the No Child Left Behind (2001) legislation.  
These parallel efforts at improving schools have been described by some as 
“fragmented governance,” (Cohen & Spillane, 1992, p. 6) because authority is so 
dispersed.  However, they have also been defined as “systemic reform” (Smith & O’Day, 
1991, p. 234) suggesting that No Child Left Behind led to a more “tightly coupled 
educational system,” (Fusarelli, 2005, p. 132).  Still, Brady (2009) warns that 
organizational and capacity differences across the states present formidable challenges to 
establishing a viable system for improving education at the federal level.  Manna (2006) 
offers another way of understanding the relationship between federal and states efforts: 
leveraging capacity at one level of government to enhance the likelihood of policy 
change at another.  Borrowing strength, as Manna (2006) calls it, allows policy 
entrepreneurs to identify weaknesses in one system and to borrow strengths in this same 
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area from a different system.  Race to the Top appears to exemplify this idea, as the 
federal government seeks to improve education by leveraging state capacity.     
 
Race to the Top 
 
Guidelines 
Race to the Top, one of President Obama’s education reform initiatives, invited 
states to submit applications for federal grant awards to support improvements in 
education.  The program was announced in July 2009, and allocated $4.35 billion from 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA).  Award recipients 
received a disbursement of money that could not be used to fund perpetual programs.  In 
other words, states had to explain how the money would be used to implement reforms 
that did not rely on recurring funding.  The program was initially divided into two 
rounds; states were allowed to apply to either or both stages provided they were not 
winners in the first round.  A third round, open to second round finalists, was announced 
in late 2011.   
Applications for Race to the Top funds asked states to document previous reform 
successes and outline plans to extend reforms in accordance with standards and 
assessments.  The Obama administration’s priorities for education reform are reflected in 
the key principles of the program: 
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 Adopting standards and assessments that prepare students to succeed in college 
and the workplace; 
 Building data systems that measure student growth and success, and inform 
teachers and principals how to improve instruction; 
 Recruiting, developing, rewarding, and retaining effective teachers and principals, 
especially where they are needed most; and 
 Turning around their lowest-performing schools, (U.S. Department of Education, 
2009). 
  Although heavily guided by the federal priorities outlined in the application, specific 
details about how to address the priorities were left to the states to propose.   
States received a score of up to 500 points based on the following six criteria: 
state success factors, standards and assessments, data systems to support instruction, great 
teachers and leaders, turning around lowest-achieving schools, and general selection 
criteria.  The fourth criterion, great teachers and leaders, was awarded the most points 
(138), and within that category, a state’s proposal to improve teacher and principal 
effectiveness based on performance received the greatest weight (58/138 points).  Panels 
of reviewers independently scored proposals and then met to finalize comments and 
scores.  The total score was an average of the reviewers’ scores.   
 
States’ efforts 
Applications for the first round of Race to the Top were due on January 19, 2010.  
Sixteen finalists were announced on March 4, 2010. (See Table 1, pp. 9, 10 for a list of 
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states, Race to the Top applicants, and winners by round).  Finalists were invited to 
present their proposals and answer questions from the reviewers.  Delaware and 
Tennessee won the first round, receiving $100 million and $500 million, respectively.  In 
the second round, 36 states applied.  Though the vast majority of states also participated 
in the initial round, six states entered the competition for the first time.  Both the number 
of finalists and winners increased in the second round.  Out of 19 finalists, ten winners 
were announced on July 27, 2010, and they received awards ranging from $75 million to 
$700 million based on the size of their student population.  Third-round winners, 
announced in late 2011, included Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, New 
Jersey, and Pennsylvania.  They each received $200 million.   
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Table 1: States and Race to the Top competition
State
Applied 1st 
Round
Finalist 1st 
Round
Winner 1st 
Round Amount
Applied 2nd 
Round
Finalist 2nd 
Round
Winner 2nd 
Round Amount
Applied 1st or 
2nd Round
Winner 3rd 
Round Amount
Gates 
Foundation 
Grant
Alabama Yes No - Yes No - Yes - Yes
Alaska No - - No - - No -
Arizona Yes No - Yes Yes No Yes Yes 200 mil Yes
Arkansas Yes No - Yes No - Yes - Yes
California Yes No - Yes Yes No Yes No
Colorado Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 200 mil Yes
Connecticut Yes No - Yes No - Yes - Yes
Delaware Yes Yes Yes 100 mil - - - Yes -
District of Columbia Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 75 mil Yes - Yes
Florida Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 700 mil Yes - Yes
Georgia Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 400 mil Yes - Yes
Hawaii Yes No - Yes Yes Yes 75 mil Yes -
Idaho Yes No - No - - Yes -
Illinois Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 200 mil Yes
Indiana Yes No - No - - Yes -
Iowa Yes No - Yes No - Yes - Yes
Kansas Yes No - No - - Yes -
Kentucky Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 200 mil Yes
Louisiana Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 200 mil Yes
Maine No - - Yes No - Yes -
Maryland No - - Yes Yes Yes 250 mil Yes -
Massachusetts Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 250 mil Yes - Yes
Michigan Yes No - Yes No - Yes -
Minnesota Yes No - No - - Yes - Yes
Mississippi No - - Yes No - Yes -
Missouri Yes No - Yes No - Yes -
Montana No - - Yes No - Yes -
Nebraska Yes No - Yes No - Yes -
Nevada No - - Yes No - Yes -
New Hampshire Yes No - Yes No - Yes -
New Jersey Yes No - Yes Yes No Yes Yes 200 mil
  
 
1
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Table 1, continued
State
Applied 1st 
Round
Finalist 1st 
Round
Winner 1st 
Round Amount
Applied 2nd 
Round
Finalist 2nd 
Round
Winner 2nd 
Round Amount
Applied 1st or 2nd 
Round
Winner 3rd 
Round Amount
Gates 
Foundation 
Grant
New Mexico Yes No - Yes No - Yes - Yes
New York Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 700 mil Yes - Yes
North Carolina Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes 400 mil Yes - Yes
North Dakota No - - No - - No -
Ohio Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes 400 mil Yes - Yes
Oklahoma Yes No - Yes No - Yes - Yes
Oregon Yes No - No - - Yes -
Pennsylvania Yes Yes - Yes Yes No Yes Yes 200 mil Yes
Rhode Island Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes 75 mil Yes - Yes
South Carolina Yes Yes - Yes Yes No Yes No
South Dakota Yes No - No - - Yes -
Tennessee Yes Yes Yes 500 mil - - - Yes - Yes
Texas No - - No - - No - Yes
Utah Yes No - Yes No - Yes -
Vermont No - - No - - No -
Virginia Yes No - No - - Yes -
Washington No - - Yes No - Yes -
West Virginia Yes No - No - - Yes - Yes
Wisconsin Yes No - Yes No - Yes - Yes
Wyoming Yes No - No - - Yes -
Totals 41 16 2 36 19 10 47 7 14
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Although Race to the Top was an opportunity rather than a mandate, its reach was 
wide, extending from state legislative assemblies to private corporations.  Tennessee and 
California were among the first to pass education reform bills in 2010 that explicitly 
addressed at least one of the selection criteria, but they were by no means the only states.  
Nineteen states passed bills related to teacher evaluation and effectiveness, likely 
reflecting the heavy emphasis on this area in the Request for Proposals (Education 
Commission of the States, 2010). The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation gave grants to 
14 states, worth $250,000 each, to help with the proposal writing, (Dillon, 2010b).  Of the 
16 finalists in the first round of the competition, only two, Delaware and South Carolina, 
did not receive funding from the Gates Foundation. 
Over the past two years, winning states and districts have begun implementing 
their ambitious, and often contentious, reform plans.  In many cases, this process has not 
unfolded as original applications outlined.  Six states and the District of Columbia 
requested approval from the Department of Education to amend their plans (McNeil, 
2011).    Tennessee was one of the first states to enact legislation and also one of two 
winners in the first round.  In 2011, it became one of the first states in the nation to 
implement annual teacher evaluations, with a significant portion of the evaluation 
dependent on test scores, in all public K-12 schools.  The events that have unfolded in 
Tennessee surrounding Race to the Top present a unique opportunity to analyze current 
education reform policymaking contexts. 
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Tennessee First to the Top 
 Tennessee was one of only two winners in round one of Race to the Top.  This 
mid-sized state is the 16th most populous, and has a history of low educational outcomes 
among its predominantly White and English-speaking students
1
. Yet, in a ten-year time 
span from 1997 to 2007, Tennessee’s high school graduation rate increased 13 percentage 
points (from 53 percent to 66) (Editorial Projects in Education, 2010).  And though 
Tennessee students, on average, continue to score below other states on NAEP reading 
and math assessments, mathematics scores have improved (U.S. Department of 
Education, n.d.). Poverty is another challenge facing Tennessee. Nearly half of the state’s 
one million students are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch (Annie E. Casey 
Foundation, 2009).  Perceiving Race to the Top’s potential for helping the state confront 
these problems, then Governor Phil Bredesen convened an Extraordinary Session of the 
Tennessee General Assembly in January 2010 to pass legislation designed to enhance the 
state’s application.   
 
Tennessee General Assembly 
 The bicameral legislature of Tennessee is comprised of 33 senators and 99 
representatives.  As is typical in other states, senators are elected for four-year terms and 
representatives serve for two years; there are no term limits for members seeking re-
election.  Tennessee has a part-time legislature, meaning that its members balance the 
demands of lawmaking with another career.  Tennessee law stipulates 90 legislative days 
                                                          
1
 According to the Tennessee Department of Education, 69% of students are White and 3% are English 
language learners (n.d.) 
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over a two-year period.  However, the governor or both speakers of the chambers may 
call an Extraordinary Session where only pre-determined issues appear on the agenda.  
This was the case in December 2009 when Governor Bredesen announced that Tennessee 
would submit an application for the first round of Race to the Top and called lawmakers 
to the state capitol to pass a comprehensive education reform bill that would align 
Tennessee school practices more closely with Race to the Top criteria.   
 
First to the Top 
 The bill became known as the “Tennessee First to the Top Act of 2010” 
(SB7005/HB7010) and had six main areas of emphasis (See Appendix A for a full copy 
of the legislation): 
1) Established an “Achievement School District” allowing the commissioner of the 
state Department of Education to intervene in consistently failing schools; 
2) Required annual evaluations of teachers and principals; 
3) Created a 15-member advisory committee charged with the task of recommending 
guidelines for evaluations; 
4) Removed restrictions against using teacher effect data until data from three 
complete years are obtained; 
5) Required personnel decisions (promotion, retention, tenure, compensation) to be 
based partly on evaluations; 
6) Mandated that 50 percent of teacher and principal evaluations be based on student 
achievement data. 
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With less than two weeks to understand, amend, and vote on the bill, both chambers of 
the legislature met in session eight times and the education committees met four times.   
Legislators overwhelmingly voted in favor of the bill - just three senators and ten 
representatives opposed it.  Although Republicans controlled both chambers, there was 
bipartisan support for the bill, proposed by a Democratic governor.  After Tennessee was 
declared a winner, the Tennessee First to the Top Advisory Council was established to 
facilitate implementation of the policy.  A study of the legislative process and subsequent 
implementation efforts after Tennessee won the money is timely and relevant, as states 
across the country are experiencing similar events. 
This dissertation is a two-part case study examining how Race to the Top 
impacted education policy in Tennessee, from events designed to enhance the state’s 
odds of winning to initial enactment of new laws regarding educator evaluations.  To 
better understand this process, I describe state-initiated reform efforts that led to 
Tennessee’s status as a strong contender for Race to the Top on the eve of a special 
legislative session called by the governor just days before the application deadline.  The 
legislation passed during the Special Session was considered a linchpin in Tennessee’s 
bid to win the competition, and thus, the events surrounding its passage are the focus for 
the first part of this study.   
The new law, called First to the Top in Tennessee (FTTT), stipulated several 
policy changes, including annual evaluations of teachers and principals.  In the second 
part of this dissertation, I explore the initial enactment of this aspect of the law.  This 
dissertation encompasses several of stages of the policy process and offers a 
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comprehensive analysis of education reform efforts related to Race to the Top in 
Tennessee.   
 
Overview of this Document 
 This dissertation contains six more chapters.  In Chapter Two I review the 
literature that frames this study.  I begin by tracing the evolution of federalism in 
American education, and then I consider scholarship on state-level governance of 
education.  During this review, I present an argument for employing political science 
frameworks to guide this study.  I conclude the chapter with a presentation of the research 
questions and a discussion of the significance of this study.   
 The third chapter provides a detailed description of the methodology I used in my 
dissertation.  For each part of this project, I outline the goals and specific research 
questions guiding the study.  I explain the sampling method I employed, as well as the 
data collection process.  Finally, I describe the analytic strategy I applied in examining 
my data. 
 In Chapters Four, Five and Six I present an in-depth description of the results of 
my analyses.  I outline the political climate in Tennessee that preceded the decision to 
enter the Race to the Top competition, with particular attention to Governor Bredesen’s 
school reform efforts in Chapter Four.  Following that, Chapter Five describes the events 
in Tennessee that led to the successful passage of the First to the Top bill and chronicles 
the state’s path of innovative reform.  I examine the factors that contributed to the vast 
and rapid support for Tennessee’s bid for Race to the Top.  Shortly after the legislation 
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passed, implementation efforts began.  In Chapter Six, I analyze interviews with 
members of the Teacher Evaluation Advisory Committee as they describe the process of 
developing policy recommendations for the statewide annual educator evaluation system.  
Collectively, these three chapters examine the democratic policymaking process that 
unfolded in this Southern state.   
 I bring together the previous chapters to briefly summarize the results in Chapter 
Seven before situating this dissertation’s contribution within the extant literature.  
Included in this chapter are a discussion of the limitations of this study and suggestions 
for future research.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter reviews the relevant scholarship that undergirds this study.  It begins 
by examining American education policymaking in a federalist system, primarily 
considering state-level governance of education with a focus on the roles of various 
individuals and institutions in education policymaking.  Following that, I present a 
rationale for using political science frameworks in this education research.  In addition to 
describing how scholars apply these lenses to their work, I provide a comprehensive 
description of the frameworks I apply in my dissertation: Mazzoni’s (1991) arena models 
and McDonnell’s policy feedback.  The chapter concludes with a presentation of the 
research questions and a discussion of the significance of this study.   
 
Federalism and Educational Governance 
 As outlined by the Tenth Amendment, America has a federalist structure of 
educational governance that gives governance of education to the states.  This dual 
sovereignty grants independent powers to both the federal and state levels of government.  
Historically, states delegated this authority to local districts.  Until the end of World War 
II, the federal government’s involvement in education was primarily through land grants, 
teachers’ salaries, and the beginning of student assistance under the G.I. Bill (Bailey & 
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Mosher, 1968).  However, a major shift in authority to the federal level began in the late 
1950s as a result of growing concerns about national defense and the belief that 
unemployment and poverty could be remedied by equalizing educational and economic 
opportunities (Sunderman, 2009).  To gain leverage in educational governance, the 
federal government, in the now historic Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
1965, introduced the practice of using financial incentives.   
 States and districts do not have to accept federal dollars, but if they do, they must 
also comply with the federal stipulations attached (Manna, 2011).  However, by 
introducing such inducements, the federal government must walk a fine political line with 
states because they must rely on the states’ cooperation to carry out the initiatives.  Thus, 
there is an inherent tension for authority amongst the different levels of government in a 
federalist system.  Lauded by some as affording opportunities for inter-government 
cooperation, it is simultaneously criticized by others for its confusing and ad hoc 
approach (Peterson, Rabe, and Wong, 1986).   
This complicated relationship is made manifest through federal mandates and 
states’ resistance to them, but also in opportunities for leveraging license or capacity at 
one level to advance political agendas at another (Manna, 2006).  To illustrate this 
tension, and the politics emerging from a federalist system of government in education, I 
present Manna’s (2006) theoretical framework that merges the literature on federalism 
and agenda-setting.  After summarizing his framework, I outline historical events in 
American education reform that have led us ‘racing to the top.’ 
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Borrowing Strength 
 Manna (2006) contends that scholarship on federalism fails to draw connections 
with theories about agenda-setting, too often adopts a top-down approach, and 
overemphasizes policy implementation.  To address these shortcomings, he proposes a 
theoretical framework to explain how federalism influences agenda-setting (Manna, 
2006).  Manna identifies three components essential to policymaking: policy 
entrepreneurs, license and capacity.  Policy entrepreneurs are key figures in agenda-
setting and policymaking (Kingdon, 1984).  These individuals analyze the political 
climate looking for opportunities to champion their issue.  In pursuing this endeavor, 
policy entrepreneurs assess the relative license and capacity available at their level of 
government (Manna, 2006).   
 Manna (2006) identifies four sources for license: political capital; linking one 
issue to an issue currently receiving attention; laws granting control over the issue to one 
level of government; and previous policy changes that have persisted over time.  Policy 
entrepreneurs enjoy greater license when there are formal sources, such as regulations or 
relevant pre-existing policies.  Capacity encompasses the human capital, financial 
resources, and organizational structures that enable government to implement policy 
changes.  The combination of these two elements is essential: Weakness in one area 
inhibits the ability of a policy entrepreneur to stimulate government action (Manna, 
2006).   
 However, in the absence of either of these two events, Manna (2006) explains 
how a savvy entrepreneur can mobilize resources at another level of government to 
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supplement this weakness.  “Borrowing strength” is how Manna describes the actions of 
policy entrepreneurs who leverage license or capacity at a different level of government 
to advance their agendas.  This notion of a reciprocal relationship between the federal and 
state governments dismisses a top-down or bottom-up perspective of policymaking as too 
simplistic and instead suggests how it can foster momentum for policy innovation 
(Manna, 2006)  Manna applies this framework to changes in education policymaking 
during the second half of the twentieth century to explain the increasing attention to 
education on the American agenda, beginning with the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965. 
 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
 Title I is perhaps the best known element of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act because its provision for providing money for disadvantaged children 
persists today.  However, Manna (2006) notes the salience of Title V because it was an 
indication by the federal government of the interdependence between federal and state 
levels.  In the 1960s, state departments of education were as weak, or weaker, than the 
federal government in terms of education policy involvement (Manna, 2006).  To address 
this weakness, Title V directed money to state agencies to support reform efforts.  
According to Manna, Title V was a deliberate capacity-building strategy that furthered 
federal interest in education.     
 Although lacking the authority to enforce the law, the federal government’s 
program brought focus to concerns that were being neglected at the local level 
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(Sunderman, 2009).  For the first time, there was widespread attention on addressing the 
needs of particular students; this focus was unique to the federal government and 
something lacking in the states (McDonnell, 2005).   New roles for the different levels of 
government were established.  The federal role in the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act was to give money to schools for specific groups of students.  The state’s 
role was to spend the money, at their discretion, provided it targeted disadvantaged 
students.  Most often, states left these decisions to local districts with the state education 
agency acting as the moral enforcer (McDonnell, 2005).   
 
States’ Efforts 
 The contemporary role of the state in education policymaking and implementation 
emerged over several decades.  Although at one time, such decisions were left to 
educators, concerns about a state’s economy coupled with pressure from the business 
community to reform education gave way to a new regime in education reform (Fusarelli, 
2005; Gittell & McKenna, 1999).  Governors and state legislators, and in some cases 
chief state school officers, emerged as the main forces shaping education policy, with 
state boards of education and departments of education assuming secondary roles (Brady, 
2009; Fuhrman, 1987; Mazzoni, 1994).  Several factors coalesced to bring about these 
changes in the early 1980s. 
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Educators to politicians 
 Although previously the business of education was left to educators (Timar, 
1997), concerns over special interests and demands about collective bargaining 
subsequently fragmented the power of educators (Fuhrman, 1987).  In the 1970s, two 
more events further shifted authority of governance from educators to elected leaders.  
First, state departments of education began to focus more on monitoring compliance of 
federal programs and less on matters of curriculum, thus diminishing their involvement in 
state policymaking (Timar, 1997).  Their role was further curtailed in the early 1980s 
when cuts in federal spending necessitated reductions in staff (Fuhrman, 1987).   
Second, states began to address school finance reform.  The 1970s were 
characterized by school finance litigation as districts were forced to address the 
inequitable distribution of resources to schools (Manna, 2006).  School finance was the 
one area in education where governors and legislators had a history of involvement, and 
their leadership in this area was a natural product of previous participation (Fuhrman, 
1987).  The rise in gubernatorial and legislative interest in education was furthered by 
growing concerns over the economy and led to the promotion of state policies concerning 
curriculum, graduation requirements and teacher quality (Brown, 2008; Fuhrman, 1987; 
Fusarelli, 2005; Vergari, 2009).  A final contributing factor to this shift was the political 
behavior of educators.  Teacher and principal interest groups tended to be reactive rather 
than proactive (Fuhrman, 1997).  This stance distanced them from the policymaking 
process, unintentionally ceding power to the state.    
 
  23   
 
 
Pressure to change 
    State leaders turned their attention to education in the 1970s in part because they 
recognized the implications it had for economic development (Timpane & McNeill, 
1991).  Concerns about providing high quality education in order to attract newcomers to 
the state and to prevent talented people from seeking employment elsewhere led states to 
assume a more aggressive role in education governance (Furhman, 1987, McDermott, 
2009, Ravitch, 1995).   Although education finance dominated the policy agenda, the 
early stages of the accountability movement began to emerge, with a focus on statewide 
assessments (Mazzoni, 1994).   
 This increase in state activity was bolstered by other national dynamics.  The 
1983 publication of A Nation at Risk galvanized public attention and raised concerns 
about school systems nationwide at the same time that President Reagan called for a 
decrease in federal involvement – both fiscally and programmatically - in education 
policy (Sunderman, 2009).  Instead, the administration utilized the bully pulpit to incite 
and exhort states to action through seemingly easy policy solutions (Mazzoni, 1994; 
McDonnell & Fuhrman, 1986). 
  Increased activity in education reform across states did not imply uniformity in 
policymaking (Fuhrman, 1989).  As states responded to their own contexts, regional, 
rather than national, characteristics emerged (Mazzoni, 1994).  Particularly salient to this 
study, Southern states championed some of the earliest efforts (Pipho, 1986).  Three 
contextual conditions contributed to the South’s foray into education accountability: 
economic implications for weak school systems (Timpane & McNeill, 1991); a desire to 
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change its underachiever reputation (Vold & DeVitis, 1991); and a conservative 
predilection for states’ rights and little tolerance for federal interference (Mazzoni, 1994).  
Reforms in these states were expedited by favorable fiscal conditions (compared to other 
parts of the country) (Mazzoni & Sullivan, 1986) and policy diffusion, including the 
Southern Regional Education Board forum for exchanging ideas, (Mazzoni, 1994).   
By the late 1980s and the early 1990s, in response to public concern and as 
education consumed a larger portion of states’ budgets, governors became even more 
enmeshed in the politics of education (Mazzoni, 1994; McDonnell, 2009).  In 1989 
governors convened in Charlottesville, Virginia for an education summit.  One of the 
meeting’s leaders was then-governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton.  The outcome of this 
meeting was a set of national goals intended as a framework to help states develop their 
own standards (Tirozzi & Uro, 1997).  Another important outcome of the meeting was 
the agreement that education governance should remain state-led, but also an 
acknowledgement of the importance of the federal role in funding education (Tirozzi & 
Uro, 1997).  Changes in education policy undertaken by individual states and the work of 
the governors at the summit are contributing factors to the federal government’s foray 
into accountability-based policies applied across the nation (Wong & Sunderman, 2007).   
 
Accountability through Mandates 
Education reform during the 1990s is characterized by the standards movement 
and initial forays into school choice policy (Manna, 2006).  During this time, then-
President Bill Clinton reauthorized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act to 
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reflect state efforts.  Although these changes represented the first time the federal 
government attempted to introduce accountability into the schools, it was a direct 
outgrowth from the work being done in the states.  The intention was to further this work, 
not disregard it.   
Yet a variety of challenges resulted in the implementation and enforcement of 
Clinton’s Improving America’s Schools Act being described as “uneven” and “relatively 
weak” (Debray, 2003: p. 58). Seven years after Improving America’s Schools Act passed, 
many states still did not have standards and assessments for all students, and only 21 
states were in compliance with the single accountability system; the rest still held Title I 
students to different standards (Debray, 2003; Goertz, 2005).  Nevertheless, it is 
important to keep in mind that states’ lack of compliance was not so much defiance as 
perhaps a reflection of an unintended consequence of Improving America’s Schools 
Act’s attempt to build upon state policy initiatives (McDonnell, 2009).  Amending 
current policies to adhere to federal requirements presented different challenges than 
establishing new ones.  Finally, variability in state capacity was also an issue 
(McDonnell, 2009).  No Child Left Behind attempted to tackle the challenges Improving 
America’s Schools Act encountered. 
 
Shifting focus 
 An important distinction of No Child Left Behind from previous reauthorizations 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act is the lack of collaboration the federal 
government sought from the states in developing the law.  No Child Left Behind was a 
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clear expansion of federal involvement in and marginalization of state control over 
education (Sunderman, 2009).  It is precisely this lack of cooperation between the two 
levels of government that led to implementation challenges.  While No Child Left Behind 
enjoyed public support, the public was not charged with the task of implementing the law 
(Debray-Pelot & McGuinn, 2009).  In his careful analysis of the challenges No Child Left 
Behind presented, Manna (2011) argues that while No Child Left Behind needed to be 
tougher than previous reauthorizations, it simultaneously weakened federal authority and 
increased variability across the states by continuing to give so much power to the states.  
Furthermore, the practice of establishing broad mandates at the federal level but leaving 
the substantive decisions up to the states reversed the principal-agent theory (Manna, 
2011).  As a result, the federal government’s role was relegated to administrative 
oversight rather than making fundamental changes (Manna, 2011).   
In her work examining the implementation of No Child Left Behind, Goertz 
(2005), concludes that the success of No Child Left Behind is dependent upon the will 
and capacity of states, with many states lacking the necessary resources to implement all 
the provisions of the law.  In particular, fiscal and human capacities were deficient in 
many states (Goertz, 2005).  Another implementation study concluded that while states 
have made progress in the development of standards and assessments, they must work to 
increase capacity to meet the demands of No Child Left Behind (Wanker & Christie, 
2005).  No Child Left Behind has been criticized for being an unfunded mandate by 
governors decrying the burden implementation imposes on their states (Wong & 
Sunderman, 2007).  In short, it has increased the tension between the federal and state 
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governments, contributing negative, rather than positive, feedback to the system (Manna, 
2006).   
 
Changes to the policy game 
 Unlike earlier federal policies, Race to the Top is not a mandate; rather it is an 
administrative initiative of President Obama that distributes money to states and schools 
through a voluntary competition.  However, like previous federal education programs, if 
states want funding, they must comply with stipulations.  Although extrinsically 
motivated like No Child Left Behind, Race to the Top offers rewards rather than 
sanctions.  A lengthier discussion of the components of Race to the Top is presented in 
Chapter I.  Here, I confine the description of Race to the Top to the way it redefines the 
relationship between the federal and state levels of government.   
 The development of Race to the Top as a voluntary program can be interpreted as 
an attempt to correct for previous reforms’ shortcomings.  Improving America’s Schools 
Act had the support of governors and business leaders (Wong & Sunderman, 2007), but 
lacked the muscle to enforce its requirements. No Child Left Behind did not seek states’ 
cooperation and applied coercive tactics to enforce compliance, which resulted in high 
levels of criticism from state education policymakers, interest groups, and teachers.  Race 
to the Top adopts a middle of the road approach.  The program is voluntary, but there are 
clear stipulations that states must accept if they want to receive money.  Perhaps most 
notable of all was the requirement that different education stakeholders commit to 
supporting the state’s plan.  The Race to the Top application asked for signatures from 
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school superintendents, school board members, and teachers’ unions indicating their 
cooperation.   
 Race to the Top also changes the politics of education by expanding the 
participants involved in the process. Tracing the history of participants in education 
reform from the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Debray-Pelot 
& McGuinn (2009), conclude that reform efforts have redefined the roles of participants, 
sometimes curtailing previous influence while at other times uniting disparate groups.  If 
the 1980s saw the rising influence of governors in education (Fusarelli, 2005; 
McDermott, 2009) and the 1990s are marked by business leaders’ involvement (Cibulka, 
2001), then Race to the Top gives evidence of the growing influence of private citizens 
(Spring, 2011).  We observe this phenomenon in both the expansion of charter schools 
promoted in Race to the Top’s criteria as well as the involvement of private foundations 
in education.  For example, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation offered $250,000 in 
grants to state education departments to assist them in writing the Race to the Top 
application (Quaid & Blakenship, 2009).  With the introduction of the influence of 
private citizens in education governance, the politics of education are once again 
redefined.  We have come a long way from the days when political leaders felt the 
business of education was best left to educators (McDermott, 2009). 
 
State Leaders in Education 
 To better understand the complexity of the challenges confronting states I 
consider the roles of various state level education stakeholders.  In particular, I examine 
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the variation that exists among the states in how individuals come to hold such positions, 
the scope of their job, and how these factors in turn influence educational governance.    
  
Primary actors 
 The role of governors and legislators as predominant actors in education 
policymaking is clear when one considers that in the past 20 years, “state legislatures 
across the United States have passed thousands of education-related bills, numerous state 
commissions on education were created, and state gubernatorial education plans were 
promulgated,” (Brady, 2009, p. 178).  Governors have built coalitions with the business 
community to advance education policy, ranging from the standards movement in the 
1980s to market-based solutions in the 1990s (Gittell & McKenna, 1999; McDermott, 
2009).  In state legislatures, the establishment of committees helped foster expertise in 
education policy among its members (Rosenthal & Fuhrman, 1981).  Although their work 
on education policy is often done in accord with one another, governors and legislators 
have also encountered contentious battles (Brown, 2008; Gittell & McKenna, 1999).   
 
Other roles 
 In addition to governors and legislators, chief state school officers (CSSO), the 
state education agency and the state board of education all participate in education 
policymaking.  The CSSO in most states serves as the executive officer of the state board 
of education and the head of the state education agency.  Just over three-fifths of CSSOs 
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are appointed, most by the state board of education, but in five states, directly by the 
governor.  CSSOs in the remaining 19 states are elected.   Despite their dual role of 
working with both the legislative body and state board of education, there is not a 
systematic relationship in terms of the degree of influence the CSSO has with these two 
groups (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976).  The state education agency (state department of 
education) is responsible for enforcing federal and state policies and providing resources, 
including technical assistance, and information to the public schools.  Finally, the state 
board of education is responsible for governing and policymaking in the public system.  
In fact, Brady (2009) considers members of the state board to be the most important for 
promoting equitable educational policies because of the diversity of voices they 
represent.  However, early research on the influence the state board has in the education 
policymaking process concluded that members were “minor participants,” (Campbell & 
Mazzoni, 1976, p. 74).     
 
Tennessee leaders 
 In Tennessee, the CSSO (called the commissioner of education), and members of 
the state board of education are all appointed by the governor.  The commissioner of 
education is the executive officer of the state department of education and a member of 
the governor’s cabinet.  The individual who holds this position is responsible for 
implementing, administering, and enforcing laws and policies for public education.  
Unlike the commissioner, who serves at the discretion of the governor, members of the 
state board of education in Tennessee serve a nine-year term.  The state board is 
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comprised of nine members, one from each of Tennessee’s congressional districts.  It 
works with both the legislature and department of education.       
 The multitude of actors who participate in state policymaking for education and 
the variability surrounding their role precludes uniformity across the states.  It can also 
provoke conflict within a state as officials negotiate their authority.  To facilitate our 
understanding of these dynamics, scholarship on the politics and policies of education is 
often advanced through the lens of political science frameworks.  In the next section, I 
present a rationale for using such frameworks in this education research. In addition to 
describing how scholars apply these lenses to their work, I provide a comprehensive 
description of the two frameworks I apply in my dissertation: Mazzoni’s (1991) Arena 
Models and McDonnell’s (2009) Policy Feedback. 
 
Political Science Frameworks and Education Policy and Politics 
 The policymaking process is complex because of the number of actors, levels of 
government, prolonged time span, and quantity of proposals involved (Sabatier, 2007).  
Further, it encompasses identifying problems, proposing alternative solutions, and 
selecting and implementing a proposal (Kingdon, 1984).  An ad hoc approach to policy 
analysis is beset with flaws, the most serious of which is the inability to detect and 
correct errors (Sabatier, 2007).  Therefore, applying a scientific framework to politics and 
policy research provides a lens for analyzing this process in a focused and disciplined 
manner.  Moreover, applying multiple frameworks to current and historical events 
develops clarity through comparisons with competing ideas (Sabatier, 2007; Allison, 
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2005).  Despite the availability of such tools, current research in education is criticized 
for failing to attend to questions about what drives policy, concentrating instead on 
whether or not the policy works (Fowler, 2006; Hochschild, 2004).  Yet, the importance 
of explicating political contexts and contributing to theory should not be underestimated 
(Cohen-Vogel & McLendon, 2009).   
  
Frameworks Applied 
 Because of the general applicability of theory in qualitative research and the 
specific relevance of political science frameworks to this research, Mazzoni’s (1991) 
arena model and McDonnell’s (2009) policy feedback theory undergird this study. 
Mazzoni’s arena model was specifically developed to understand the state-level 
policymaking process, while the politics created by policies, and the impact these politics 
have on subsequent policies, is the subject of McDonnell’s policy feedback.  The first 
part of this study explores the policymaking process that occurred in the state legislature.  
Mazzoni’s model is particularly relevant because it examines the influence of the site, or 
arena, in policymaking.  The recent education reform legislation passed in Tennessee 
presents an opportunity to study this influence on legislation proposed by the governor in 
response to a federal competition that gained overwhelming support in both the House 
and Senate.  The second part of this study investigates the implementation of a specific 
aspect of the bill: policy recommendations for a statewide annual evaluation system of 
educators.  Policy feedback permits me to analyze the politics that emerged during this 
process (McDonnell, 2009).  These models are more fully explained in the next section.   
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Mazzoni’s Arena Model 
 
Arena defined 
The arena model, like Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams, examines how actors 
and ideologies vie for attention in the agenda-setting process, and expands to analyze the 
contextual influence specific sites have in provoking major policy change (Bastedo, 
2007; Mazzoni, 1991).  Mazzoni (1991) draws on case studies of state-level education 
policymaking and previous literature to hypothesize a framework for addressing “how” 
questions in policy development and transformation.  Central to this model is the role of 
the site, or arena, where policy decisions occur.  Mazzoni describes an arena as “…a 
middle-range term, referring to the political interactions characterizing particular decision 
sites through which power is exercised to initiate, formulate, and enact public policy,” (p. 
116).  However, an arena is more than just the site of policymaking; it also identifies 
relevant actors, defines the shared context, negotiates the availability and power of 
resources, and influences the mode of reaching consensus.  Further, Mazzoni (1991) 
stipulates that a change in arenas is highly likely to affect the outcome of a policy 
initiative.   
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Initial arenas 
 Mazzoni’s (1991) hypothesized model identifies two arenas for policymaking: 
subsystem and macro.  The subsystem arena is dominated by small groups of legislative 
committee members, agency bureaucrats, and interest groups.  The emergence of an iron 
triangle is not uncommon in the subsystem arena.  The subsystem is usually concerned 
with representing the interests of stakeholders, particularly those with resources.  When 
conflicts arise in the subsystem, they are usually short-term and resolved through orderly 
negotiations.  Low visibility of the subsystem to the public affords a degree of privacy 
prompting a “…predominant bias of the subsystem toward interests already represented 
at the bargaining table, interests accepted by lawmakers as having a legitimate and 
substantial claim to favorable treatment,” (Mazzoni, 1991, p. 117).  Participants in the 
subsystem have neither the motivation nor inclination to advocate for major change 
because it would disrupt the status quo where all participants are generally satisfied.  
Thus incremental changes where interests are accommodated are more likely.   
Because of the subsystem’s tendency toward accommodation, major policy 
change is necessarily located in another arena.  Mazzoni (1991) characterizes the macro 
arena as more visible and accessible to the public, but also distinguished by more strife.  
Actors in this arena include top-level elected officials – governors and legislative leaders 
– who proactively push their policy ideas along with mass media, opinion leaders, state 
officials, agency bureaucrats, policy entrepreneurs, interest groups, and grassroots 
networks.  Elected officials seek media attention to champion their position and mobilize 
support from stakeholders.  In the macro arena, in contrast to the more subdued 
subsystem, “(t)he frontstage appeal replaces the backstage deal; the evocative politics of 
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the theater replaces the pragmatic politics of the meeting room,” (Mazzoni, 1991, p. 117).  
When conflict intensifies, participants seek support from powerful allies to bolster their 
position, and the process becomes messy and disorganized.  It is this dynamic nature of 
the macro arena that enhances the likelihood of success for major change as careful 
negotiation gives way to direct confrontation and success depends on the power of the 
participants.  Mazzoni notes, however, that the concentrated energy required in the macro 
arena prevents its long-term sustainability.   
 
External factors 
The initial arena model identifies two factors that instigate a shift in policymaking 
from the subsystem to macro arena: external pressure and the availability of revenue.  
Mazzoni (1991) draws from Kingdon’s (1984) explanation of how an issue becomes a 
problem as well as the important role of policy entrepreneurs to this process.  External 
pressure to change could include organized interest groups, public attitude/mood, media 
attention, and major events.  Policy entrepreneurs advocate positions, garner support, 
attract attention and offer solutions to problems.  Their actions promote a softening of the 
system’s resistance to change.   
In addition to external pressure, the availability of new revenue is also an 
important motivating factor for major policy change.  It is even possible that elected 
officials would initiate such change without public demand when confronted with 
unanticipated resources.  While Mazzoni (1991) allows that increased revenue without 
public pressure could result in change within a subsystem arena, more likely, “… (i)f 
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however, outside pressures for change are powerful, then abundant revenues do facilitate 
nonincremental, redistributive policies,” in the macro arena (p. 118).  Yet, even here, 
Mazzoni cautions, if the battle is ideological, rather than material, opponents are not 
likely to be persuaded by increased revenue because losing means giving up moral 
ground. 
 
Arenas revised 
Based on findings from a study of school choice in Minnesota, Mazzoni (1991) 
revised his hypothesized model to include the enhanced role of elites and leaders in 
instigating policy innovation, and added two additional arenas.  Mazzoni’s revised model 
gives greater consideration to the important role of organized elites in imposing pressure 
on the system to change.  These elites, members of business, policy, and civic 
organizations, have both the resources and access necessary to make their demands heard 
and encourage change.  Also absent from the initial model is the critical role of proactive 
leadership at the top level (e.g. governor).  This leadership is essential in mobilizing mass 
public support for implementing policies.  Policymakers can establish reforms, but will 
need support to successfully implement them.  A proactive leader fulfills this role.  
Mazzoni also noted the presence of two additional arenas. 
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Commission arena 
The commission arena is comprised of appointed members who represent broad 
interests.  In the case of Minnesota, the governor appointed a commission when the 
debate over school choice became too contentious and progress stalled (Mazzoni, 1991).  
In the commission arena participants work to legitimize, expand, and revise policy 
proposals that originate in the macro arena. The goal in the commission arena is 
consensus among all actors, and persuasion is the most common bargaining tool.  This 
process is mostly orderly, yet still unpredictable because power must be distributed 
among participants.  The commission arena enjoys a mid-range level of visibility with 
some media coverage and attention from the general public, but typically it is not closely 
scrutinized by these groups.  However, interested stakeholders can monitor the 
commission’s actions more carefully if they choose.  In this arena, major changes are 
likely to be discussed, but not recommended.  More likely are recommendations that 
reflect the most basic level of consensus among such a diverse group of participants 
(Mazzoni, 1991). 
 
Leadership arena 
The final arena of state-level policymaking is the leadership arena.  This site is 
characterized by interaction among top-level elected officials and between these officials 
and the private groups who influence them.  When appropriate, subsystem participants, 
such as committee chairs, may participate in the leadership arena as well.  The success of 
major policy change in this arena depends on: unity among participants; commitment of 
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resources to proposed policy change; lack of visibility to general public; and shaky 
opposition from groups and constituents (Mazzoni, 1991).  While some of the 
participants in the leadership arena can also participate in the macro arena, the rules of 
engagement are different.  Where the macro arena is more open and contentious with 
higher degrees of chaos and visibility, membership in the leadership arena is more 
restricted, and the more orderly negotiations take place behind closed doors out of public 
view.   
 
Policy innovation in the arenas 
The revised model considers the conditions that affect the likelihood of major 
change occurring in each of the four arenas (Mazzoni, 1991).  The subsystem is unlikely 
to produce major policy change because of the pre-existing relationships and rules of 
engagement which favor political niceties.  The macro arena is threatened by the very 
forces that ignite it: a highly visible increase in competing demands resulting in 
gridlocked decision-making.  The commission arena can move beyond this impasse but is 
still unlikely to enact innovation because of the diverse positions members represent.  
According to the Minnesota study, the leadership arena is the most likely setting for 
major policymaking – both in initiating legislation and ensuring its passage (Mazzoni, 
1991).   
Mazzoni attributes this to the bargaining chips top-level elected officials possess, 
including: party backing, larger staff, the ability to make political appointments, access to 
media attention, political savvy developed through experience, and accumulated political 
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favors.  These advantages position leaders with “…the knowledge of, access to, and 
authority over the procedures, rules, and institutions that govern the workflow in 
legislative policymaking.  They can – and often do – structure this workflow in ways that 
assist friends and confound foes,” (Mazzoni, 1991, p. 130).   
However, Mazzoni (1991) also identifies several conditions with the potential for 
dismantling the leadership arena.  Fragmentation of the system, high political costs 
associated with policy proposals, and the increased numbers of interest groups all 
threaten policy innovation in the leadership arena.  Also noteworthy are the probable 
implementation problems which arise from innovation in the leadership arena.  The 
closed nature of this context violates expectations for participatory decision-making and 
can result in a lack of support from the wider community, and more worrisome, lack of 
commitment among those who must carry out the policy (Mazzoni, 1991). 
 
Arenas revisited 
A case study of Ohio’s innovative education reform process provided an 
opportunity to test Mazzoni’s initial and revised arena model (Fowler, 1994).  Ohio’s 
non-incremental policy change addressed student assignment plans and school choice.  
Fowler (1994) interviewed twenty state policymakers and analyzed related documents.  
She found little evidence of a shift from the subsystem to macro arena primarily due to 
the lack of external pressure from the media and public opinion (Fowler, 1994).  Instead, 
she finds the governor’s promotion of policy to be proactive, driven by his own agenda, 
rather than reactive to external pressure (Fowler, 1994).  Yet even the governor’s 
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courting of the media to promote his proposal did not cause constituents to mobilize, 
either in support or opposition, another indicator of the “inert” role of the macro arena in 
Ohio (Fowler, 1994, p. 341).   
Following the examination of the macro arena, Fowler (1994) turns her attention 
to evidence of the commission arena.  Interviews and news articles identified the 
presence of three commissions during Ohio’s school choice policy initiative period.  
Although some of the commissions’ recommendations subsequently appeared in the 
legislation, Fowler suggests that rather than providing evidence in support of the arena 
model, the formation of three commissions reflects divisions within state leadership.  
Fowler also proposes that the commission arena was not entirely divorced from the 
leadership arena, as Mazzoni’s (1991) model indicates.  Further, the study reveals the 
lack of consideration given to commission reports, as well as friction among commission 
participants (Fowler, 1994).  This friction is particularly interesting given Mazzoni’s 
(1991) characterization of the commission as consensus-seeking.   
Mazzoni’s (1991) criteria for innovation in the leadership arena (unity, 
commitment of resources, low visibility, and weak opposition) were all met in the Ohio 
study (Fowler, 1994).  Additionally, interview subjects consistently identified top leaders 
(members of the leadership arena) as instrumental in bringing about reform (Fowler, 
1994).  However, Fowler also notes two conditions in Ohio not identified by Mazzoni: 
external pressure from national-level actors and the presence of the business elite within 
the leadership arena.  While Mazzoni’s revised model notes the importance of organized 
elites, including business organizations, he identifies them as external pressure points.   
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Fowler (1994) concludes that Ohio’s education policy innovation reflects a 
moderate fit to Mazzoni’s (1991) revised arena model because it did predict a shift to the 
commission and leadership arenas and policy innovation ultimately occurred in the 
leadership arena, but she also offers several critiques.  First, Fowler rejects the 
assumption of the commission’s independence from the leadership arena and challenges 
their ability to achieve consensus.  Second, Fowler calls for an expansion of the 
leadership arena to include business elites and consideration of national level pressure for 
change.  Finally, despite Mazzoni’s certainty of the essential role new revenue plays in 
bringing about policy innovation, the legislation in Ohio passed without budgetary 
concerns (Fowler, 1994).   
 
Arenas in Tennessee 
Applying Mazzoni’s (1991) arena model provides a lens for understanding how 
the Tennessee legislative process regarding Race to the Top unfolded and to explore the 
generalizability of an education policymaking framework.  This theory offers the most 
comprehensive perspective for understanding the state-level policymaking process, 
including the individuals involved and both agenda-setting and subsequent policy change.  
I interviewed state policymakers and education stakeholders about their perception of and 
participation in the process of passing the bill.  Mazzoni’s revised arena model will 
scaffold my analysis, allowing me to consider the actors, bargaining strategies, and level 
of visibility present during the policy innovation process.  This study also provides an 
opportunity to extend our understanding of a theoretical framework in light of Mazzoni’s 
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revised model and Fowler’s critique.  Finally, this dissertation makes a contribution to the 
scholarship on state policymaking in education, an area criticized for being understudied 
(Mazzoni, 1994).  In the next section, I unpack McDonnell’s policy feedback model that I 
apply to the second half of this study.   
 
McDonnell’s Policy Feedback Theory 
 Policy feedback considers how policies create politics which, in turn, lead to new 
policies (McDonnell, 2009).  Typically, scholars approach this process by first 
considering the political factors that shape policy.  In contrast, policy feedback first 
addresses the politics that result from instigating policies (McDonnell, 2009).  
McDonnell does not dismiss this traditional approach, but argues that it is incomplete and 
that a policy feedback model provides additional insight into the politics of education.  
To apply this lens, research “…focuses analytical attention on the institutional structures 
and rules policies establish, the elite and public interpretation of those policies, the 
interests that are mobilized, and how these factors interact to shape future policies,” 
(McDonnell, 2009, p. 417).  McDonnell draws from the literature on historical 
institutional approaches to political science as well as mass political behavior to develop 
her theory.   
 Central to McDonnell’s (2009) model is an understanding that policies are both 
outputs of and inputs to the policy process.  In either case, policy innovation has the 
potential to create institutional arrangements and spur the mobilization of interest groups 
in support or opposition of the policy – both of which impact subsequent policy 
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development.  In particular, McDonnell advances this model as a way of understanding 
the dynamic between elites and the mass public and the role of democracy in education 
policymaking.  Ultimately, McDonnell defines policy feedback as “…applying 
knowledge of past policies and the politics they create to predict how they are likely to 
shape the next generation (p. 425). 
 
Instigating policy 
 To begin applying a policy feedback approach, one must unpack the 
characteristics of the instigating policy (McDonnell, 2009).  An analysis of these 
characteristics includes identifying the origins of the policy, whether the policy represents 
incremental or major change, the nature of the policy targets, and the type of policy 
instruments.  The answers to this analysis provide grounds for speculating about the 
politics that are likely to be generated.  For example, identifying the origins of the policy 
can imply whether the policy is likely to face challenges from other branches of 
government.  Further, classifying policy targets by policymakers’ perceptions of their 
value and the political power they possess can illuminate probable reactions from these 
groups or individuals (McDonnell, 2009; Schneider & Ingram, 1997).   
 
Institutional structures and rules 
 Following an examination of the policy characteristics, the analysis proceeds to 
focus on the institutional structures and rules that emerge (McDonnell, 2009).  A policy 
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can create new institutions or, alter or dismantle existing ones.  In this phase, the 
structures and capacities for governance are explored.  A policy can guide who 
participates, establish rules for decision-making, and allocate power and resources within 
an institutional establishment.  This component of policy feedback is situated between the 
policy characteristics that influence its structure and the mobilization it provokes.  
Understanding the structural rules encourages predictions about which individuals and 
groups might mobilize in support of, or opposition to, the policy.   
 Two branches flow from the analysis of the institutional structures and rules.  In 
the first, interpretive effects, McDonnell (2009) draws from Pierson’s (1993) concept that 
how institutions implement policies mediates an individual’s interpretation of them.  
Accordingly, “(i)nterpretive effects capture the impact of policies on political identity, 
learning, and trust,” (McDonnell, 2009, p. 419).  Interpretive effects focus on public 
opinion, both in general and specific to stakeholders.     
 The institutional structures combine with the public’s interpretation to mobilize 
interests.  The way in which institutions allocate resources, for example, can incentivize 
targets to organize.  Whether individuals perceive a policy as advantageous or not also 
influence their reaction.  Positive policy feedback can extend the shelf-life of a policy 
whereas negative feedback can curtail it (Hacker, 2004 in McDonnell, 2009 & Pierson, 
2000).  Finally, a policy can have differential effects because of the advantages and 
disadvantages it offers various groups.  McDonnell (2009) explains that mobilizations 
can occur “…at just the elite level or at both the elite and mass levels,” because of the 
inequalities it promotes (p. 420). 
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Provoking policies 
 All of these components – policy characteristics, institutional structures and rules, 
interpretive effects, and the differential mobilization of interests – provoke politics that 
then shape subsequent policies.  Policy feedback, as conceptualized by McDonnell 
(2009) is a relatively recent development in the political science tradition.  As such, 
McDonnell’s application of the model relies “…on extant research, much of which was 
not conducted with the explicit purpose of discerning what kinds of politics each policy 
has produced,” (p. 418).  The application of policy feedback in this study makes an initial 
contribution to McDonnell’s call for developing a research agenda that concentrates on 
the politics policies provoke.   
 
Research Questions 
This dissertation focuses on two distinct parts of the policy process in Tennessee 
and steps to win and then implement Race to the Top.  First, I explore the sequence of 
events, including the Special Session in the General Assembly that occurred when 
Tennessee decided to enter the competition.  I interview key actors, including policy 
advisors to the governor, state legislators, and Tennessee Education Association (TEA) 
officials about the comprehensive legislation they passed in 2010 in an effort to secure 
Tennessee’s chances of winning Race to the Top.   
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This phase of the study draws from Mazzoni’s (1991) arena models to consider 
the political environment surrounding the legislation, paying particular attention to why 
the bill was considered instrumental in Tennessee’s bid and how political leaders 
garnered support for it.  Importantly, I also include an historical account of recent 
education reform in the state that suggested the state was well poised to win.  In addition 
to examining the policymaking process, this phase of the study examines the parallels 
between the Race to the Top application guidelines, Tennessee’s education reform 
initiatives, and Tennessee’s plan for continued improvement outlined in their Race to the 
Top application.  The research questions guiding this component of the study are: 
1) How did Race to the Top evolve politically in Tennessee in 2010? 
a. What external forces opened a window for widespread change in 
education policy?  
b. How did the political arena contribute to the bill passing? 
The next part of the study considers the state’s efforts to enact the legislation.  I 
focus on one particular aspect of the 2010 legislation: the annual evaluation of teachers 
and principals.  The legislation established an advisory committee charged with the task 
of developing and recommending policy for the new system, including the use of student 
achievement data.  The committee began meeting in March 2010, and state-wide 
implementation of the system was set to occur during the 2011-2012 school year.  To 
understand how this new policy was developed, I interview committee members and 
analyze pertinent documents, including the agendas and minutes from the meetings and 
the proposals and guidelines produced from their work.  In this part of the study I use 
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policy feedback (McDonnell, 2009) to examine how the characteristics of the legislation 
and the perspectives of the participants shaped the policy recommendations.   
The research questions guiding this component of the study are: 
2) How did the Teacher Evaluation Advisory Committee work to implement the 
Tennessee legislation concerning annual educator evaluations?  
a. How did the policy characteristics of the legislation influence the political 
dynamics of the Teacher Evaluation Advisory Committee?   
b.  How did the institutional structures and rules of the committee impact the 
process of recommending guidelines for the educator evaluation system? 
 
Significance of the Study 
This study brings together three bodies of literature to investigate connections 
among policymaking in a federalist system, the political context of education reform, and 
current trends in education policy change, including emerging actors in the policymaking 
process.  In particular, it extends our understanding of state level education 
policymaking.  The extant literature frequently addresses education policy change 
initiated at the federal level, but studies of state-led reform are less frequent.  Studies of 
state-led reform efforts and initiatives are important because, in shaping education policy, 
they tend to reflect the nation’s preference for local control in education more than 
federal policymaking.  While tensions between the state and individual districts do exist, 
these may be substantially less pervasive than the tensions between federal and local 
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levels, as the state is in a better position to anticipate and respond to context-specific 
needs.   
 
Current context 
The Race to the Top program represents a new policy lever in education by 
creating a competition among states to produce the most ambitious reform plans.  Unlike 
previous federal mandates, notably No Child Left Behind which has been criticized for 
encouraging states to establish minimum requirements, Race to the Top had the opposite 
effect: States pushed the limit for policy change within their state in an effort to win 
federal dollars.  It is likely that states’ haste to amend policies before the application 
deadline was exacerbated by the tough economic conditions facing the nation.  Yet, 
money alone cannot explain the willingness of so many states to commit to such 
ambitious plans.  Thus, this study provides an expanded explanation for the political 
conditions that facilitated these changes.   
For the first time since Title V in the original Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act gave money to states to strengthen state education agencies, the federal 
government, through the Race to the Top program, invests heavily in developing states’ 
capacity to reform education.  This program offers states the opportunity to continue the 
work they have already initiated on education reform while simultaneously guiding the 
direction of these efforts toward specific focal areas.  The result is increased state 
capacity to support education policy change, but also more standardization across the 
states.  This study offers a close examination of the process in one state and lays the 
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foundation for future research to compare Tennessee’s process with similar changes in 
other states.   
 
Tennessee leading the way 
Southern states have historically been at a disadvantage in education, and 
Tennessee is no exception.  Improving outcomes for students has important implications 
both economically and for civil rights. Therefore, a close examination of what Tennessee 
is doing to improve its education system is both timely and relevant to the current 
discourse in education.  As we seek to understand the policy changes surrounding Race to 
the Top, it is also important to consider other recent changes in the state’s education 
system that positioned Tennessee as a front-runner and eventual winner of the 
competition.  This understanding can forecast the necessary conditions for future policy 
change. 
Legislative changes made to enhance the state’s likelihood of winning do not stop 
after the vote is tallied.  Even before Tennessee was declared one of two first round 
winners, work had already begun to put the policy into practice, or at least to formulate 
the policy that would become practice.  The most significant change in Tennessee 
legislation was the requirement of annual evaluations for all teachers and principals.  
Further, the Race to the Top guidelines stipulated that a major portion of the evaluation 
must come from student achievement data.  Many other states also passed similar laws, 
but Tennessee was the first to implement the policy on a statewide scale.  This policy 
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represents a major change in education and threatens what teachers have come to expect 
– tenure, autonomy, and a “close the door” mentality.   
Interestingly, in Tennessee, a committee of educators, legislators, and members of 
the business community came together to make recommendations for the new system.  
This too, was unusual.  Not just because the group included non-educators, but because, it 
is the State Board of Education which makes policy recommendations in Tennessee.  
Policy development by volunteer stakeholders is a new landscape, and it introduces new 
actors to the policymaking process.  This study explores this dynamic and pays particular 
attention to the roles of the individual members and the interests they represented.   
 
Policy innovation explained 
This study presents an examination of rapid, fully supported policy change in one 
state, including a description of how non-traditional actors developed policy.  It considers 
the shifting role of the TEA, the importance of political leaders in negotiating tough 
legislative changes, the emergence of new participants in the policymaking process, and 
the role of a popular governor in the waning days of his administration.  This dissertation 
investigates how democracy worked, including the factors that coalesced to set an 
agenda, and also initial implementation efforts.  It offers both a broad picture of the 
policy process and a close examination of one aspect of the legislation.  Together, these 
components provide a detailed description of recent policymaking in Tennessee, a state 
that hopes to become a national leader in education.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 The research methodology employed for this dissertation is detailed in this 
chapter.  To begin, I present a rationale for the selection of a case study design.  
Thereafter, I explicate the methodology, including the specific research questions the 
study sought to answer, data sources and sample selection, and interview procedures.  I 
then detail my analytic strategy and conclude the chapter with a discussion of the 
strategies employed to ensure validity and reliability.   
 
Rationale 
A case study is appropriate to this dissertation because it “investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident,” (Yin, 2009, p. 18).  
Further, this form of empirical inquiry benefits from prior development of a theoretical 
framework to guide data collection and analyses with a goal of expanding our 
understanding of how and why phenomena occur (Yin, 2009).  To accomplish, this, it is 
essential to triangulate multiple sources of data (Yin, 2009).   
This dissertation employed qualitative methods in the form of interviews and 
document analyses to understand the events surrounding the Race to the Top education 
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reform legislation and implementation in Tennessee.  Corbin and Strauss (2008) explain 
the suitability of qualitative methods when attempting to understand and explain events 
because, “(t)he world is very complex.  There are no simple explanations for things.  
Rather, events are the result of multiple factors coming together and interacting in 
complex and often unanticipated ways,” (p.8).  As a result of this complexity, qualitative 
researchers must, 
…try to obtain multiple perspectives on events…We realize that, to understand 
experience, that experience must be located within and can’t be divorced from the 
larger events in a social, political, cultural, racial, gender-related, informational, 
and technological framework and therefore these are essential aspects of our 
analyses, (p. 8).  
 
The case study approach and qualitative methods applied in this study are complimented 
by an emergent strategy that allows for agility in design as the study progresses.   
 A case study embraces an emergent, rather than a priori, design because “… it is 
inconceivable that enough could be known ahead of time about the multiple realities to 
devise the design adequately,” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 41).  This flexibility 
underscores the intention of the study conducted here to capture unanticipated 
phenomena of state-level education policymaking that surface during data collection.  By 
employing an emergent design in a naturalistic setting, my methodological approach 
supports the overall goal of this study to understand a process embedded in its context. 
In summary, qualitative studies allow for more extensive and in-depth 
descriptions of a contemporary phenomenon, concentrate on “how” and “why” questions, 
and are well-suited for multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2009).  This is perhaps best 
articulated by Corbin and Strauss (2008) who write that among the many reasons to 
  53   
 
 
employ qualitative methods “…perhaps the most important is the desire to step beyond 
the known and enter in to the world of participants, to see the world from their 
perspective and in doing so make discoveries that will contribute to the development of 
empirical knowledge,” (p. 16). 
 
Research Questions 
 My dissertation is an analysis of state policy changed in preparation for entry in 
the Race to the Top competition and explores the initial development of specific elements 
of the corresponding legislation.  To accomplish this I focused on two main phases of the 
process: the education reform bill passed in 2010 in an effort to win Race to the Top, and 
work of the Teacher Evaluator Advisory Committee established to develop an evaluation 
system for educators, as stipulated by the legislation.  This two-pronged approach permits 
an analysis of both the policy formulation process as well as the enactment phase.  The 
overarching research question for the first phase is: 
1) How did Race to the Top evolve politically in Tennessee in 2010? 
Two sub-questions lend further shape to the analysis of the policy formulation phase: 
a) What external forces opened a window for widespread change in education 
policy? 
b) How did the political arena contribute to the bill passing? 
In the second part of this study, I examined the initial enactment process of a key 
component of the education reform legislation: the development of policy 
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recommendations for a statewide educator evaluation system linked to student 
achievement data.  To understand this process, I asked: 
2) How did the Teacher Evaluation Advisory Committee work to implement the 
Tennessee legislation regarding annual educator evaluations? 
a. How did the policy characteristics of the legislation influence the political 
dynamics of the Teacher Evaluation Advisory Committee? 
b. How did the institutional structures and rules of the committee impact the 
process of recommending guidelines for the educator evaluation system?   
The subsequent sections detail the data sources and sample selection for each part of the 
dissertation and the interview procedures I followed. 
 
Data Sources and Sample Selection 
 
Part I 
 Two data sources supported each segment of this study.  The cornerstone of each 
data collection component is participant interviews, supplemented with archival 
document analysis.  Interview participants were purposefully selected to ensure that they 
were knowledgeable, willing to talk, and represented a range of perspectives (Rubin, & 
Rubin, 2004).  However, as is also appropriate in an emergent design, I employed 
snowball sampling, a technique whereby participants refer other individuals relevant to 
  55   
 
 
my study.  Both of these approached allow me to reach saturation, the point “when all the 
concepts are well defined and explained,” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 145). 
To begin, I gathered primary source documents relevant to the legislative process 
including Race to the Top guidelines, the First to the Top legislation, Tennessee’s Race to 
the Top application, text from the governor’s speeches, and secondary sources such as 
news articles from The Tennessean and other media sources covering the events 
surrounding the Special Session.  Information in these documents initially served three 
purposes: to further my own knowledge about the topic, to inform the development of my 
protocol, and to allow me to identify key legislators.  Following this analysis, I conducted 
semi-structured interviews with a purposeful sample of 21 Tennessee state legislators in 
Spring 2010
2
.  Purposeful sampling, a hallmark of qualitative research, allows the 
researcher to select “information-rich cases for study in depth,” (Patton, 2002, p. 230).  
Table 2 (p. 56) presents an overview of my sample of legislators
3
. 
                                                          
2
 I requested interviews with 23 legislators; two declined to participate. 
3 These legislators included both key informants (e.g. the bill sponsors as well as some members of the 
Education committees in both the Senate and House) and members of the General Assembly who voted on 
the bill, but did not have specialized knowledge of education policy.  I conducted interviews with the 
Senate and House sponsor and co-sponsor.  Six additional interviews were conducted with members of the 
Education committees.  To ensure that I was hearing different perspectives, the remaining eleven 
participants voted on the bill, but did not play an active role writing and revising the bill, although all of 
them attended committee meetings and some asked questions or spoke against the bill during this time.  
In the second stage, I gave consideration toward balancing Democrats and Republicans and dividing 
interviews among Senators and Representatives in a way that reflected the distribution among the full 
legislature.  In total, I interviewed 11 Democrats and 10 Republicans.  To reflect the fact that the Senate 
represents one-third of the legislature, seven of my participants were Senators.  A final consideration was to 
ensure that I spoke with both supporters and opponents of the bill.  As the bill passed by an overwhelming 
majority in both the House and Senate, I oversampled dissenters; nearly one-third of my participants voted 
against the bill.  Since my intention was to focus on the legislative process, I do not think this 
overrepresentation compromises my analysis.   
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 In these initial interviews, legislators identified their colleagues and other 
policymakers who were instrumental in ensuring the successful passage of the First to the 
Top education reform bill.  In the fall of 2011, I conducted four follow-up interviews 
with legislators who held leadership roles in the General Assembly during this time as 
well as interviews with seven public employees who participated in Tennessee’s bid for 
Race to the Top.  The non-elected study participants (Table 3) represented four members 
of the governor’s staff, one Department of Education bureaucrat, and two officials from 
the TEA.  In total, I conducted interviews with 28 individuals for this component of the 
study.   
 
 
 
Table 2. Sample Description (Legislators)
Sample (n=21)
1
Total (n=132) %
Senators 7 33 21
Representatives 14 99 14
Education Committee Member - Senate 3 9 33
Education Committee Member - House 5 22 23
Vote - Yes 15 112 13
Vote - No 5 11 45
Vote - Abstained 1 1 100
Republicans 10 70 14
Democrats 11 62 18
Male 14 59 24
Female 7 15 47
1
 I requested interviews with 23 legislators; 2 declined to participate.  
Table 3. Sample Description (Public Employees)
Sample (n = 7)
Governor's staff (former) 4
Tennessee Department of Education 1
Tennessee Education Association 2
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Part II 
 The second part of the dissertation also relied on archival documents and 
participant interviews.  To begin, I gathered agendas and minutes from the Teacher 
Evaluation Advisory Committee (TEAC) meetings.  These documents are publicly 
available online. An initial examination of these documents informed the principal data 
component – interviews with committee members.    
 I contacted 16 members of the TEAC
4
.  Twelve members agreed to participate in 
my study.  Table 4 shows the classification of my sample. Of the two who declined to 
participate, one attended only 25% of the meetings, and the other expressed concern for 
jeopardizing her position if she participated.  Two members did not respond to repeated 
requests.  Interview participants identified the meeting facilitators as instrumental to the 
process.  I requested an interview with the primary facilitator, who consented, and thus I 
had a response rate of 76%.   
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 The legislation established a 15-member committee.  However, four individuals served in the role of 
Commissioner of Education during the TEAC’s term.  I interviewed two of the four commissioners.  The 
remaining two only held the position for one meeting, and thus are unlikely to provide much additional 
information.   
Table 4.  Sample Description (Teacher Evaluation Advisory Committee)
Sample (n = 13)
1
Educators 8
Legislators 1
Other Stakeholders 3
Facilitator 1
1
 I requested interviews with 17 individuals.
Two declined to participate; two did not respond.
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Interview Procedures 
  I applied a recruitment procedure of sending an initial introductory letter or email 
followed by a phone call.  Both for the convenience of the participants as well as the 
opportunity for the researcher to understand the political environment, legislator 
interviews were conducted on-site at the General Assembly.  Interviews with the 
remaining participants were a combination of in-person meetings and phone interviews, 
when distance necessitated such a forum or when requested by the participant.  With the 
participants’ permission, all interviews were audio-recorded. Interviews ranged in 
duration from 14 minutes to 65 minutes, with a typical interview lasting approximately 
half an hour.   
 I used a semi-structured interview protocol, asking informants to describe their 
role in and perceptions of either the legislative events surrounding the First to the Top bill 
or the work of the TEAC.  For example, I asked legislators “Why did you decide to vote 
yes (or no) on the proposed legislation?” and I asked committee members, “Was someone 
in charge of the meetings?”  (See Appendices B- E for copies of my interview protocols.)  
My protocols drew from the political science frameworks that scaffold this study as well 
as my analysis of relevant archival documents.  These instruments provided a flexible 
structure to my interviews and allowed me to pursue unanticipated subject areas that 
emerged during our conversation (Patton, 2002).  Interviews were recorded and 
transcribed verbatim. 
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My Role as a Researcher 
 Prior to conducting the interviews, I had never met any of the participants.  In my 
introductory script, I explained that I was conducting research for my dissertation.  At 
times during an interview I briefly described my background in education.  I found this 
particularly helpful when talking with educators because it established my credibility 
with the topics and built rapport with the participant.  However, I was mindful not to 
offer my opinion of the changes to education policy, and specifically, of the teacher 
evaluation system, in order to avoid compromising my objectivity.  While conducting 
interviews with legislators, I had the opportunity to observe the daily activities of the 
General Assembly, and I was also invited to sit on the floor of the House during one of its 
sessions.  This prolonged engagement enhanced my own knowledge of how the 
legislative branch operates in Tennessee. 
 
Analytic Strategy 
  In keeping with the fluid nature of qualitative research, data collection and 
analysis occurred simultaneously (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Patton, 2002).  This method 
permitted me to modify my protocol in response to emerging themes.  I took detailed 
field notes following each interview, paying attention to moments where participants 
echoed (or disputed) what others had said, or when they suggested a new line of inquiry.  
In preparation for data analysis, interviews were transcribed verbatim and all data were 
uploaded to NVIVO, a software program for analyzing qualitative data.  To capture my 
thoughts and decisions during data analysis, I utilized NVIVO’s memo feature.  These 
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memos documented my ideas: explaining why I created, expanded, or collapsed nodes; 
drawing connections between my data and my frameworks; and identifying additional 
sources to check for specific nodes.  In sum, the records I created during data collection 
and analysis, in conjunction with my data, establish an audit trail that an independent 
third party could use to determine the trustworthiness of my study (Erlandson, Harris, 
Skipper, & Allen, 1993).   
Since the data collection for this study involved two parts, I conducted separate 
analyses for policy formulation and implementation.  Data analysis blended grounded 
theory and theory-driven approaches (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Patton, 2002).  Race to the 
Top established a unique policy environment by engaging states in a cross-state 
competition responding to a request for proposals.  Because of this new direction in 
education policymaking, it was reasonable to expect that the frameworks examined in the 
previous chapter may not quite fit.  Rather than strictly adhering to Mazzoni’s (1991) 
arena model or McDonnell’s (2009) policy feedback, I used them to guide, not confine, 
my analysis.  This blended strategy mitigates bias (Yin, 2009).  Appendix F details my 
coding framework for themes that emerged during grounded theory and for themes 
derived from the literature.   
 Specifically, my initial coding procedure for each component applied grounded 
theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  Grounded theory allows categories and properties of 
categories to develop from the data rather than fitting data to pre-existing classifications 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  Emergent designs often utilize this 
approach because the multiple realities encountered are likely too vast for a priori theory 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  My initial analysis concentrated on this approach, adding codes 
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for motifs as they emerged.  For example, as I analyzed transcripts for the first part of this 
study, I developed nodes for the various factors that contributed to Tennessee’s decision 
to enter the Race to the Top competition.   
 However, Fowler (2006) promotes the utility of applying existing frameworks in 
qualitative research, particularly for novice researchers.  She contends frameworks help 
focus a study (Fowler, 2006).  Further, Yin (2009) declares that theory development is 
crucial for case studies.  Thus, after completing this preliminary coding, I reexamined the 
data for indicators suggested by theory, including: key actors, problem identification, 
politics created, priorities and goals valued, and policy levers.  For example, in my 
analysis for the second part of this study, I identified components of McDonnell’s (2009) 
policy feedback model and searched my data for support (or challenges) to the theory.  
Subsequent to these steps, I returned to the codes, looking for similar and contrasting 
dimensions.  This iterative process can identify relationships within and across codes and 
facilitates theoretical saturation, the point in which no new themes arise (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008).    
 A major strength of a case study is the use of multiple sources of evidence to 
triangulate results (Yin, 2009).  In this study, I supplemented my principal data source, 
interviews, with primary and secondary source documents.  I purposefully selected many 
of my interview participants to ensure I heard a range of perspectives.  This allowed me 
to analyze my transcripts for common and divergent themes.  Additionally, I relied on an 
analysis of archival documents to augment my interviews as well as to provide evidence 
in support of (or against) the frameworks, and provide concrete examples for topics 
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discussed by participants.  Finally, I endeavored to ensure the validity and reliability of 
this study in several ways. 
 
Issues of Validity and Reliability 
 
Internal Validity 
The hallmarks of ensuring trustworthiness in a qualitative study encompass four 
criteria: internal validity (credibility), generalizability (transferability), reliability 
(dependability), and confirmability (Guba, 1981; Patton, 2002).  Perhaps the most 
important of these criteria is internal validity, often called credibility in qualitative 
research, which seeks to ensure that the results of a naturalistic study are indeed reflective 
of reality (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  I employed several strategies to strengthen internal 
validity in this study.  To begin, I applied an emergent design, which allows for the 
flexibility needed in working with human subjects.  This design approach permitted me to 
utilize snowball sampling when members identified other individuals as important for me 
to interview.  Additionally, I developed instruments grounded in theoretical constructs, 
developed familiarity with my subjects before entering the field, and established a data 
collection timeframe that supported prolonged engagement.   
During my analysis, I attended to elements of the data that appeared to contradict 
emerging patterns.  This negative case analysis was essential to the second part of my 
study, where participants frequently disagreed with each other and establishing 
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commonalities was difficult.  To facilitate this process, I inserted an additional step into 
my analysis.  After coding my transcripts in NVIVO, I created spreadsheets in Excel to 
track the frequency of comments made in reference to a particular theme.  For example, 
after coding remarks members of the TEAC made regarding a specific component of the 
evaluation system, I summarized their responses in an Excel spreadsheet.  This 
spreadsheet allowed me to note which members were absent during a particular 
conversation, count how they voted on an issue, and to categorize their preference for a 
four or five point rating system.  Once I had organized the data in this manner, I could 
more easily search for common and contrasting patterns.   
Because of the challenges in discerning these patterns among participants in the 
second part of the study, I added a final step in my analysis of these transcripts: color 
coding.  Committee members represented three main types of stakeholders: educators, 
legislators, and the business community.  Two members represented two of these areas.  
As I was curious to know the extent to which common patterns emerged within each of 
these groups and diverged across groups, I developed a color-coding system to highlight 
participants’ responses in a way that allowed me to visually observe similarities and 
differences.  I assigned the three primary colors, red, blue, and yellow, to each main 
category.  For example, I assigned yellow to legislators, blue to educators, and red to the 
members representing the business community.  For the two members who spanned two 
groups, I assigned the secondary color created by blending the colors from the 
corresponding primary colors.  For example, for the legislator who was also an educator, 
I assigned the color green.  These spreadsheets allowed me to more easily search for 
consistent and contradictory patterns in my data. 
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Confirmability 
Triangulation of sources augments internal validity and also strengthens 
confirmability, concerns about the objectivity of the researcher.  In this study, I 
triangulated my data in two ways: across methods and across different types of 
informants.  The use of interview data and document analysis, “in concert compensates 
for their individual limitations and exploits their respective benefits,” (Guba, 1981 in 
Shenton, 2004, p. 65).  Further, my interview subjects represent different interest groups.  
For example, when I interviewed Tennessee legislators, I included both members of the 
education committee as well as non-committee members to elicit similarities and 
differences in their experiences with the legislation.     
I also attended to confirmability during data analysis and reporting of my results.  
During data analysis, I shared my transcripts with the chair of my dissertation committee 
and we engaged in informal debriefing discussions about the extent to which I had 
identified themes and patterns in common with the ones he recognized.  These 
conversations helped to focus my analysis and also resulted in the addition of an 
interview I had not previously considered.  The aforementioned memos and field notes 
contributed to the process of establishing confirmability, as did my inclusion of examples 
of quotations in reporting my results.   
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External Validity 
Such thick descriptions of raw data correspondingly establish generalizability, or 
external validity.   Because qualitative research is highly dependent upon context, it is 
incumbent upon the researcher to provide the reader with enough information about the 
inquiry to decide if the results and conclusions can be transferred to other contexts.  In 
short, generalizability is concerned with balancing contextual factors with applications to 
a wider population.  As it is difficult for the researcher to have enough knowledge of 
other contexts to confidently make such an assertion, this criterion is dependent upon the 
relationship between the investigator and the reader.  I strove to provide thick 
descriptions of the aforementioned components in the chapters detailing my results.  The 
explanation of my sampling methods also speaks to the generalizability and reliability of 
my results.   
 
Reliability 
Finally, reliability (dependability) was considered in two important ways.  First, I 
addressed the traditional definition of reliability, which contends that repeated testing will 
reproduce results, by recoding sections of transcripts to ensure I was coding them 
consistently.  Second, I dealt with the need to make the research design explicit by giving 
a detailed account, in this chapter, of the design plan and the actual implementation of my 
study.  In Chapters Four, Five, and Six I offer an in-depth description of the results of my 
analyses.   
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Chapter IV 
 
TENNESSEE’S EDUCATION POLICY ENVIRONMENT  
 
“We were tired of being last, so…”  
Tennessee State Representative  
 This sentiment, expressed by many state policymakers, reflects frustration and 
weariness with Tennessee’s education system.  Tennessee consistently ranks below the 
majority of other states in both reading and math, according to trends on the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (2011), and is in last place for per pupil expenditures 
(Baker, Sciarra & Farrie, 2010).  Attempts to improve public education reach back 
several decades, but were intermittent.  Table 5 (p. 67) contains a timeline of education 
reform in Tennessee.   
To understand Tennessee’s decision to enter and success in winning Race to the 
Top, it is necessary to analyze education reform efforts in the state that precipitated the 
competition.  In this chapter I draw from interviews with legislators and non-elected 
policymakers to demonstrate how Tennessee’s prolonged attention to education, 
uncommon in the typically fleeting lifespans of policy agendas (Kindgon, 1984) was 
instrumental in positioning the state for success in the Race to the Top program.  I also 
consider the presence of environmental stimuli Mazzoni (1991) identifies as necessary 
for policy innovation in Tennessee.   
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Early Education Reform Efforts 
The Comprehensive Education Reform Act of 1984, initiated by then-Governor Lamar 
Alexander, introduced a career ladder for teachers and a basic skills curriculum sequence 
Table 5.  Education Reform Timeline in Tennessee Over Three Decades
1978 Legislation permitting Tennessee Education Association and affiliates to engage in collective bargaining.
1984 Comprehensive Education Reform Act.  Established Career Ladder Program (merit pay for teachers) and a 
Basic Skills Program.
1991 Education Improvement Act.  Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (TVAAS) introduced.  LEAs 
required to report progress on students using TVAAS.  System wide information is reported to the public.  
Individual teacher effect data is not.
1992 Basic Education Plan (BEP) created by legislation.  Equitable funding formula for K-12 education shared by 
state and LEA.  Three categories of funding: instructional, classroom, and non-classroom.
2002 Charter school program created by legislation. Limited to 50 schools.  Enrollment extended to students 
attending,  or zoned for, school failing to make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP), or who failed TCAP.
2007 BEP 2.0 passed by legislature.  Increased state share of funding, eliminated cost differential factor formula, 
fully funded at-risk students, adjustments to student-teacher ratio.
Governor Bredesen initated statewide conversation about raising state standards.
Joined Achieve's Diploma Project aimed at increading high school standards and preparing students for  
college and careers.
2008 State Board of Education adopts new curriculum standards.
2009 Expansion of charter schools by legislature.  Increased cap to 90 schools.  Enrollment extended to 
low-income students. 
Race to the Top competition announced.
Batttelle parternship announced to improve STEM education.
2010 First to the Top legislation passed.  Mandates annual evaluation of teachers of which 50% must be based 
on student achievement data.  Establishes Achievement School District. 
Tennessee wins first round of Race to the Top.
Teacher Evaluation Advisory Committee begins meeting to recommend guidelines for annual evaluations of 
educators, as stipulated in First to the Top bill. 
2011 Charter school laws amended.  Eliminated cap on number of charter schools.  Eligibility extended to all   
students.
Legislation ends collective bargaining for TEA and affiliates.  
State wide implementation of Tennessee Educator Acceleration Model.
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for students.  The landmark legislation was the state’s first major foray into education 
reform.  Nearly a decade later, the Tennessee Value-Added System (TVAAS) was 
introduced.  This longitudinal data system tracks student growth on standardized tests and 
links students with teachers and schools.  A year later, in 1992, the Basic Education Plan 
was implemented.  The BEP is a funding formula for ensuring equitable instructional, 
classroom, and non-classroom related allocations to schools across the state.  Ten years 
later in 2002 lawmakers authorized 50 charter schools for children attending public 
schools that failed to make Adequate Yearly Progress.  In spite of these efforts, 
Tennessee schools continued to struggle. 
 
Crisis Event  
 
Advancing an agenda 
 Tennessee might have continued along this path of making intermittent changes to 
education policy had it not been for the publication of the U.S. Chamber of Congress’s 
Leaders and Laggards: A State-by-State Report Card on Educational Effectiveness report 
in 2007.  This study addressed concerns in the business community that students were not 
adequately prepared to succeed in college or the modern workplace.  Each state was 
graded on nine categories, including academic achievement on the National Assessment 
of Educational Progress (NAEP), examinations to rigor of standards, and flexibility in 
management.   
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Tennessee received a failing grade in three of the nine categories, including the 
academic achievement of low-income and minority students, postsecondary and 
workforce readiness, and a category called truth in advertising about student proficiency 
(Institute for a Competitive Workforce, 2007).  This category compared the percentage of 
students the state identified as proficient on math and reading exams to the percentage of 
proficient students on the NAEP in 2005.  Tennessee’s score reflected the large 
discrepancy between the two examination systems, with far more students scoring 
proficient on state assessments than on the NAEP.  The report also noted that only 30% 
of ninth graders who finished high school enrolled in college.  However, Tennessee did 
receive a B grade (the state did not receive any A’s) in data quality for its value-added 
system that tracked student test scores over time.     
In my interviews, five participants mentioned the significance of this report. 
According to one state senator, when Race to the Top was announced, the state’s 
concerted attempt to reform education “…had been building over several years, actually, 
beginning with, I guess, even as early as ’07.  The truth in advertising F that the National 
Chamber of Commerce had put on Tennessee.  So there were a lot of conversations going 
on statewide at different levels.”  One bureaucrat at the Tennessee Department of 
Education called it the “Cream Puff Award” for having such a large gap and not trying to 
remedy it.  The publication of this report signified a crisis for the state and instigated a 
prolonged issue-attention cycle (Downs, 2005) bringing Tennessee’s struggling schools 
to the top of policy agendas and putting pressure on policymakers for change. 
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Pressure for Change 
 
Tennessee’s Modern Education Reform movement 
Mazzoni (1991) identifies several factors in the environment that bring pressure 
for change to the policy system including a crisis event, public and media outcry, and the 
organization of political elites and policy entrepreneurs.  Figure 1 (p. 71) gives a 
summary of the arena model applied to Tennessee, including the environmental stimuli.  
Here I present an analysis of these stimuli.   
In Tennessee, these factors coalesced to bring about Tennessee’s “modern 
education movement” as termed by one former Bredesen advisor beginning “in 2007 
during the standards movement,” and “laid the foundation for a much more aggressive set 
of reforms and the Race to the Top.” This movement was led by Governor Phil Bredesen 
and encompassed changes to the traditional public system like education funding and 
curriculum standards, as well as innovative reforms like school choice.   
In 2007 the governor, who stated that education was his highest priority, 
embarked on a statewide campaign to alter Tennessee’s reputation as an education 
laggard.  To begin, he encouraged the successful passage of the Basic Education Program 
2.0, which increased the state’s contribution to education and lowered the student-teacher 
ratio.  In the same year, Tennessee embarked on the Tennessee Diploma Project with the 
national education reform organization, Achieve.  As part of this collaboration to prepare 
students for college and careers, Governor Bredesen initiated conversations about raising 
curriculum standards with education and business stakeholders across the state.  
     
  
7
1
 
ENVIRONMENT     LEADERSHIP ARENA      OUTPUT 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  An arena model (Mazzoni, 1991) of the passage of Tennessee’s First to the Top legislation.
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Widespread participants to the policy process 
The State Board of Education (SBE), rather than the governor, is responsible for 
approving curriculum changes.  At the time most SBE members were Bredesen 
appointees, so presumably persuading them to agree would have been easy.  However, as 
one former advisor to the governor explained:  
…instead what he wanted to do was to build a public case for it.  So he had 
roundtable discussions all across the state with business leaders and CEOs talking 
to them about what was currently lacking in work force skills; what’s not being 
addressed by the human capital they’re getting out of high schools. 
 
Over 100 business leaders joined in the roundtable discussions about curriculum 
standards hosted by the Governor.  Participation from this community persisted 
throughout the Race to the Top application process and into the development of the 
educator evaluation system.  These conversations brought the need for serious change in 
the education system to the forefront of public and political attention.  Subsequently, in 
2008, the State Board of Education adopted new K-12 curriculum standards in all subject 
areas.  
Another effect of these conversations was inviting new participants to the policy 
process: business and community leaders as well as the education foundation, SCORE.  
Former U.S. Senator Bill Frist founded the Tennessee State Collaborative on Reforming 
Education Commissions (SCORE), an organization dedicated to working with state and 
local governments to advance education policy reform.  SCORE held town hall meetings 
across the state to gather information about the state’s education priorities.   
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Eight interview participants specifically mentioned SCORE and their role in 
education reform.  According to one legislative leader, SCORE “…brought in everybody 
from teachers, to the principals, the parents to the non-profit organizations, to the 
foundations, to the business people, the government folks, you name it. And to begin to 
kind of develop this consensus that we have to do something in Tennessee.”  While most 
policymakers expressed similarly positive statements about the work of SCORE, one 
legislator disagreed.  A Harvard-educated attorney, this legislator described the report 
SCORE produced as “the biggest bunch of…after I read it I put it down, and they may 
not remember it, but I yelled. I said this was the biggest bunch of gobblygock bullshit 
I’ve ever read. It was just nothing but buzzword bingo.”  He further explained his 
criticism was due to the report’s failure to address the fundamental problem: the high cost 
of fixing the schools.  Nevertheless, it is clear that even though this legislator disagreed 
with SCORE’s assessment, he, too, was concerned about education. 
Statewide efforts were not limited to reforms within the traditional public 
education system.  At the urging of the governor, and after a contentious battle in the 
state legislature, approval was given to expand the charter school cap to 90 schools and to 
extend enrollment to low-income students.  Finally, endeavors to improve Tennessee’s 
schools were not limited to state participants.  The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
awarded Memphis City Schools a $90 million grant as part of its Teacher Effectiveness 
Initiative.  The significance of this external agency’s involvement in Tennessee cannot be 
underemphasized, as the Foundation was the top-ranked philanthropy and the third-place 
organization overall in a 2006 report of the leading influences in education policy 
(Swanson & Barlage, 2006).   
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My analysis of Tennessee’s reform efforts precipitating Race to the Top finds 
evidence of a crisis event, widespread demand for change, and the organization of policy 
entrepreneurs thus corroborating the pressures for change Mazzoni (1991) identifies as 
preceding policy innovation.  The pressure for education reform in Tennessee from 2007-
2010 appears cyclical in nature: Reforms brought attention to the issue, which then led 
policymakers to call for more reforms.  Repeated public attention – whether in the form 
of test scores or national reports – garnered political attention and engendered a sense of 
urgency.  Additionally, the presence of a political elite, the governor, committed to the 
issue ensured its continual presence in the policy spotlight over several years.  Both the 
pressure to improve and the governor’s attention to public education facilitated several 
education reforms, and led Tennessee to be considered a strong contender for the Race to 
the Top competition (Brill, 2011; Gates Foundation, 2009).   
 
Further Stimulus for Reform 
In spite of, or perhaps because of, the protracted focus on education, there was 
widespread agreement in 2009 among policymakers that problems persisted.  Legislators 
on both sides of the political aisle commented that Tennessee’s decision to pursue Race 
to the Top, and the eventual success of the education reform bill, was due to the need to 
address a broken system.  One Democratic representative expressed this sentiment 
saying, “I think the bill passed because there’s enough bad stuff going on in education, 
enough doubt, misgivings, and frustration, that folks were ready to try anything at least 
once.”  His Republican counterpart stated simply, “The system is broken and we have to 
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recognize that…”  Throughout the General Assembly, legislators expressed concerns 
similar to these, along with a desire to find policy solutions.  A Knoxville legislator 
speaking about the research he had done regarding the proposed policy changes explained 
the need for new policy thusly, “…because obviously what we’re doing now isn’t 
working.”   
The governor also believed there was much work to be done.  According to a 
former policy advisor and Tennessee Department of Education bureaucrat, Bredesen’s 
concern about the state of education in Tennessee was “…coupled with this issue he had 
been struggling with for three years about what do we really do with our most failing 
schools and our lowest performing schools?  How do we implement some sort of system 
to help turn those around?”  Thus, when Race to the Top was announced it offered 
dissatisfied policymakers a new stimulus for reform efforts in Tennessee.   
 
Race to the Top Criteria and Tennessee Policy 
When the requirements for the Race to the Top competition were revealed, 
Tennessee found itself in an enviable position.  Like many states, it had a struggling 
education system; the Volunteer State also had a recent history of education reforms.  
Finally, there was a favorable political climate across the state, led by a popular second-
term governor.  Rather than proposing a radical new direction for education reform, in 
Tennessee at least, Race to the Top became an opportunity to advance a path the state 
was already treading. 
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Three former members of the governor’s staff spoke specifically about Bredesen’s 
efforts to improve education by strengthening standards and assessments.  One of these 
individuals declared that the state had “done all of the things that the application asked 
for… with the exception of the evaluation.”  Another, referring to the Race to the Top 
application priorities, stated that “the federal Race to the Top program just teed it up so 
nicely (for Tennessee), because of the four pillars, we arguably were pretty strong in most 
of them.”  Finally, one former policy advisor spoke about how Tennessee’s previous 
work to improve standards was inadvertently a “cornerstone for Race to the Top.”   None 
of the participants in this study gave any indication that Race to the Top represented a 
revolutionary shift in education reform.  Instead, it seemed to provide the leverage the 
state needed for policy innovation that was the next logical step.   
 Table 6 (pp. 77, 78) shows the alignment between the Race to the Top criteria 
and education policy in Tennessee.  This next section focuses our attention on the first 
two columns – connections between the criteria and Tennessee’s standing prior to the 
Special Session.  The remaining columns are addressed in the following chapter. 
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Table 6.  Connections between Race to the Top and Education Policy in Tennessee
Race to the Top Criteria Education policy in TN prior to 
Special Session
First to the Top legislation Tennessee's RTTT application TN's points 
received
State Success Factors (125 points)
1) Articulate reform agenda and LEA's 
participation 
2) Build capacity to implement and 
sustain plans
3) Demonstrate progress in raising 
achievement and closing gap
1) All 136 districts support TN's RTTT 
plans
2) 93% of TEA local leaders support TN's 
RTTT plans
112/125
Standards and Assessments (70 points)
1) Develop and adopt common standards
2) Develop and implement common 
assessments
3) Support transition to enhanced 
standards and assessments
1) 2007 Joined American Diploma Project
2) 2008 Approved new standards
1) Will adopt Common Core standards 67.6/70
Data Systems to Support Instruction (47 
points)
1) Longitudinal data system
2) Accessing and using state data
3) Use data to improve instruction
1) TVAAS 18 years of longitudinal data 1) Create a P-20 state longitudinal data 
system
2) Expand existing data dashboard to 
include TVAAS
3) Require training for pre-service 
teachers on how to use TVAAS to 
improve instruction
43.6/47
Great Teachers and Leaders (138 points)
1) Provide high-quality pathways for 
educators 
2) Improve educator effectiveness based 
on performance
3) Ensuring equitable distribution of 
effective educators
4) Improve effectiveness of educator 
preparation programs
5) Provide effective support to educators
1) Mandates annual evaluation of 
teachers and principals 
2) Establishes Teacher Evaluation 
Advisory Committee to develop 
guidelines for evaluations  
3) Mandates evaluations be a factor in 
personnel decisions  
4) 50% of the evaluation based on 
student achievement data 
5) Removes prohibition on using teacher 
effect data until three years of data are 
obtained
1) Fund expansion of traditional and 
alternative teacher training programs in 
hard-to-staff subjects
2) Competitive fund to assist distrcints in 
implementing alternative salary schedule
114/138
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Table 6, continued
Race to the Top Criteria 
Education policy in TN prior to
 Special Session First to the Top legislation Tennessee's RTTT application 
TN's points 
received
Turning Around the Lowest-Achieving 
Schools (50 points)
1) Intervening in the lowest-achieving 
schools and LEAs
2) Turning around the lowest-achieving 
schools
1) Establishes Achievement School 
District (ASD) for persistently failing 
schools
2) Commissioner of education contracts 
with person or entitity to manage schools 
in ASD  
48/50
General Selection Criteria (55 points)
1) Make education funding a priority
2) Ensuring successful conditions for 
charters and other innovative schools
3) Demonstrate other significant reform 
conditions
1) 1992 Basic Education Program 2.0 for 
equitable funding of schools
2) 2009 legislation expanded cap on 
charter schools
43.2/55
Emphasis on Science, Technology, 
Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) 
(15 points, all or nothing)
1) Offer rigorous course of study in 
STEM
2) Cooperate with industry partners to 
prepare and assist teachers 
3) Prepare more students for advanced 
study and careers in STEM
1) Partnership with Battelle to establish 
state network of programs and schools 
designed to expand teaching and learning 
in STEM educaton.  Announced in 
December 2009.
15/15
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 The Race to the Top application encompassed seven sections: state success 
factors, standards and assessments, data systems to support instruction, great teachers and 
leaders, turning around failing schools general selection criteria, and emphasis on 
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.  Tennessee could claim established 
progress in three of these areas when the competition was announced: standards and 
assessments; the general selection criteria, and data systems to support instruction.  Issues 
that the state needed to address were ‘unlocking’ the value-added data so that it could be 
used to evaluate teachers and principals; developing a plan for failing schools, and 
building widespread support for the plan.   
 
Standards and assessments 
In 2008, the State Board of Education approved new curriculum standards, and as 
the Governor’s staff member indicated above, the state planned to adopt Common Core 
standards with other states and had implemented more rigorous assessments.  These 
actions, coupled with the state’s participation in the American Diploma Project, indicated 
commitment to the federal program’s emphasis on standards and assessments. 
 
Data systems and Tennessee’s linchpin 
 Arguably Tennessee’s greatest strength at this time was the longitudinal data 
system, TVAAS, that tracked student progress on state assessments and linked teachers 
with individual students.  The application outlined an expectation that states would 
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develop such systems, but Tennessee’s had been in place for 18 years.  As the earlier 
report from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2007) indicated, few states could make this 
claim.  In the preceding years, Tennessee’s districts had been required to report student 
progress to the state, and value-added information about the districts was publicly 
available.  However, the legislation prohibited reporting teacher effect data for individual 
teachers, and the information was not used for teacher evaluations or retention and tenure 
decisions.      
 In a speech to the General Assembly, Governor Bredesen stated that he believed 
Tennessee had a competitive edge over other states for many reasons.  However, he also 
clearly identified Tennessee’s greatest weakness regarding its use, or, rather lack of use , 
of the longitudinal data system.  Two senators with leadership roles in education 
explained how the statute in Tennessee prohibited the use of the data in many ways now 
required by Race to the Top.  One of the senators explained that the First to the Top 
legislation was necessary to ensure there weren’t any barriers to using data.  The other 
senator was more direct in saying that if Tennessee did not remove this prohibition, then 
there was no reason for the state to apply.   
 The Race to the Top application distributes a total of 500 points across six 
categories.  The fourth category, great teachers and leaders, had the highest possible 
number of points, 138.  Within that category, a state’s plan for improving educator 
effectiveness based on performance was weighted most heavily, at 58 points – more than 
double any combination of two other criteria in the category.  Finally, within that one 
criterion – improving educator effectiveness – states needed to establish a plan to 
measure student growth (5 points); design and implement an educator evaluation system 
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(15 points); conduct annual evaluations of teachers and principals, including the use of 
student growth data (10 points); and use the evaluations to inform professional 
development, make decisions regarding pay, promotion, retention, and tenure or teachers, 
and remove ineffective teachers and principals (28 points).   
If the point distribution left any question as to the Obama administration’s 
intention that student data was to be an essential component of teacher evaluations, Arne 
Duncan, the Secretary of Education, forcefully clarified it when he announced that any 
state with “a law on the books forbidding the linking of student test scores to individual 
teachers,” would be prohibited from applying, (Brill, 2011, p. 260).  A senior policy 
advisor to Governor Bredesen was quite accurate in his statement “that ultimately what 
was going to be the linchpin in the proposal would be unlocking the value-added 
assessment system to be used in teacher evaluations.”   
 
General selection  
 Two other recent policy changes reflected Race to the Top general selection 
priorities: changes to school funding and charter school restrictions.  Improvements to the 
Basic Education Plan in 2007 ensured a more equitable distribution of money to schools, 
while the cap on charter schools was increased to 90.  The latter legislation also 
authorized the closure of charter schools that failed to make Adequate Yearly Progress 
for two years, which according to Tennessee’s Race to the Top application, was one of 
the toughest charter school accountability laws across the country.   
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Failing schools and STEM subjects 
 As a member of the governor’s staff explained, once they understood that 
legislation would be necessary for the state’s bid to win, “we also knew that there had to 
be some stuff done giving the state authority to take over schools more clearly.”  Turning 
around the lowest achieving schools, the fifth category in the Race to the Top application, 
was worth 50 points, in the middle of the point distribution, but Tennessee had nothing in 
place that addressed this criterion.  According to a member of the governor’s staff who 
went on to work for the Department of Education, both the value-added data and the issue 
of what to do with failing schools weighed heavily on the governor’s mind.  So did 
another aspect of the competition: the emphasis on Science, Technology, Engineering, 
and Mathematics (STEM).  This seemingly innocuous category – worth a mere 15 points, 
but to be awarded as all or nothing – became “a very important part” for Tennessee, 
recalled a senior policy advisor.   
 In summary, education reform in Tennessee was already on the policy agenda in 
2009 when the Obama administration announced its competitive program to fund 
innovative solutions in the states.  Even more promising for the Volunteer State, many of 
the reforms they had recently implemented reflected Race to the Top priorities.  
According to Mazzoni (1991), major policy change is preceded by environmental stimuli.   
In Tennessee, negative publicity about the education system generated a series of policy 
changes intended to reform the state’s reputation.  As reforms commenced, widespread 
public support grew from non-traditional sources, namely the business community and 
non-profit organizations.  This dynamic created conditions amenable to additional reform 
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endeavors, and when an additional stimulus was introduced by the federal government, 
Tennessee was well-positioned for a competitive advantage.   
 
Available Revenue 
 In addition to environmental pressure for change, the arena model (Mazzoni, 
1991) requires new revenue to enhance the likelihood of policy innovation.  Race to the 
Top, with its promise of money to winners in difficult financial times was an attractive 
incentive.  Although the policy initiatives outlined by Race to the Top promoted ideas 
many states were interested in pursuing, the opportunity to win money cannot be 
underestimated.  A former deputy to the governor with a long career in government gave 
his assessment about how the money mattered: 
I will tell you this, others will tell you, that the reforms that we undertook around 
First to the Top were things that needed to be done, that would have been done 
irrespective of the money, that would have been proposed irrespective of the 
money. Truth is, it would not have happened but for the promise, the opportunity, 
to achieve some serious financial assistance through Race to the Top.  Now if 
we’re truthful, it would have been proposed over time; I think all of these things 
would have happened but it would have been a decade. 
 
This civil servant made no attempt to hide his admiration for the stimulation Race to the 
Top provided.  He continued: 
(s)ome pretty far-reaching kinds of policy changes were all achieved in that very 
short window of time and were driven primarily by Race to the Top. I mean, Arne 
Duncan is a genius. Whoever helped conceive of this thing for him.  Because it 
really did move the needle on policy in a way that skipped a generation. It was 
amazing. 
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 Other study participants also commented on the effect the promise of money 
seemed to have.  For one Senate Republican, the competition, “was really a vehicle for 
there to be some wind in our sail financially in a really tight budget time…” Dismissing 
the notion that the money was the only reason for Tennessee’s interest, she continued, “it 
was just good timing for Tennessee to get an investment in what was already building to 
be a comprehensive plan for Tennessee.” Like the former deputy governor who believed 
the policy changes would have occurred eventually, this legislator views Race to the Top 
as the catalyst the state needed to continue its efforts.   
 The aforementioned senator, who spoke about the necessity of changing laws if 
Tennessee wanted to enter the contest, adopted a more cynical view about the lure of 
money.  He expressed bemused bewilderment as he talked about states’ decisions to 
change policy in order to chase “this money, which, let’s face it, is chump change.”  
Although he acknowledged that Tennessee’s $485 million award is a significant amount 
of money, when he considered the share his county will receive over a period of several 
years, it was only a fraction of the county’s entire education budget.  But, nonetheless, he 
believed it was the money that prompted the governor to take on these issues because, he 
says, “the governor was absolutely convinced that number one we were going to get 
some serious dough, and number two was that we weren’t going to get anything unless 
we changed things.  So he decided that was what we were going to do.”  
 According to my study participants, Tennessee decided to enter the Race because 
it allowed the state to continue its reform efforts.  However, they also acknowledged the 
importance of the money winning the competition would bring.  Thus, while Fowler 
(1994) does not find evidence that additional revenue is necessary to provoke policy 
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innovation in her application of the arena model (Mazzoni, 1991), this study finds 
support for this condition of Mazzoni’s model.   
 
Pressure or Opportunity? 
 Mazzoni (1991) identifies several environmental stimuli that provoke policy 
innovation, by concentrating on pressure at the state level.  In her critique of the arena 
model (Mazzoni, 1991), Fowler (1994) calls for an expanded conceptualization of the 
environment to include national level policymakers as a source of pressure.  Although 
Race to the Top was advanced by the federal government, interviews with Tennessee 
policymakers (both elected official and non-elected civil servants) do not substantiate the 
idea that the state was responding to pressure when it decided to enter the Race.  In this 
next section, I draw from Manna’s (2006) theory of borrowing strength to propose a third 
potential precursor to policy innovation: the opportunity to leverage license from other 
levels of government. 
 
Leverage at the federal level 
The governor could, and did, use the competition as justification for the 
legislative changes embodied in the First to the Top Legislation.  In his speech to the 
General Assembly at the commencement of the Special Session, the governor declared 
that he was exercising his right to call a Special Session for only the second time in his 
term because, “I believe there are opportunities – and obligations – before us that are as 
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compelling as any I have seen in my time as Governor.”  Bredesen looked to the federal 
government for the license he needed to build support for radical policy changes in 
reforming struggling schools. Specifically, he outlined the discrepancies between Race to 
the Top criteria and Tennessee’s education policy in two areas: failing schools and 
teacher and principal evaluations.   
In discussing the governor’s concern for failing schools, a former policy advisor 
did not believe the governor “felt like a single solution was having the state take over and 
run schools, but yet, he looked for some way to create more teeth in the laws and looked 
for more ways the state could intervene or force some intervention or change in the 
lowest performing schools.”  Race to the Top stipulated that a plan be developed for 
direct state intervention in the “persistently lowest-achieving schools.”  This offered the 
state the necessary leverage to warrant its intrusion into local control.   
Most important, Bredesen was also able to draw strength from the competition for 
his proposals regarding educator evaluations.  Secretary Duncan’s assertion that states 
that prohibited the use of student data for teacher evaluation were ineligible to apply, 
coupled with the high-point value assigned for developing such systems, provided a 
strong rationale for pursuing an ambitious plan.  The present statute prevented value-
added data from being used until after a teacher’s third year, by which point tenure 
decisions had already been made.  To be competitive, Tennessee would need to make 
changes to existing policy.   
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Local license 
A local initiative also provided some leverage for the proposed legislation.  A 
Bredesen policy advisor talked about how the Gates Foundation grant awarded to 
Memphis for developing a teacher effectiveness program helped the governor’s push to 
unlock the data.  He believed it “eased some political tension through the process,” 
because:  
you had this Democratic stronghold of state politics down there (in Memphis) that 
ordinarily would be prone to kind of follow the union wherever the union told 
them to go.  But they had already had this very open conversation in their 
community about teacher effectiveness and it was a very positive situation 
happening down there.   
 
Unexpectedly, a reform effort in one urban district provided a source of strength for a 
state-wide initiative.  Tennessee policymakers were able to leverage their plans for the 
state by looking to both the federal and local levels for support.   
 Whereas Bredesen’s policy advisor felt the Memphis initiative generated what 
Manna (2006) considers positive feedback, one Memphis area representative felt it had 
the opposite effect.  Referring to the Gates grant, he explained, “There were a lot of folks 
who didn’t necessarily like that.  They felt it was a sell-out of the city, so Race to the 
Top, in a lot of folks’ opinion, was just a continuation of the sell-out.”  Rather than 
viewing the grant as an opportunity to leverage Governor Bredesen’s proposed policy 
changes, this representative espoused the idea that opposition to the Memphis program 
generated a negative attitude for the state’s Race to the Top bid.  
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 This notion of borrowing strength to build the state’s capacity was noted by a 
former Senator and member of the Republican leadership team.  She described the federal 
government’s approach as “very out of the box” and “really wise, because states were 
able to build on their own conversations that they were having and develop their own 
pretty rigorous plans for moving forward.”  Her explanation lends further support to the 
idea that federal competition presented Tennessee with the opportunity to continue 
education reform efforts already underway rather than mandate conformity.  Accordingly, 
Tennessee’s decision to enter the Race can be understood as a result of three factors: a 
cyclical and prolonged process of pressure and attention, the availability of new revenue, 
and the opportunity to leverage license from other levels of government.  One other 
reason was mentioned by study participants. 
 
Legacy 
 Thus far, there is evidence to suggest that the state’s decision to enter Race to the 
Top was motivated by pressure within the state to reform education, the opportunity to 
leverage license for reforms from other levels of government, and the lure of money 
which might accelerate innovative policy changes in a short time.  Yet, four other 
participants offered another reason for consideration: a legacy play by the governor.  
Although all of these individuals acknowledged other motives for Tennessee’s decision, 
including that it was a way to continue the path of education reform already in place, they 
also felt the governor was aware that his term was drawing to a close and this was an 
opportunity to “put a final stamp on his legacy as an education governor,” (State senator).    
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 Whatever the many reasons for Tennessee’s decision to enter the race, and in spite 
of the state’s strong position, winning was not guaranteed.  There was a great deal of 
work to be done in a very short amount of time.  Accordingly, the governor’s team 
launched a relentless campaign to soften the system (Kingdon, 1994) and allow for an 
unprecedented level of bipartisan support for education reform.   
 
Chapter Summary 
 The Race to the Top competition, though unique in many ways, did not propel 
education reform onto the policy agenda in Tennessee.  Rather, it provided additional 
stimulus, both financially and symbolically, to an endeavor begun in 2007.  Earlier efforts 
to collect longitudinal student data and ensure equitable funding to schools 
notwithstanding, Tennessee’s launch into concerted reform efforts was precipitated by 
the U.S Chamber of Commerce’s publication that gave the state failing scores in several 
areas.   
 Phil Bredesen, the popular Democratic governor in his second term, focused his 
attention on high school graduation rates, curriculum standards, and statewide 
assessments.  His efforts were neither constrained to traditional facets of education, nor to 
conventional stakeholders.  Under his guidance, the laws governing charter schools were 
amended to increase both the number of such schools allowed in the state and expand the 
criteria for student eligibility.  During this same time, the governor invited members of 
the business and foundations community to participate in conversations about what 
Tennessee needed to do to strengthen K-12 education. 
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 This cyclical process of attention and policy change generated momentum for 
keeping education reform on the state’s agenda.  Led primarily by Governor Bredesen’s 
commitment to education, the Volunteer State was well positioned to enter the Race to 
the Top competition.  Yet, though Tennessee could claim progress in several of the areas 
outlined by the competition criteria, three areas – teacher evaluations, intervention in 
failing schools, and STEM priorities – would become crucial targets for success.  Among 
these, unlocking Tennessee’s longitudinal data system, TVASS, was absolutely essential 
in the state’s efforts to win.  To build support for this dramatic policy change, Governor 
Bredesen was able to leverage strength from both the federal competition with its 
promise of money, as well as local initiatives in Memphis, one of four districts to receive 
a grant from the Gates Foundation to improve teacher effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
EDUCATION POLICY INNOVATION IN TENNESSEE 
 
The education policy environment in Tennessee was committed to reform, and as 
Governor Bredesen’s term was drawing to a close, Race to the Top was an opportunity to 
continue reform efforts and represented one final chance for him to leave a lasting mark 
on the state.  This potent mixture of pressure for change, money, and opportunity 
instigated an intense ambition to be ‘first to the top.’  In this chapter, I report my results 
from interviews with legislators and non-elected policymakers to examine the 
participants and conditions in Tennessee’s leadership arena that facilitated major policy 
innovation with the passage of First to the Top.  Figure 1 (p. 71) summarizes my findings 
for the arena model in Tennessee (Mazzoni, 1991).   
 
First to the Top 
Tennessee’s First to the Top Act had six main areas of emphasis: 
1) Established an Achievement School District allowing the commissioner of the 
state Department of Education to intervene in consistently failing schools; 
2) Required annual evaluations of teachers and principals; 
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3) Created a 15-member advisory committee charged with the task of recommending 
guidelines for evaluations; 
4) Removed restrictions against using teacher effect data until data from three 
complete years are obtained; 
5) Required personnel decisions (promotion, retention, tenure, compensation) be 
based in part on evaluations; 
6) Mandated that 50 percent of teacher and principal evaluations be based on student 
achievement data. 
Although the Achievement School District shifted authority of failing schools away from 
local districts and to the state, the most provocative aspects of the bill were the changes it 
made to teacher and principal evaluations: namely, requiring annual evaluations, basing 
half of those evaluations on student achievement data, and mandating that evaluations be 
a factor in personnel decisions. (Appendix A presents a copy of the legislation while 
Table 6, pp. 76,77, provides a concise summary of the alignment between the Race to the 
Top criteria and Tennessee’s proposed legislation, including the components of the 
state’s application and points received.) 
 
Arenas in Tennessee 
. The arena model identifies the presence of four arenas with the state 
policymaking system: subsystem, macro, commission, and leadership (Mazzoni, 1991).  
Both Mazzoni (1991) and Fowler (1994) find evidence to support the likelihood of policy 
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innovation when there is a shift from the subsystem to leadership arena.  Because of their 
findings, and importantly, because the reform efforts in Tennessee immediately preceding 
Race to the Top were led by the governor, this study does not seek to confirm the 
existence of the subsystem, macro, and commission arenas. Instead, it accepts the 
presence of the leadership arena as the dominant venue for policy innovation and 
investigates the participants and conditions that facilitated innovation in this arena.   
 
Proactive Leadership of Political Elite 
 Initial conversations between the governor and his staff about how to position the 
state for success began shortly after the stimulus bill was passed and the Obama 
administration announced that $5 billion would be set aside for the competitive program 
– well in advance of the release of the specific criteria for the contest.  Proactive 
leadership at the top level of government such as this was identified as essential to policy 
innovation by Mazzoni (1991), following his study of education reform in Minnesota.   
In Tennessee, Governor Phil Bredesen enjoyed a job approval rating that hovered 
around 70%.  He was re-elected in a landslide victory, winning all 95 counties within the 
state; a remarkable accomplishment in any event, but particularly so for a Democrat in a 
very Red state.  Given this, a former deputy governor admitted he would not have been 
surprised if the governor had “adopted the attitude that these last two years, I’m going to 
do victory laps.”  Instead, Governor Bredesen led the charge to change state statutes that 
would have precluded the state’s entry in the race.     
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There was a perception among bureaucrats and legislators that Bredesen’s 
popularity was well-deserved.  Members of the governor’s staff and bureaucrats at the 
Tennessee Department of Education (six in total) talked about his tendency to reach out 
to other stakeholders, even the opposition.  A former Department of Education employee 
gave an example of this strategy from early on in Bredesen’s first term: 
The very first challenge he had in January of 2003, when he came in, we were 
looking at the third small school system lawsuit staring us in the face.  And the 
first thing he did was bring in a group of legislators from both sides, all the 
different stakeholders, higher education, business representatives, the whole 
gamut and started working through it with that approach.  So yes, he’s always 
been noted for that regardless of the issue… 
 
Bredesen also had a good relationship with the TEA, a sentiment expressed not only by 
the governor’s staff but also by both TEA officials interviewed for this study.  Bredesen’s 
popularity is noteworthy because Mazzoni (1991) contends that political elites in the 
leadership arena are more likely to benefit from additional resources including: political 
savvy developed through experience, larger staff, the support of their party, access to 
favorable media attention, and accumulated political favors.   
 
Additional Resources 
 
Deploying a kitchen cabinet 
In Tennessee, Governor Bredesen first accessed these resources when he 
deployed a “kitchen cabinet,” reporting to the deputy governor, to begin strategizing 
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about the state’s application for Race to the Top.  According to one senior policy advisor, 
the group included the governor’s staff and representatives from the business and 
foundation communities, the Department of Education and the State Board of Education.    
The kitchen cabinet’s efforts were bolstered by the Gates Foundation’s decision to  
provide technical assistance to Tennessee, and a handful of other states whose chances 
for winning they deemed “promising”(Brill, 2011; Gates Foundation, 2009).   
 Tennessee chose the consulting firm Education First to help finesse the state’s 
application.  Throughout the summer of 2009, this working group – the kitchen cabinet, 
now joined by Education First – put together the crux of Tennessee’s plan to win.  
Although the state could demonstrate progress in three of the areas outlined by the Race 
to the Top application (see Chapter IV and Table 6, pp. 76,77) it needed to address other 
critical areas.  According to a senior policy advisor, the plan included: 
 affirming the state’s commitment to common core standards and common 
assessments; 
 deploying more charter schools; 
 developing the Achievement School District; 
 contemplating new types of professional development for educators; 
 and aggressively investigating what it would take to unlock TVAAS data.   
It was this last point upon which the kitchen cabinet focused the most.  As stated by the 
deputy governor, by late summer, it became clear that, “for us to be successful we really 
needed to position the state aggressively in this teacher evaluation dynamic.”  To 
accomplish this, the state needed to do two things: remove the statute prohibiting the use 
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of value-added data and develop an evaluation system based on student success. (The 
third column of Table 6, pp. 76, 77, details the specifics of the First to the Top legislation 
as it corresponds to the Race to the Top criteria in the first column.)   
 
STEM partnership 
 In addition to these five focal areas, to be competitive, the state needed to 
accomplish two other important tasks to complete the application and build momentum 
for the proposed policy changes.  These accomplishments are shown on Table 6 (pp. 76, 
77).  First, in December 2009, the governor announced a partnership with the research 
and development firm, Battelle, to develop a network of programs and schools with a 
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics focus.  Although only assigned 15 
points on the application, Governor Bredesen believed strongly enough in this aspect that 
when he addressed the General Assembly, he described it as one of the three major areas 
of emphasis in the state’s application.   
 
LEA support 
The second task was persuading all 136 school districts to pledge their support for 
the plan.  The state asked the school board, superintendent, and local Association 
president of each district to sign a memorandum of understanding (per Race to the Top 
application guidelines) indicating their agreement to participate in new state standards 
and assessments as well as the new annual evaluation system for principals and teachers.  
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Like the partnership with Battelle, the governor’s announcement to the General Assembly 
that all districts had signed-on strengthened the case that legislators needed to pass the 
First to the Top bill.  I asked two members of the governor’s staff who were intimately 
involved with planning the Special Session if they intentionally obtained the districts’ 
agreement before the session commenced.  Both denied that there were any conversations 
about this, but also acknowledged that it certainly did help.  One individual explained:  
No, it was really more… it wasn’t about the legislation passing.  It was really 
more about competing for the Race to the Top grant.  I’m not sure in my mind we 
ever related that to the passing of the legislation.  It was a great point to make and 
it suggested to the Assembly that it was a big deal and it was a state-wide effort.  
But having everybody sign up was really more about showing folks that we were 
going to be scoring the proposal and everybody was on board. 
 
These two factors, the STEM partnership and the districts’ participation, were initiated as 
part of the state’s goal of submitting a competitive Race to the Top application; however, 
they had a secondary function of making it more difficult for legislators to object to the 
proposed policy changes.  As one representative later explained, “The fact that all school 
systems in Tennessee signed a pledge to support this pretty much established the 
boundaries of how far they (opponents) could go to overtly work against the bill.”  
Governor Bredesen was able to accomplish these tasks, in part because he had the 
staff to manage the process and media access to announce these successes.  Another 
resource at his disposal was the ability to call a special legislative session to address his 
reform proposals outlined in First to the Top.   
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Special Session strategy 
As the deadline for the first round of Race to the Top applications drew near, the 
decision was made to address the First to the Top legislation in a special legislative 
session.  Tennessee’s Constitution grants governors the power to call such a session, but 
it is a power they use sparingly: Governor Bredesen had only called one other such 
session.  When it was announced on December 15, 2009, the governor stated, 
“Sometimes the stars line up to create an opportunity that no one expected.  And when 
you’re in public office, you’re obligated to seize the moment when it happens.” 
(Bredesen announces plans for a special session, 2009) The governor would repeat this 
statement in his address to lawmakers on the eve of the Special Session in January, and 
while the opportunity to compete for much-needed dollars was extraordinary, the 
decision to hold a special session was not nearly as capricious as the phrase “seize the 
moment” conveyed. 
The policymakers I interviewed were highly consistent regarding the decision to 
hold a Special Session.  According to a former bureaucrat at the Department of 
Education, as well as other insiders, the benefit of a Special Session is that legislators 
“can only talk about that one thing and you can’t get bogged down in…some other issues 
because you have to stay completely focused on just that one issue.  Not just education in 
general, but that one bill that’s being proposed.”  A more blunt sentiment was offered by 
a governor’s policy advisor:  
…just to be honest about it, part of doing the special session quickly is that you 
get it all lined up and you get it done really quickly.  That’s sort of the point of a 
special session is you don’t have the time for things to become bigger issues. 
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Two other members of the governor’s staff acknowledged these benefits, and said the 
decision to call a Special Session was done in part because of the Race to the Top 
deadline, but also because there is too much going on in the regular legislative session to 
give this issue the attention it deserved.   
 Another informant, a House Democrat, explained, “Bredesen, I think, was 
smart…at first I criticized him for it, to wait for the last minute, but I think strategically 
he did that on purpose…to put on pressure.”  Whether the decision to wait until only a 
week before the deadline was strategic or the result of logistics, it engendered a sense of 
urgency and concentration among legislators both because of the looming Race to the 
Top application deadline and the need to begin the regular legislative session.  This level 
of determination provoked a drastic change, “probably one of the biggest first steps that 
the state has ever made in education,” commented a member of the House education 
committee.   
 Governor Bredesen was able to strategically utilize the resources available to his 
position, including large staff, media access, and the ability to call a Special Session in 
preparing Tennessee’s application for Race to the Top.  However, before considering the 
outcome of the Special Session, it is important to examine the effect of the closed nature 
of the leadership arena. 
 
Closed Arena 
This leadership arena (Mazzoni, 1991),  characterized by the interactions of 
individuals – both government officials and private groups who influence them - affords 
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its members lower public visibility, subsequently restricting access in the initial planning 
stages and increasing the likelihood of consensus among the participants.  In Tennessee, 
there was an additional necessity for restricting access to the leadership arena: the 
competitive element of Race to the Top.   
During the kitchen cabinet’s initial planning, efforts were made to keep the plans 
“under wraps” in an effort to prevent other states from learning about Tennessee’s plans.  
According to one member of the governor’s staff, this was “very different from how 
education policy normally works.”  Typically, she explained, education policy is 
characterized by conversations similar to “what have you done in your state, and tell me 
more about it, and I’m going to figure out how to do that in my state.”  Yet that was not 
the case with Race to the Top.  Secretary Duncan promised that only a few states – those 
with the strongest plans – would win.  This forced states into an interesting position: 
trying to develop viable winning plans without showing their hand to their competition.  
And, as the fourth quarter approached, the planning “kicked into overdrive” as the 
urgency to make statutory changes was heightened. 
The U.S. Department of Education’s announcement that a state’s application 
would only receive points for legislative changes that had been made – not for promises 
to make changes if the state won - was a game changer for Tennessee.  As the governor 
would later explain in his speech to the General Assembly: 
While we once thought that we could promise in our Race to the Top application 
to change this in the future, we learned in November that the only things that will 
count are those that are established in the law on the date of the application: 
January 19
th
.  Right now we’re not competitive.  Your job this week is to fix that. 
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However, the immediate impact of this announcement was the realization that the 
working group needed to reach out to other stakeholders, namely TEA and the legislative 
leadership.   
 
Opening the Arena 
 
Tennessee Education Association 
 In many states, the Race to the Top application was threatened by strong 
opposition from teachers’ unions (Brill, 2011).  Colorado, Michigan, and New York are a 
few examples.  Tennessee’s story was different.  The state would ultimately pass 
comprehensive education reform legislation with nearly unanimous support and submit 
an application with support from 93% of local teachers’ unions.  What explains the 
contrast between Tennessee and states like Colorado, Michigan, and New York?  
According to TEA officials and members of the governor’s staff who participated in 
negotiations with TEA, it came down to two factors: trust and political reality. 
 
Back and forth negotiations 
 Governor Bredesen reached out to TEA leaders in late November.  At a luncheon 
the governor hosted for the executive director of TEA, the director of government 
relations, and the Association president, he presented his plan, saying “I want to talk to 
you about something that is not in TEA’s DNA.”  TEA officials describe the governor as 
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speaking “candidly” about his support for Race to the Top and its stipulations.  He 
wanted to win, and he wanted the Association’s support to do it.  The luncheon initiated a 
series of “tough” negotiations between the TEA leadership and members of the 
governor’s staff.   
 The Race to the Top application guidelines clearly outlined expectations for 
annual evaluations of educators linked with student data.  What it did not specify was the 
weight that needed to be given to the data.  Tennessee wanted to win, as did all the other 
states that were entering, so no one wanted to divulge the percentage they were promising 
to give.  As one policy advisor explained, a rumor circulating among education policy 
circles was that Indiana had settled on 50% of a teacher’s evaluation depending on 
student data.  So, Governor Bredesen decided Tennessee would go for 51%.   
As individuals involved in this process explained, TEA officials were adamant 
that this was too much; they wanted 35%.  Negotiations went back and forth with little 
progress.  At one point, the deputy governor, following Bredesen’s orders, told TEA 
officials they could either agree and continue to have input into the legislation or the 
governor would go ahead “and beat you in the legislature.”  The officials walked out; a 
few hours later the governor’s representatives called them back and offered to settle at 
50% of the teacher’s evaluation comprised of student data, with 35% of the 50% 
specifically value-added data.  TEA officials agreed to present this compromise to their 
Board.   
 TEA officials met with the Board to explain the compromise on the table and to 
discuss the pros and cons of endorsing the plan.  One TEA leader wanted to make it very 
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clear to the Board that he was deferring to them.  He told them, “We can either accept 
this compromise and move forward, or I’ll be glad to chain myself to the pillars of the 
Capitol in opposition to this, but you all are going to make that decision. I’m not.”  The 
Board voted to support the plan.   
 
Trust 
While representatives from all parties involved in these negotiations talk about the 
challenges they encountered, they also speak with great respect for each other and the 
process.  One TEA official believes the people representing the governor’s office “went 
as far as they could go to really be conciliatory in this process.”  Another lauds the 
relationship TEA had with the governor:  
I’ve said this over and over again to people, and I’ve said it to our own members: 
never, never did I think that I could not trust the governor’s office. I couldn’t say 
that now. But never did I think that they would not do what they said they would 
do or that they would not honor their word. And I think they felt the same way 
about us. And I think we had probably built that relationship over the eight years 
that Governor Bredesen had been there, (TEA official). 
This idea was substantiated by other informants and Bredesen himself acknowledged it 
(Brill, 2011). 
These feelings of respect and trust were mutual; one member of the governor’s 
staff describes a TEA official as demonstrating “incredible personal courage to do what 
he did” in supporting the legislation.  Another believes TEA “came to the table and 
agreed to do some things …that probably weren’t comfortable for them to agree to” in 
“good faith” because of “their longstanding good relationship with the governor.”  This 
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relationship is an example of another resource the governor possessed: accumulated 
favors.  TEA was willing to participate in these discussions because they trusted the 
governor to treat them fairly.  No one overtly classified this as a situation where TEA 
owed anything to the governor, but rather it is a more implicit understanding of the value 
of cooperation. 
 
Political reality 
 Undoubtedly influenced by the positive relationship that existed between the 
governor and TEA, the political reality of the situation also forced the outcome.  One 
TEA official says that while the organization agreed to the compromise, he was “not real 
comfortable with what we agreed to do,” but that over the years he had learned “to count 
the votes.  And it was going to pass.  We could have laid down in front of the train and 
gotten run over by it… but there’s no question in my mind that it was going to pass.”  
Both TEA officials interviewed in this study acknowledged that it was better to try to 
impact the legislation in a positive way rather than jump aboard a sinking ship.   
The other TEA official explained, “It was very much a political decision for us, 
not an education and policy decision… our paramount reason to agreeing to it was just 
the political reality that we found ourselves in.”  Further, because TEA officials were 
communicating constantly (primarily through email) with their members, they sensed that 
the majority of teachers also “understood the dynamics of the situation” and that the 
Association did “what we had to do.”  Nonetheless, they did catch “a lot of heat” from 
some members. 
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The political reality of the situation influenced the governor’s camp as well.  TEA 
officials believed that the governor sought their support because he needed their 
signatures for the Race to the Top application.  One member of the governor’s staff 
agreed that this was important, but they also wanted to persuade the Association not to 
“mount a vigorous opposition to trying to pass the bill” because that “can be a political 
problem.”   
The Tennessee leadership arena, which until that point had been restricted to the 
kitchen cabinet, had now expanded to include leaders at the TEA.  And, based in part on 
the governor’s positive history with TEA, there was a great deal of willingness on both 
sides to negotiate. In Tennessee, there was a sense among TEA officials that opposing the 
bill, which was sure to be enacted, would provoke more of a backlash than supporting it 
did.  For their part, the governor’s office believed the bill could pass regardless of the 
Association’s support, but still preferred to avoid a messy fight in the legislature.  Both 
parties were motivated to avoid conflict, and the high level of trust ripened conditions for 
innovation without interference.  While working to gain TEA’s support, the 
administration was simultaneously building its case with the legislative leadership. 
 
Legislative Leadership 
 The governor had been meeting regularly with members of the legislative 
leadership to talk about what changes were needed in higher education.  According to 
two senate leaders, Bredesen first announced his plans for Race to the Top at one of these 
meetings.  Gaining the support of the legislative leadership was important because the 
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reforms Governor Bredesen was proposing, much like the criteria in the Race to the Top 
application, were more commonly championed by Republicans.  And, although 
Republicans enjoyed a slight majority in both the Senate (18 to 14) and House (50 to 48), 
one informant contended, “…the Republicans said they were in charge but they weren’t,” 
because there was “one Republican who voted with the Democrats a lot.”  Thus, though 
Mazzoni (1991) contends that a political leader is likely to enjoy party support, a TEA 
leader believed most Republicans were “on board” and the “division would (have been) 
in the Democratic caucus.”   
 An interview with one of the bill’s sponsors, a Democrat, lends support to this 
idea.  He explained, “As a matter of fact, I would not have carried the bill if the teachers 
didn’t sign off on it.  I told the governor that.”  Four other legislators also commented 
that their decision to support the bill was based largely on gaining the support of 
educators.  Thus, an added incentive for the governor to gain TEA’s support was to 
convince legislative leaders to endorse the plan and work to convince their colleagues to 
do the same.   
 One benefit of the leadership arena’s restricted access that was strategically 
opened to TEA and the legislative leadership was low visibility.  This low visibility 
simultaneously encourages consensus among members and decreases the likelihood that 
opposition groups will form.  Both of these conditions also increase the likelihood of 
policy innovation (Mazzoni, 1991). The events in Tennessee indicate that the passage of 
First to the Top was not about opposing voices, but about those who supported it.   
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Supporting Innovation 
Session Logistics 
 The narrow focus of a special legislative session changes the way the General 
Assembly typically operates.  Rather than having multiple committees working on issues, 
only the committees affected by the specific legislation operate during a Special Session; 
in this case, education and finance.  As one senator described, during the regular session 
“…we have many things going on, many things you have to make up your mind.  We 
have multiple voices at all times, all clamoring for our attention. And the challenge is to 
be heard.”  But, for one week in January 2010, there was an opportunity for 
“concentrated study and review” much like learning a language “when you’re totally 
immersed” said a Republican Representative.   
 
Widespread support 
 When the Special Session began, TEA was openly, albeit cautiously, supportive 
of the legislation, leadership in both parties and houses were actively working to build 
support, and the governor could also claim support from all 136 school districts.  So it 
makes sense that four individuals specifically commented there were few changes to the 
bill the governor originally proposed and instead, most of the time during the week was 
spent “letting people get comfortable with it,” as one bill sponsor described.  The session 
was “politics at its best, rather than at its worst,” summarized one representative because, 
“we had an opportunity to speak our minds and voice our opposition.  But then, 
ultimately, one side won, but that’s the way democracy is supposed to work.” 
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 The bill passed with only 11 “no” votes out of a possible 132.  And, although the 
Democrats might have needed more convincing, four of them, along with five 
Republicans, say they voted for the bill because they agreed with the changes.  A 
Republican freshman, whose first experience as a legislator was the Special Session, says 
he thought “overall” there were good ideas in the bill and notably, supported the idea of 
using the data Tennessee had been collecting for many years.  A Democratic senator 
concurred, declaring that tying teacher evaluations to student test scores would “put 
pressure on teachers to achieve…we all do better when we’re working under a little 
pressure.”  Similar sentiments expressed by others who supported the bill likely 
contributed to five legislators describing the bipartisan nature of the special session.  One 
representative believes the bipartisan effort “was key to the bold aspects of this piece of 
legislation and how it came to be and how it finished up.”  
Such high level of cohesion among members in the leadership arena is an 
important factor for facilitating policy innovation (Mazzoni, 1991).  Another factor is 
weak opposition.  In addition to the reasons offered by the legislators who voted against 
the bill, the weak opposition can be attributed to a lack of organized leadership.   
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Weak Opposition 
 
Voting against the bill 
I interviewed five of the legislators who opposed the bill as well one 
representative who abstained from voting.  They offered three reasons for opposing the 
bill.  One senator representing counties just outside of Nashville was upset at being asked 
to make such a major policy change in a short timeframe and opposed the bill because 
she believed Race to the Top violated the 10
th
 amendment.  Although another Republican 
legislator also mentioned his objection to the federal government’s interference in state 
affairs, this senator stood out as the only one to vote against the bill for this reason.   
 The remaining legislators who opposed the bill did so either because they 
disagreed with its provisions or because they heard from constituents, primarily 
educators, who urged them not to support the bill.  For one Democratic representative 
who had served his community for many years, it was a difficult decision, particularly 
because of his respect for the governor.  Yet, in the end, he decided to vote “against an 
education bill for the first time,” because of the concern teachers from his district had and 
his own worries about making such big changes without the money being guaranteed.  
Although these legislators spoke passionately about why they voted against the bill, their 
voices were lost in the sea of supporters.  Another reason for the successful passage of 
the bill was the lack of organized opposition. 
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Lack of organized opposition 
 The lack of organized opposition to First to the Top can be explained by three 
factors: the closed nature of the leadership arena; timing; and politics.  Restricting access 
to the leadership arena allowed the kitchen cabinet to prepare the state’s application 
without alerting potential opponents to their plans.  It is difficult for objections to develop 
when policies are developed behind closed doors.  Though noted previously by one 
policy advisor, this is an unusual context for education policy, the competitive aspect of 
Race to the Top necessitated secrecy.   
The timing of the events also had an effect on the lack of opposition.  The kitchen 
cabinet began working on these matters in the summer 2010.  However, the proposed 
changes were not made public until mid-December.  Barely a month later, the process 
was over: First to the Top was enacted, and the state’s application had been submitted. 
Opponents had less than two months to organize and build their case.   
Finally, by inviting TEA to participate in the process, the kitchen cabinet 
effectively neutralized their most likely adversary.  With the legislative leadership and 
TEA endorsing First to the Top, it was difficult to find opponents.  And, as TEA asserted, 
it was “politically risky” to go against the opportunity to win money for Tennessee 
schools.  A senate leader confirms this assertion, stating:  
There are certain political risks for voting for it and political risks for voting 
against it.  Especially speaking loudly against it when your own governor 
proposes it.  Which some people chose to do.  There are people whose job it is to 
remember that.   
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To summarize, lack of information about the governor’s plans, a rapid timeframe, and the 
political risks associated with opposing First to the Top resulted in a shortage of 
organized opposition that could prevent the passage of the bill.   
   
 
A Return to Leadership 
 Policy innovation in the leadership arena depends heavily on the proactive 
leadership of an elite individual (Mazzoni, 1991).  In her critique of the arena model, 
Fowler (1994) finds that the leadership of the governor of Ohio drove policy change even 
more than  external pressures.  Much of the success of the First to the Top legislation can 
similarly be attributed to Governor Bredesen’s efforts.  Ten participants specifically 
identified his leadership as instrumental in helping the bill pass.  These policymakers 
noted Bredesen’s leadership style of reaching out to all stakeholders and the copious 
information the governor and his team provided during the Special Session as crucial 
factors in the bill’s success.  One representative, a Republican, spoke of the impact the 
governor’s presence during the Special Session had in creating a bipartisan spirit:  
…so we had a general consensus that we were pulling together, and the governor, 
he not only asked us to do this, but walked with us the entire way.  He was in the 
hallways working; he was in the committee rooms with us. There was always a 
presence from the governor’s office, motivating, driving, pushing forward with 
the schedule, listening to everything.   
 
 Two other individuals – one representing TEA and another from the governor’s 
staff, expressed doubt as to whether such sweeping changes could have occurred if they 
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had been initiated by individual legislators.  Yet, although the House sponsor of the bill 
claims his role was “secondary” to the governor and TEA, two Senators believe such 
changes can, and have, originated in the legislature.  A senate leader further suggested 
that, while the governor’s role was important, “there was a lot of shared ownership” 
among legislative leaders that also contributed to the bill’s success.  Nonetheless, 
although he stated that the education committee had proposed innovative changes in the 
past, another Senator emphasized that in this instance, “the political power came from the 
governor” whose proactive leadership “was a deciding factor.”  Conditions in Tennessee 
were set before the Special Session commenced for education policy innovation and, in 
the words of one Democrat, legislators either had to “get onboard or get off or you’ll get 
run over.  And it worked out pretty good.”   
 
A Change in Leadership 
 There is a codicil to this analysis that underscores the confluence of events, and 
particularly the high degree of bipartisan support Tennessee’s education reforms 
garnered.  Similar to many other states, in 2010 Tennessee voters turned out in favor of 
Republican candidates, including staunch conservatives and Tea Party members.  
Whereas the legislature had only slightly larger numbers of Republicans during the 2010 
session, the 107
th
 General Assembly opened with the GOP firmly in control of both 
houses (85 to 47 overall).  And although the newly elected Republican governor, Bill 
Haslam, had pledged to support the reforms promised in the Race to the Top application, 
he would also support other changes that prompted one TEA leader to say, “the 
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legislature dishonored what had happened in the previous legislative session.”  Among 
the three largest changes, two are highly contentious: the end of collective bargaining for 
teachers and changes to tenure laws that extend a probationary period from three to five 
years for new teachers and allow a tenured teacher to be fired for poor performance 
evaluations.  A third bill to eliminate the statewide cap on charter schools also elicited a 
fight from Democrats.   
 Comments about these changes from policymakers emphasize the demise of the 
bipartisan spirit that characterized the special session and the trust between legislators 
and the TEA.  The high level of opposition to these bills sharply contrasts the near 
absence of such conflict during the Special Session and is a result of: 
the TEA being actively against it (collective bargaining restrictions) and being for 
the First to the Top.  So had they [the TEA] done that during the Special Session 
we would have had lots more teachers there, which would have put more pressure 
on us, 
 
explained one Senator.   
Chapter Summary 
 Tennessee’s entry into Race to the Top was supported by the state’s recent reform 
efforts, but it required focused and strategic planning to win.  Shortly after the 
competition was announced, Governor Bredesen spoke with his staff about Tennessee’s 
entry.  A kitchen cabinet of the governor’s team, Department of Education bureaucrats, 
and members of the business and foundations community began meeting, preparing a 
case for the state’s selection.   
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This elite group benefited from low public visibility in two ways. To begin, it 
helped keep Tennessee’s plans secret.  In contrast to the more open exchange of ideas 
that typically occurs between states, the Race to the Top competition created a 
competitive environment in which states guarded their plans with great intensity.  The 
second benefit of these private meetings was that it did not allow opposition groups to 
develop.  Instead, the kitchen cabinet quietly expanded its membership as it worked to 
build support from key stakeholders. 
It soon became apparent that in order to win, Tennessee would have to make 
significant changes to laws that restricted the use of student data for teacher evaluations 
and human capital decisions.  Drawing from the positive relationship he had cultivated 
with the TEA, Governor Bredesen invited leaders in that organization to the table.  He 
offered them the opportunity to participate in the policymaking process and provide input 
to the plans.  Although both representatives of the governor and Association officials 
spoke about the trusting relationship that existed between them, the negotiations were not 
easy, and trust does not fully explain why the governor’s team included TEA, or the 
organization’s eventual support. 
Though confident the legislation would pass regardless of TEA’s support, the 
governor’s team sought their cooperation to reduce the likelihood that organized 
opposition could disrupt the process. For their part, the Association also seemed to 
foresee the bill’s impending success. TEA offered its cautious support, motivated by a 
desire to avoid negative political fallout if the Association was perceived as preventing 
Tennessee from winning, and the opportunity, however slight, to influence the scope of 
the policy.  This combination of trust and politics created an alliance between the 
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governor and TEA that was atypical of many other states as they prepared their own 
applications. 
Gaining TEA’s endorsement was important, but not the only place the kitchen 
cabinet looked for allies.  Before Race to the Top was announced, Governor Bredesen 
had begun meeting with legislative leaders to discuss necessary changes to education 
policy.  Finally, the governor’s staff successfully negotiated a partnership with Battelle, a 
research and development firm, to bolster the state’s focus on STEM education, and 
obtained the support of all 136 school districts for the state’s application.  All of these 
factors ensured that when the Special Session began in January 2010, anyone who 
opposed the plan would be viewed as contradicting the governor’s efforts to improve 
education – a plan endorsed by educators.   
The Special Session focused legislators’ attention on a very specific issue with 
limited time for debate.  The issue at hand – increasing accountability for 
educators- added its own twist to the unusual situation.  Though typically legislators 
respond to their constituents, Democrats found themselves caught between different 
stakeholders: educators, parents, and other community members.  To further complicate 
their position, TEA supported the plan.  Ideologically, Republicans generally favor 
accountability reforms, which meant that Governor Bredesen faced more challenges 
getting his own party to support the bill than from the GOP.   
Yet the governor and his staff followed a plan that was part strategy and part 
capricious timing, and they entered the Special Session with unstoppable momentum,  
fueled by the governor’s reputation for reaching out to stakeholders and his commitment 
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to education.  First to the Top enjoyed widespread support from private citizens and 
parents and the business community, and with cautious cooperation from TEA, the 
proposed bill was championed by legislative leaders throughout the General Assembly.  
It passed with wide margins, and two months later, Tennessee became one of two 
winners in the Race to the Top competition.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
MULTITUDE OF VOICES 
 
This chapter explores the political dynamics created by First to the Top and their 
subsequent role in shaping the new education evaluation policy.  In Tennessee, the First 
to the Top legislation established a new form of education governance: policymaking by 
a volunteer committee of diverse stakeholders.  I apply a policy feedback perspective 
(McDonnell, 2009) to describe the process in Tennessee and organize contributing factors 
in a way that allows me to draw conclusions about the strengths and challenges of this 
new type of education governance.  McDonnell advances this framework as a way of 
analyzing the political context that develops from an instigating policy.     
The task before the 15 committee members was to develop a statewide annual 
evaluation system for teachers and principals and to recommend this plan for approval by 
the State Board of Education – in less than 18 months and in a forum open to the public 
and media.  In the area of education governance, this approach to policy development and 
rule-making is unique.  Typically, the General Assembly enacts legislation or the State 
Board of Education advances policy, and in either case, the state Department of 
Education assumes the role of implementing and enforcing the new course of action.  
However, the First to the Top legislation stipulated annual evaluations of educators with 
broad parameters, but delegated the policy details to a committee of public and private 
citizens.  Skocpol (1992) asserts that policies generate new politics in part because they 
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transform state capacity, a transformation that is apparent in Tennessee’s approach to 
fulfilling its Race to the Top promises.   
 
Policy Feedback 
In using policy feedback (McDonnell, 2009) to scaffold my analysis, I examine 
the parameters set by the legislation and what they forecasted for the committee’s work; 
the institutional structures and rules that guided the committee work; the how the 
different members understood their role; and the opportunity for public input to this 
process.  In short, this component of my study explains how the Teacher Evaluation 
Advisory Committee, established by First to the Top, worked to develop the new 
statewide educator evaluation system.  
I begin with a description of the section of First to the Top that established the 
TEAC and outlined its charge.  In this analysis, I describe the conditions set by the 
legislation’s passage, the parameters it outlined for the new evaluation system, and the 
political context in which the committee began its work.  I pay particular attention to how 
the policy characteristics forecasted the politics likely to emerge during the committee’s 
term.  Figure 2 (p. 119) summarizes my finding for this, and other, components of policy 
feedback (McDonnell, 2009). 
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Figure 2.  A policy feedback perspective (adapted from McDonnell, 2009) applied to the Teacher Evaluation Advisory Committee 
 
Policy Characteristics 
 Major change. 
 Legislation adopted 
with widespread 
support. 
 Systems changing 
instrument established 
new form of 
education governance. 
 Mandates set 
parameters for new 
evaluation system. 
 Favorable political 
context. 
Institutional Structures 
and Rules 
 Changing 
commissioners, lack of 
strong leadership, and 
the addition of external 
facilitators led to 
confusion among 
members as to who was 
in charge. 
  A strict and quick 
deadline for developing 
the policy 
recommendations added 
pressure to the 
committee’s work.   
Mobilization of Interests 
 Frequent discussions about 
each issue gave members the 
opportunity to voice their 
opinions. 
 Decisions reached by vote. 
 Ambiguity regarding the 
scope of the TEAC’s role 
was pervasive.   
Interpretive Effects 
 Meetings open to public and 
held at different locations to 
encourage stakeholder 
participation. 
 TEA made several 
suggestions regarding 
evaluation system.  Some 
preferences reflected in new 
evaluation system, but 
unclear how much impact 
stakeholders had.   
Statewide Educator 
Evaluation System 
  
120 
 
 
Following this description, I draw from interviews with the TEAC members and 
the facilitator to examine the structures and rules of the committee, including their 
perceptions about leadership and the effect of the timeline for their work.  Committee 
members represented a variety of fields - education bureaucrats, teachers, principals, 
businessmen, and legislators.  Table 4 (p. 57) describes my sample while Table 7 reports 
the composition of the full committee.  I explore the political dynamic created by 
considering the perspectives, motivations, and personal priorities for the evaluation 
system both within and across groups of members.   
 
 
 
How these structures and rules affected the committee is the subject of the 
subsequent section.  Here I examine the discord among members regarding the scope of 
their responsibilities and provide a detail description of one aspect of the policy 
development, educator effectiveness ratings, as an example of how this tension was 
manifested.   
Table 7.  Teacher Evaluation Advisory Committee
Educators Legislators Other Stakeholders
Public School Teachers (5) Chair, House Education Committee Business Community (2)
Public School Princiapsl (2) Chair, Senate Education Committee School Board
District Superintendent
Executive Director, State Board of Education
Commissioner of Education
  
121 
 
Finally, as meetings were open to the public and the TEAC invited representatives 
from different education stakeholders (e.g. TEA, education Foundations, local districts, 
and commercial education products companies) to provide input, I explore how their 
preferences and priorities impacted the final evaluation system the TEAC recommended.   
 
Instigating Policy Characteristics 
Policy feedback dictates that the characteristics of an instigating policy - such as 
an innovative new educator evaluation system - generate a set of political dynamics that, 
in turn, will influence subsequent policies (McDonnell, 2009).  Because the new 
evaluation system represented a major policy change, the circumstances in which the new 
policy developed, the parameters of the legislation, and the political context deserve 
consideration for the effects they had on the TEAC’s work. 
 
Origins 
 The First to the Top legislation received strong bipartisan support.  Just 11 
legislators voted against the bill.  Other stakeholders including Tennessee Education 
Association and local school districts also endorsed the legislation.  These policy origins 
– binding legislation with widespread support – set initial conditions as promising for the 
development of the evaluation system.  The policy instruments the legislation selected for 
this work also suggested possible political dynamics for the committee.   
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Policy instruments 
 The legislation employed two types of policy instruments (McDonnell & Elmore, 
1987) for the educator evaluation system: systems changing and mandates.  Section 10 of 
the First to the Top legislation established a “teacher evaluation advisory committee” 
consisting of 15 members, including the state commissioner of education, the executive 
director of the State Board of Education, the chairpersons of the Education Committees 
of the House and Senate, five public school teachers, two public school principals, one 
director of schools, and three members representing other stakeholders’ interests.  (Table 
7, p. 126)  The formation of a committee of stakeholders to develop policy 
recommendations represents a system change to the traditional authority of state level 
education governance through elected officials and high-ranking bureaucrats.    
The local level educators were selected, in part, to represent the variety of 
educators and schools across the state.  They came from urban and rural districts, 
elementary and secondary schools, taught subjects ranging from math to vocational 
education, and represented traditional public schools as well as a magnet program within 
a district.  The committee members appointed to represent other stakeholders’ interests 
included businessmen and a member of a local school board.   
The decision to empower a committee to develop the policy details was a strategic 
move.  Four TEAC members were also involved in the legislative process that crafted 
First to the Top.  Two of them stated that the rationale for the committee’s diverse 
composition was a deliberate decision to hear all voices.  As one bureaucrat explained, 
“Well, basically trying to make sure that we kept all kinds of people in mind and trying to 
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understand what everybody would look for…the main thing that we were trying to do 
was just to make sure that everybody had a voice.”   
A third participant in this process commented on the importance of having 
educators on the committee explaining, “that was one of the requirements that I really 
owned,” and emphasizing his role in ensuring that “half of them (the members) were 
educators.”  Emblematic of Governor Bredesen’s style of reaching out to all stakeholders, 
the committee’s composition was both symbolic and practical: It suggested that this 
policy was a state effort, acknowledged the importance of having the individuals who 
would be affected by the system (educators) contribute to its development, and implied 
that there was support for the system from the education community.   
The importance of this strategy is magnified when one considers Mazzoni’s 
(1991) caution that policies emerging from the leadership arena, as First to the Top did, 
may be threatened by implementation challenges because “they violate participatory 
expectations for involvement, rest on a thin base of commitment, and inspire little 
feelings of ownership,” (p. 131).  A committee of stakeholders ranging from public to 
private citizens representing educators, parents, lawmakers, and the business community 
is a strong antidote to concerns that First to the Top reflected the preferences of only a 
few high-ranking officials. 
Whereas the formation of a committee represents one type of policy instrument, 
other provisions in the legislation are more characteristic of a different instrument: 
mandates.  The committee’s charge was to “develop and recommend to the board, 
guidelines and criteria for the annual evaluation of all teachers and principals employed 
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by LEAs, including a local-level evaluation grievance procedure,” (Public Chapter No. 2, 
2010, p. 5).  The legislation further stipulated that 50% of the evaluation criteria be based 
on student achievement data.  Thirty-five percent of this piece was expected to come 
from student growth data, available from TVAAS, or “some other comparable measure of 
student growth, if no such TVAAS data is available,” (Public Chapter No. 2, 2010, p. 5).   
The remaining 15% was to be based on other measures of student achievement 
selected from a list developed by the TEAC.  The other 50% of the evaluation could 
include, but was not limited to: review of prior evaluations, personal conferences, and 
observations, including a written assessment.  Finally, the TEAC was to determine an 
overall effectiveness rating for the evaluation.   The effect of the mandates outlined by 
the legislation was a set of parameters that simultaneously restricted the scope of the 
committee’s recommendations as well as offered broader license for some elements of 
the new system.   
 
Political Context 
 The favorable political context surrounding the committee as they 
embarked on this task also helps forecast the politics likely to develop.  Symbolically, 
once Tennessee was declared a winner – one of only two winners in the first round – 
there was a sense that this was an opportunity to make a difference for children in 
Tennessee, and objecting to the evaluation system would be perceived as challenging this 
goal.  Finally, one can discern a psychological motivation for the committee’s 
composition: The educators on the committee were selected by high-ranking elected 
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officials, including the governor, and their acceptance of the position was voluntary.  
Thus, it seemed an honor to be asked to serve.  If they had truly objected to an evaluation 
system, they could have refused to serve on the TEAC.  The remaining members, 
bureaucrats and legislators, had a vested interest in helping the legislation they had 
supported be successfully enacted.   
 
Forecast 
All of these conditions, legislation adopted with widespread support, education 
governance by a diverse committee of stakeholders, Tennessee’s success in Race to the 
Top, and voluntary participants, forecast a successful, though perhaps not easy, outcome 
for the TEAC, with less resistance than one might expect, given that educators are 
powerful policy targets (McDonnell, 2009).  Though such a committee cannot be 
expected to reach consensus without conflict, an open forum for such debate is at the 
heart of democratic endeavors.   
 
Structures and Rules 
 After scrutinizing the characteristics of the instigating policy, McDonnell (2009) 
considers how policies affect institutional structures and rules.  While McDonnell’s 
model considers how existing institutions are altered by a policy, in my application of 
this framework, I examine how the legislation created a new institution, the Teacher 
Evaluation Advisory Committee and the structures and rules that guided their work.  
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Specifically, I consider how the committee’s leadership and time constraints created 
discord and tension among members.  First to the Top dictated the members of the 
TEAC, but did not detail how the committee would operate beyond identifying the 
commissioner of education as the chair.  This ambiguity resulted in the TEAC devoting 
time at several early meetings to figuring out “what we were doing,” as described by four 
members.  This struggle to establish structures and rules to guide the TEAC’s work 
would be further complicated by the change in commissioners – four in all – and the 
decision to hire an outside consulting firm to facilitate the process.  
 
Meeting logistics 
 Minutes from the meeting are publicly available on the internet and detail the 
date, topics, and participants at each meeting.  In total, the Teacher Evaluation Advisory 
Committee met 20 times between March 18, 2010 and April 6, 2011; eight of these 
meetings were conference calls.  Although five members lived in the Nashville area, the 
remaining ten traveled from across the state, from Memphis and Knoxville, and one 
teacher reported traveling six hours each way.  Attendance ranged from a low of 25 
percent to a high of 92 percent, with the median rate of 80%.  Accordingly, while 13 
members attended over half the meetings, one member attended only eight meetings and 
another just five.  Two members remarked that attendance at meetings was a problem 
because meeting dates were changed unexpectedly.   
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Leadership Difficulties  
 The legislation identified the commissioner of education as the chair for the 
committee.  Though arguably the intent of this provision was to provide leadership for 
the committee, an unanticipated development challenged this purpose: the resignation of 
the first commissioner.  The commissioner’s resignation, due to health reasons, was 
announced at the October 7, 2011 committee meeting.  The second commissioner chaired 
the committee until his retirement in January (for a total of four meetings).  At this time, 
an interim commissioner was appointed to serve until the new Governor, Bill Haslam, 
appointed a new commissioner.  This individual chaired one meeting; the final meeting 
was chaired by the new commissioner.  This “revolving door of commissioners” as one 
participant termed it, left the committee without clear leadership, and led to discord 
among members.  I will return to this issue in a subsequent section, but first I will explore 
how the decisions made by the first commissioner regarding his approach to leading the 
committee impacted their work.   
Reflecting on his role in the initial meetings, the first commissioner explained:  
At first it was enormously difficult and that is a typical thing.  You know, trying 
to figure out whose role was what and that kind of thing.  It was tough.  I mean, 
when you’re trying to deal with a committee of that many people you have to 
figure out what the leadership is going to look like and whether anyone would 
have the right to veto and deal with that kind of thing.  So that’s what I did.  I was 
trying, first and foremost, to make sure that everybody was heard.  It was tough. 
  
This individual acknowledged the “growing pains” the committee experienced in trying 
to decide how to operate, and also emphasized the goal of gathering input from all the 
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participants, mirroring earlier statements by others about the rationale for establishing 
such a diverse committee.   
One committee member spoke positively about the chair’s role in listening to 
everyone’s perspective. “When we first started out, the then-commissioner of education 
was the chair of the committee, and we were very open around the table about what we 
thought and how we felt.”  However, two members representing the business community, 
objected to this style of leadership, or more specifically, criticized the commissioner for 
his lack of leadership.  Both of these members expressed frustration with the process of 
listening to all ideas, and they spoke directly about these concerns.   
According to one of these members, “in the private sector, this change would 
have been made sooner and this change would have been made without regard of how 
other people felt.  The change would have been made to drive the result, not to make 
everybody happy.”  For this member, good leadership is paramount to the success of any 
endeavor, and he denounced the chair’s approach to hearing all voices:  
I think organizations sink or swim based on leadership.  And the leadership for 
that committee is the commissioner.  I would expect him to have driven this 
process, not be an innocent…not to be a facilitator of the process but to lead the 
process. There’s a difference between facilitating and leading.   
 
This expectation for strong leadership from the commissioner was echoed by a third 
participant who stated that even though there was ambiguity surrounding the TEAC’s 
work, it is precisely in those circumstances that “a commissioner should make a 
decision…no doubt about it” and he did not.   
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While the commissioner expressed his goal of hearing all voices, he also 
expressed some regret about this position, and seems to agree with these individuals’ 
assertions that the TEAC needed different leadership.  The commissioner spoke of the 
challenges the committee faced, including resistance to changes in the evaluation system 
that were expressed by some on the committee and members of the audience.  When 
asked if he believed the approach of hearing all voices was a good one, he responded, “I 
think so, yeah.  I think it was the right approach but I think it was not managed the way it 
should have been.  And that’s on me.”  Instead, he reflected, “I probably should have 
been more of a dictator.”  This member seemed conflicted; part of him truly wanted to 
listen to everyone, but he also acknowledged the challenges this created for the TEAC’s 
work.   
Although members representing the business community seemed at odds with the 
commissioner, this remark tells a more nuanced story.  Their shared conviction that the 
changes to the evaluation system are a necessary means to improve children’s education 
are not as far apart as one might have expected by only considering the differences in 
leadership styles.  In fact, the commissioner himself acknowledged the valuable role the 
members from the business community played.   
Referring to the contributions of the business members, he says: 
 I will tell you, they’re real.  They’re hardcore, but they’re right, they’re exactly 
right.  You know, they were concerned with the outcomes and the actual product 
that we were trying to produce.  I mean, they were obnoxious at some point, but 
they were really right. 
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Thus, while suggesting that there may have been some tensions among members, the 
commissioner applauds the members who criticized him for their dedication to helping 
children.  Another development that prompted concerns from members was the hiring of 
an external consulting firm to assist the TEAC with their work. 
 
Technical Restart 
 At the May 13, 2010 meeting of the TEAC, the consulting firm Education First 
was introduced.  According to the meeting minutes, Education First explained its role in 
this process to “help things happen” by providing “support for the decisions of the 
committee, facilitate conversations, and support work overall.”  Previously, Education 
First had helped the state prepare its Race to the Top application, and the firm described 
its work with the TEAC “as very similar to the roles they played” previously in this 
process; “stating that ‘Tennessee makes decisions for Tennessee’ while Ed First does the 
underlying work, facilitates bringing forward best practice so that Tennessee can be 
successful,” (May 13, 2010).  In spite of this explanation, there was confusion among 
members regarding how and why Education First was selected and the parameters of 
their role.   
 One educator on the committee recalls spending time “entertaining folks who 
wanted to be paid to facilitate our meetings,” and stated that, “the Department of 
Education was the one who chose Education First.  We were told ‘This is the group that 
we’re going with.’” But another educator expressed confusion about how Education First 
came to facilitate the meetings: 
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I don’t know.  I think they took bids, like they did an RFP or something.  I know 
they had worked with them.  I think they maybe helped the write the Race to the 
Top grant, and so then they selected them because of that?  I really don’t know.  
 
In contrast to these uncertain understandings about the circumstances surrounding 
Education First’s selection, another member seemed more aware.  Speaking about the 
decision to hire a consultant, he says: 
So what became clear to us was that we needed someone to be able to step back, 
who was not part of the process, and to be able to look at what we were assuming 
and make suggestions and really just tell us what had been said.  So that’s how it 
happened. 
 
The minutes for the two meetings prior to the May meeting do not reveal enough 
information to corroborate any of these interpretations, but one facilitator clarified that 
Education First was hired by the Governor’s Office of State Policy and Planning.   Still, 
there is evidence that suggests most TEAC members were not aware of this decision prior 
to the May meeting.   
One committee member who was privy to some of the behind-the-scenes work 
says he “had been briefed, so I knew what to expect,” but Education First’s involvement 
was an unexpected development for others.  The minutes from the May meeting support 
this assertion and record one member’s “dissatisfaction at not being informed.”  This 
member wondered whether this meeting was a “re-start” to the work of the TEAC and 
sated it made him feel that the previous time they had devoted to the meetings “had been 
a waste.”  The commissioner conceded that it “was technically a ‘re-start’ but not 
completely;” rather it was more of “ a partial reconstruction.”  This discord among 
members’ perceptions about the circumstances surrounding Education First’s 
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participation in the TEAC’s work extends into the committee members’ 
misunderstandings about the leadership for the meetings. 
 
Collective Confusion 
During our interviews, TEAC members discussed their perceptions about the 
leadership structure in the meetings.  Their answers varied considerably and suggested 
that ambiguity about who was in charge persisted throughout their work.  Three main 
actors were identified in leadership roles but members’ definitions of these roles were 
frequently divergent.   
The most straightforward explanation, provided by one of the legislators, 
identified the Department of Education as a “catalyst, and their staff kind of helped up 
begin organizing our thoughts and organize our meetings and sort of laid out a plan of 
action.”  He further expounded that “the meeting was chaired by the commissioner,” and 
“Education First was an organization that was contracted to just help kind of guide us 
through” by raising “the questions that would begin to kind of clarify your position.” 
Even though other members identified these same actors, they offered contrasting 
perceptions of their roles.   
Eight committee members identified the commissioner as being “in charge” of the 
meetings, because he was the chair.  However, they did not offer much elaboration on 
what this meant, although one member said the role was “more perfunctory” than 
anything, with the chair basically “calling the meeting to order and pretty much that was 
it.”   
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Two educators felt the commissioner’s role changed when Education First began 
participating.  One of these members described the confusion of the first two meetings, 
saying, “we didn’t really know what we were doing,” and “then Education First took 
over.”  Another member also seemed confused about whether the commissioner or 
Education First was in charge.  Initially he states that Education First “really led the 
committee.  We would, within the parameters of their agendas, offer ideas and 
thoughts…”  But, later he contradicts himself when he states that “the commissioner was 
in charge of the committee,” and Education First was not “in charge so much as they just, 
sometimes you need somebody to take your thoughts and put it in a cogent idea…”  
 In the first statement, this member unequivocally identifies Education First as 
leading the meeting when he explains that the committee would respond to agenda items 
determined by the consulting firm.  Yet, in the second statement, he describes Education 
First’s role as more of unbiased outsider, a depiction echoed by others. 
Four other members, all educators (though two of these members also represented 
other perspectives) defined Education First’s role in a way that reflects a more traditional 
understanding of a facilitator.  Collectively, they identified Education First as the 
“manager of the process,” whose job it was to “keep us on task and keep our work 
focused.”  However, four different members did not perceive Education First to be the 
“independent third party” one member termed them to be.  These members, three 
educators and one representative of the business community, acknowledged that 
Education First was a contractor, and, thus, in some ways, had to respond to their client, 
the Department of Education.   
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 The effect of endeavoring to “hear all voices” appears to have created confusion 
regarding the leadership for the committee.  While some members criticized the 
commissioner for a lack of leadership, the vast majority identified him as the person in 
charge of the meetings.  Nonetheless, one member who joined the meetings in October 
sensed “a little bit of friction because no one knew whose role was what.”  Further still, 
members’ perceptions about the role of Education First ranged from complimentary to 
highly negative.  While some stated  the consulting group provided them with an outside 
perspective and helped them maintain focus, others suggested that the Department of 
Education was controlling the process through the facilitators.  According to one 
participant, this discord regarding leadership was exacerbated by the replacement of 
commissioners and the lack of strong management.  The time constraints the committee 
faced increased the pressure for members. 
 
Committee timeline 
All participants, save one legislator, commented that the work was rushed because 
of the timeframe the committee faced, describing it as “challenging” and “very tough.”  
Five members said they might have made some different decisions if they had had more 
time, but three members, all representing a variety of stakeholders, also conceded that the 
timeframe forced them to take action and not prolong the process, because as this 
educator explains:  
while what we’re doing is painful, it’s a step forward, instead of waiting and 
waiting and waiting.  We can’t wait much longer.  Our kids are really struggling 
and we’ve got to shine a light on achievement, we’ve got to shine a light on high 
expectations, and shine light on the kind of support our educators need.  
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One commissioner perceived the effect of the pressure the TEAC felt to meet the 
deadlines and reminded them: 
you’ve got to get this thing to the point where we can get it started. It’s not in 
concrete.  Statutes can be revised, can be amended, can be changed, and we’re 
going to make mistakes and we’ve got to feel comfortable enough with what we 
proposed to get it started and then obviously this process can be tweaked and 
refined as this process is implemented and we see things that need to be changed. 
This sense of urgency to “get this thing to the point where we can get it started” was real.  
The Race to the Top application promised to fully implement the new system at the start 
of the 2011-2012 school year.  The committee had less than 18 months to develop the 
guidelines.   
 Changing commissioners, lack of strong leadership, and the addition of external 
consultants to facilitate the process led to confusion among members regarding who was 
in charge.  Members’ opinions about the leadership approach of the first commissioner 
varied as did their assessment about Education First’s role.  The strict and quick deadline 
for developing the policy recommendations for the new evaluation system added pressure 
to the committee’s work.  These dynamics shaped how committee members worked 
toward their goal.   
 
Mobilization of Interests 
 Policy feedback is concerned with understanding the politics generated during the 
policymaking process.  Both the characteristics of an instigating policy, in this case First 
to the Top, as well as the institutional structures and rules that guide the process produce 
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a political dynamic that is manifested in how individuals respond to these elements.  In 
this case, the politics produced are apparent in how members reached decisions and 
understood their mission.   
 
Reaching Decisions 
After engaging in a “review of the issues” members voted on major aspects of the 
policy.  Study participants commented on the process of discussing the issues, sometimes 
over the course of several meetings, and occasionally with input from invited speakers 
who represented different groups – the teachers’ union, Department of Education, 
principal organizations, etc. Committee members talked about various elements of the 
evaluation system, and three members identified the discussions regarding the language 
for the overall effectiveness rating as particularly salient. Their interviews, along with the 
comments from other members captured in the meeting minutes on this topic, provide an 
illustrative example of how the committee conducted discussion around a topic, 
concluding with a vote.   
 The overall effectiveness rating for the evaluation system is the final score an 
educator receives based upon all elements of the system.  Minutes from the meetings 
indicate the TEAC first considered this issue at the July 22, 2010 meeting.  Conversation 
about the effectiveness rating covered three topics that day: the number and names for the 
categories, as well as the importance of this piece of the policy for human capital 
decisions.  At the conclusion of this meeting, there was a tentative preference for a four 
versus five point scale because it forced principals to make a clear distinction between 
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effective and ineffective rather than defaulting to a more neutral, middle, option.  The 
minutes also note that a member of the audience makes a suggestion for a five point 
system, including category headings. 
 The TEAC returned to this issue at the August 19, 2010 meeting.  The minutes 
indicate members spent time discussing both the number of categories (four or five), as 
well as the terms for each level with “most members agree(ing) with the 4-point scale.”  
Then, a former president of the TEA who was attending the meeting as a guest expressed 
his concern about the terms for the levels because he anticipated that the newspapers 
would want to publish this information for individual teachers.   
One member recalls this as a particularly contentious moment.  While she felt “it 
was beyond our scope” to worry about what the media might do with the information, she 
was struck by how angry another member, a non-educator, became by this matter.  
According to her, “he was really upset about the notion that the public shouldn’t have 
access to how the teachers in a public school system perform.”  The minutes reflect his 
consternation, while an educator describes the incident as “comical” because “the 
consensus of the group was that we did not want to use verbage that would offend 
someone.”    
This incident raises several important issues, including the opportunity for 
audience members to offer opinion regarding policy decisions, the tension among 
members about the role of the committee, and the different perspectives of educators and 
non-educators.  The issue remained unresolved at the end of the meeting. 
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Changing opinions 
 The committee was expected to make initial recommendations, including 
proposals for the overall effectiveness rating to the State Board of Education during the 
Fall 2010.  At the September meeting, the TEAC resumes its discussions about the 
effectiveness rating, and a member who initially supported the use of a 4-point scale 
because “it pushes the envelope and forces decisions to be made between the 2 and 3” 
appears to have completely reversed his position.  This educator expresses a preference 
for the 5-point scale because “it has a natural breaking point.”   
The minutes do not provide any additional explanation about his revised position, 
but following this, three members who explicitly stated a preference for a 4-point system 
at the August meeting, also endorse the 5-point scale.  One of these members, another 
educator, states that she initially favored the 4-point scale but has changed her mind as a 
result of the ‘breaking point’ explanation.   
 One educator who strongly endorsed the 4-point scale at both earlier meetings did 
not change her mind.  She explained her stance on this: 
The other thing that I was pushing for and I failed was that I was pushing for four, 
a rating scale of four instead of five, and I really pushed on that one. Because 
whenever there’s five there’s always that middle. There’s always a three or a C. 
So I’m just afraid that so many teachers are going to get that middle of the road 
score of a three. And when you have the even numbers, a principal has to make a 
decision. Either they’re a three or a four or they’re a one or a two. Either they are 
satisfactory or they’re not. Having that odd number in the middle does not push 
the principal to make that hard decision. 
 
This member, with experience in schools and classrooms, believed principals needed to 
clearly identify teachers as effective or ineffective and feared they would not do this if 
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there was another option.  She felt so strongly about this that not only did she vote against 
this aspect of the policy, but the minutes indicate she was the sole member to oppose that 
the set of policy recommendations decided at this meeting be sent to the State Board of 
Education. She remarks that she does this because of the effectiveness scale. 
 
Voting  
 Following a discussion about the terms for the scale (in contrast to TEA’s request 
to eliminate them), the committee voted on a motion to recommend a 5-point scale, with 
terms of Significantly Above Expectations, Above Expectations, At Expectations, Below 
Expectations, and Significantly Below Expectations.  The motion passed with seven 
members, including all non-educators and four educators, voting in favor of the motion
5
.  
In addition to the educator quoted above, three other members voted against the plan; one 
appears to have disagreed with the terms rather than the use of a 5point scale.   
The commissioner abstained from voting on this, and all other issues for which a 
vote was taken at this meeting.  According to a facilitator, the TEAC was following 
Robert’s Rule of Order, an operational guide for meetings, which indicates the chair only 
votes when a tie-breaker is necessary.   
 The process of deciding the overall effectiveness rating component is illustrative 
of how the TEAC worked through many of the components of the policy.  From 
interviews and meeting minutes, it appears that the TEAC engaged in a process of 
discussion amongst themselves, hearing from external stakeholders, and finally, voting 
                                                          
5 Two members were absent. 
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for most aspects of the policy.  This process of continuously revisiting issues before 
voting supports the goal for the committee as a forum for ensuring multiple voices are 
heard.  This example of developing the effectiveness ratings illustrates that members 
brought different opinions to the table and changed their minds during the process, and 
also that there were winners and losers.  My data also reveal that the TEAC struggled to 
understand the scope of their mission throughout this process.   
 
Mission Misunderstandings 
All of the study participants commented that they devoted time during the 
meetings to clarifying their mission and goals as a committee.  According to the statute, 
the TEAC was to make recommendations to the State Board of Education for the annual 
educator evaluation system.  Specifically, the TEAC had to: 1) recommend how to 
evaluate teachers without student growth data; 2) develop a list of measures for 
evaluating teachers on the 15% achievement component; 3) decide what elements should 
be included in the 50% non-data component; and 4) determine an overall effectiveness 
rating for the evaluation.  Members, like this legislator, commented on the need for 
understanding the level of detail they were supposed to include in their recommendations: 
“We had some discussions just as to what kind of level of detail, whether it was just 
going to be a broad concept and then the Board would take it and develop the details, 
kind of along those lines.”   
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 ‘How’ versus ‘what’ 
 One way the TEAC, guided by the facilitators, tried to understand their mission 
was to review the statute, both in its entirety and specifically, the areas relevant to each 
component of the system.  An illustrative example of the dissonance among members on 
this point comes from two members of the committee, both representing different 
education stakeholders.  One member describes the process of reviewing the statute as 
restricting the TEAC’s role.  She explains: 
 …there were several times at the start of the meetings where they (Education 
First) put the statute up there.  And they gave their interpretation of the statute, 
and basically their point was that this is a statute that says that you can make a 
recommendation to the State Board of Education, but that’s all you can do.  It was 
just a very clear message that, as a committee, our role was quite limited. 
 
This educator disagreed with Education First’s understanding of the legislation 
and instead argued that “it really depends how you interpret the statute.”  Further, “(t)he 
goals of the committee were to figure how the teacher evaluation should…what were the 
parameters for it?  How was it going to work?”   Her use of the word ‘how’ to describe 
the responsibilities of the TEAC is antithetical to how another member explained their 
task. 
 This member carefully articulated her understanding of the statute, as well as the 
concerns she had in the way others interpreted it: 
We were to recommend, and we had to keep that in the forefront, that we were not 
setting the policy, we were recommending policy to the state board on how to 
fulfill the obligations and qualifications of the law, the First to the Top law. So we 
were to establish due policy, what the new evaluation system would look like, and 
that policy. And so there were some back and forth at times, I remember, on our 
role, because we were trying to establish policies, not processes. Which is 
  
142 
 
different, you know. You establish policy and the administration is supposed to 
put the meat behind it and say, “Here’s the policy and here’s how you are 
supposed to make it happen.”  I thought, at some times, “I think we’re exerting a 
power that we don’t have sometimes.   
 
This interpretation suggests the intended outcome was a broader set of policy 
recommendations that did not include micro-detail.  Instead, that responsibility belonged 
to the Department of Education.  Interestingly, this member also explicitly stated that the 
TEAC was not responsible for developing the ‘how’ of the system, just the ‘what’.  
“We’re here to determine ‘what’.  And the State Board is going to adopt the ‘what’ that 
guides the Department’s how’.”  Another educator echoed this member’s belief that the 
Department would interpret the TEAC’s recommendations and “then develop the 
process,” as did a member who represented the business community.  
 
Discord among educators  
 The three members who felt the policy should include a higher level of detail than 
the other members were all local-level educators.  They each spoke about how the end 
product of their work was not as specific as they initially understood it would be.  One 
member recalls: 
At first, and I’ll be very blunt with you, at first I felt like the committee was going 
to make a change, that what we were doing as a committee was going to have an 
effect on the teacher evaluation model.  As time went on, it became…it was 
apparent that we were only to make recommendations, that we were not going to 
affect policy at all, except just to discuss and make recommendations. 
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This member also commented that she believed the Department had a plan and the TEAC 
was just going to make suggestions to, rather than generate, the plan.  Making 
suggestions is not what she and two other educators initially understood the charge of the 
committee to be.   
However, another teacher disagreed with this interpretation, and her statement 
more closely mirrors what the members who distinguished between the ‘what’ and ‘how’ 
expressed:   
Well, because we were an advisory committee…the TEAC stood for Teacher 
Evaluation Advisory Committee. We had to remember that. Anything that 
we…we made suggestions. We advised the state. We made no decisions. We 
made no final decisions as committee members. The media has taken some of that 
and it’s out in the media that we had made those decisions. No. TEAC advised the 
state. So we were in an advisory position, not making the decisions. 
 
This educator is very clear in her understanding that the TEAC was responsible for 
making broad recommendations, and unlike the educators who felt the need to 
incorporate a greater level of detail in the policy, she does not indicate that her 
understanding was challenged as the process unfolded. 
According to one commissioner, this tension between recommending a broad 
versus detailed policy arose partly because, “there was a whole lot of misunderstanding 
of the role of the state board versus the committee versus the legislature.  Finally the 
whole thing was just new ground.  We were all working on new ground and it was kind 
of tough.”  This was a new form of education governance, so his explanation is 
understandable, but the impact of leadership instability is another explanation. 
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 Another reason for the ambiguity regarding the level of detail was offered by an 
educator.  “When the new administration came over, we suddenly were not going to be as 
specific as we all thought.”  A facilitator acknowledged this shift, stating that it was not 
until the end of the process that the TEAC’s mission was clarified.  According to her, 
“lack of clarity around the direction of the TEAC definitely stemmed from the revolving 
door of commissioners.”  In total, five participants, including the two just mentioned, 
identified the change in commissioners as contributing to the confusion regarding the 
TEAC’s role.  The remaining seven indicated this was not much of a problem, in part 
because of Education First’s constant presence.   
 Similar to the confusion among members concerning the leadership for the TEAC 
meetings, members also disagreed on the goals and outcomes for their work.  Despite 
attention to the statute’s stipulations, some members, particularly local-level educators, 
felt their role was more limited than they initially anticipated.  A minority of participants 
attributed this confusion to the changing commissioners, and one commissioner credited 
the new form of governance as part of the problem.   
Finally, a third explanation was offered by a participant speculated that some of 
the “uneasiness” among members regarding their role was due to the fact that the plan 
had to be developed and implemented by July 1, 2011.  Typically, development and 
implementation would not have occurred simultaneously, but rather, planning would have 
preceded implementation.  The effect of this deadline was an overlap in the planning and 
implementing stages whereby the state needed to conduct the pilot for the system before 
the TEAC finished its work.   
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Consequently, the committee was able to see how the Department planned to 
implement their guidelines before the guidelines were finalized.  And, in some case, this 
implementation did not match the way the members had envisioned it.  For one educator, 
this certainly rang true: she stated, “we kind of ran out of time at the end” because the 
Department needed to begin training educators on the model but she continued to say, 
“…we will modify and adjust, just like a good educator does, as we go along.”  From 
these remarks, it is apparent that the timeframe the TEAC faced was another contributing 
factor to the tensions that arose. 
In the account of how the committee worked to create the effectiveness rating and 
the description of the disagreement regarding the level of detail, I find, as McDonnell 
(2009) maintains, that the instigating policy characteristics and the institutional structures 
and rules shape the political dynamics that emerges.  Policy feedback considers one 
remaining element: how policy targets, in this case educators, understand and respond to 
the instigating policy (First to the Top).  This next section addresses this element.  
 
Interpretive Effects 
 Interpretive effects, how policy targets understand a policy also depend on the 
instigating policy characteristics and institutional structures and rules (McDonnell, 2009).  
In this study, educators are the policy targets, and here I analyze opportunities for 
educators to participate in the process of developing the new teacher and principal 
evaluation system.  Specifically, I examine how TEA, an integral participant in the First 
to the Top process, contributed to the TEAC’s work.   
  
146 
 
Voices around the room 
 The TEAC meetings were open to the public, and according to committee 
members, there were “a multitude of different people” attending these meetings, 
including the media, the TEA, vendors, education Foundations, representatives from the 
Department, principals’ groups, and superintendents.  Members’ estimates of the number 
of visitors at the meetings ranged from 20-50.   
There were multiple opportunities for the public to give input. Frequently (14 out 
of 18 meetings) different groups were invited to speak; one member stated that audience 
members could pass comments and questions to the members, and there were 
spontaneous (and uninvited) remarks from “the gallery” recorded in the minutes.  The 
locations of the meetings are symbolic of the desire to gather all voices as well.  The 
TEA, SCORE, Department of Education, and Tennessee School Boards Association all 
hosted meetings.   
 
Tennessee Education Association 
One voice that lacked a formal role in this process was TEA. This was surprising, 
given their role in Tennessee’s Race to the Top application process. Although they 
attended, hosted, and were even formally invited to speak at several meetings (three), 
TEA lacked a formal seat on the committee.  Yet, while there is no evidence that their 
input affected the TEAC’s recommendations, a comparison of the minutes and the 
TEAC’s final recommendations permits an analysis of whether TEA’s preferences were 
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reflected in the committee’s decisions.  (Appendix F contains a copy of the TEAC’s final 
policy recommendations.) 
 
Student growth 
At the June 10, 2010 meeting, the TEA president shared feedback from meetings 
the Association conducted with its members across the state.  TEA members expressed 
their preferences for different elements of the evaluation system.  Regarding the 35% of 
the evaluation that was to measure student growth, TEA recommended the use of 
portfolios, pre- and post-tests, and IEP goals for teachers in subjects and grades without 
value-added data.   
In their final recommendations, the TEAC indicated that these educators would 
choose from a list of state-approved options, and until such time as these measures were 
developed, the school-wide value-added data would be used.  At the start of the 2011-
2012 school year (the first year of implementation), measures had not been developed, 
although there were statewide committees working on them.  For the first year of the new 
system, these teachers were evaluated using the school-wide data, even in some instances 
when their school configuration did not include tested grades.  In those cases, the data 
from the schools into which those students subsequently enrolled was used. Thus, while 
these measures might one day reflect TEA’s preferences, the timeframe for implementing 
the system precluded their use this year. 
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Other achievement data 
TEA members also suggested measures for the 15% other achievement data 
component.  Their recommendations included performance on tests such as Advanced 
Placement exams and the ACT, the use of portfolios and exit exams, and performance in 
student competitions like Model UN and debate teams.  In this area, the TEAC 
recommended a menu of options, approved by the Department, including, but not limited 
to, graduation rates and the percentage of students proficient on the TCAP (statewide 
assessment).  Principals and teachers were to use the menu to collaboratively select the 
measure to be used.   
In the final model, the Tennessee Educator Acceleration Model, the Department 
outlines a list of approved measures that included the tests mentioned by TEA members 
and added postsecondary matriculation, completion of advanced coursework, and ninth 
grade promotion/retention rates, as well as school-wide value-added data, to the menu.  It 
is not possible to conclude whether or not TEA recommendations actually impacted the 
final model, but it does reflect their preferences, at least giving the impression that their 
voices were heard. 
 
Qualitative component 
A final area of input from TEA at this meeting concerned the 50% qualitative 
component.  TEA asked members to offer suggestions for how this component should be 
evaluated and members’ responses ranged from Professional Learning Communities, to 
National Board certification to communication with parents.  As noted emphatically by 
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the TEA president, no one said observations.  The meeting minutes show that teachers 
felt this way “because observations have not been conducted well/consistently in the 
past,” (June 10, 2010).  Given the TEAC’s final recommendations that the criteria for this 
component include a review of prior evaluations, personal conferences, and classroom or 
school observations (and the TEAM model follows this), one can conclude that the 
TEA’s preferences are not reflected in this component.    
 
Summarizing the Voices 
 The process of engaging multiple stakeholders in the conversation over the 
new evaluation system was motivated by the goal of ensuring the process was open and 
transparent.  This was made manifest in several ways: a committee composed of 
representatives from the education and private sectors, meetings open to the public, and 
stakeholders invited to give input.  Meetings were even held in different locations to 
further facilitate opportunities for public involvement.  Despite this, however, committee 
members did not feel that the policy recommendations they made were influenced by the 
guest attendants.  Two members commented that it was “helpful” to hear their 
perspectives, and another said it was “fine” because “after all, it’s the state of 
Tennessee’s education system…we’re all involved.”  Beyond that, however, members 
did not identify specific instances when the audience or invited guests affected their 
decisions. 
An analysis of committee meeting minutes sheds some light on how one group, 
TEA, offered their input to the process, and a comparison of their preferences to the final 
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product reveals the extent to which these preferences are reflected in the new evaluation 
system.  However, it is not possible to make assertions about the level of influence they 
had.  Thus, while McDonnell’s (2009) model suggests that how policy targets interpret a 
policy impacts the development of subsequent policies, this study does not find evidence 
that educators’, and particularly TEA’s, preferences directly influenced the development 
of the evaluation system.  
 
Reflections 
 The distinction between hearing all voices and responding to them was addressed 
by one educator who contends that the TEAC structure was a good approach because 
regardless of the level of influence the committee or audience members had, “it was a 
good thing to have there, to hear us.”  In all, over two-thirds (n= 9) of study participants 
reflected positively on the overall experience of serving on the TEAC.  While they also 
used the words “challenging,” “frustrating” and “aggravating” to describe the process, 
members reported being “honored” to have served on the committee.  A comment from 
one of the commissioners embodies this dichotomy, “…You look back on it now and you 
think, ‘boy, that was a lot of fun’.  For those two or three days it wasn’t that much fun, 
but you know, it was a challenge, and I’m kind of proud of the role I had in it.”   
 The two members who remained dissatisfied with the process expressed reasons 
that were similar, but not identical, to each other.  Both of these members felt that the 
process had been poorly handled.  But, while one educator criticized the organization of 
the meetings and the way in which she felt the committee’s role had been limited, a 
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recurrent theme in the other member’s interview was that the process was too 
“bureaucratic” to be effective.  For this member, hearing from people who are “already 
part of the problem” was an ineffective use of time.  He lamented that the process did not 
better reflect the private sector’s way of operating.  Another distinction between these 
members is that the educator says she “was glad to be a part of it…” and, “I felt really 
honored to be a part of it and to have been selected and I just felt responsible for making 
sure we did a good job.”  But, the other member who criticized the process concluded our 
interview by saying, “it was a miserable process.”   
 Ultimately, the diversity among members’ perceptions and reflections of their 
work with the TEAC is reflective of the divergent perspectives they brought to the table.  
For just over a year, a committee of public and private citizens – legislators, educators, 
and businesspeople – worked to establish policy guidelines for a new statewide 
evaluation system for educators.  Some members reflected on the process more positively 
than others.  It was messy and complicated, involving long hours, and for several 
members, long commutes, but in the end, they met their charge and delivered their 
recommendations to the State Board of Education.   
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter applied a policy feedback framework (McDonnell, 2009) to 
understand the political dynamic that resulted from the TEAC’s work.  The First to the 
Top legislation created a new form of education governance with the TEAC, a volunteer 
committee of diverse stakeholders.  My analysis shows how conditions set by First to the 
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Top as well as the structures and rules that guided the committee’s work impacted the 
development of the new educator evaluation system.  Further, my analysis finds that 
despite numerous opportunities for public input, the committee members did not think 
this had an effect on their work.   
Tennessee embarked upon an unusual venture when it charged a 15-member 
committee, comprised of public and private citizens representing education, business, and 
parent stakeholders, with developing policy recommendations for the annual evaluation 
of educators.  A principle reason for this approach was a desire to have all voices 
represented at the table.  This sentiment was echoed by the commissioner of education 
who served as the committee’s chair.  However, though the policy characteristics of the 
First to the Top bill, as well as the circumstances surrounding its successful passage, 
would suggest favorable conditions for the TEAC’s work, weak structures within the 
committee provided challenges.   
 For 13 months the TEAC and other participants met to work on the policy 
recommendations.  They devoted time to clarifying their mission and carefully examined 
each element of the plan with which they were charged with recommending guidelines.  
They struggled with a lack of leadership stemming from a “revolving door” of 
commissioners responsible for chairing the committee’s work.  The effect of this was 
made manifest in the many discussions the committee held trying to understand the 
parameters of their role as well as the role of Education First, the Department of 
Education, and the State Board of Education.  Add to this ambiguity an ambitious agenda 
in a short timeframe, and members’ remarks that the process was “frustrating” and 
“challenging” are not surprising.   
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 The politics that developed from these circumstances reflect a fragmented 
committee.  However, this sense of dissonance did not appear to divide members 
according to the stakeholders they represented.  For example, although both members of 
the business community objected to the leadership of the committee, the commissioner 
agreed that he probably should have taken a stronger approach.  And, while two 
educators perceived that Education First, or the Department of Education, were guiding 
the committee to make certain decisions, other educator members disagreed.   
Finally, while two members remained dissatisfied with the process, feeling that it 
was poorly managed and too concerned with how individuals who were resistant to 
change felt, the majority contended that conversation and collaboration were the strengths 
of the committee’s work.  No one characterized the process as easy, but most spoke 
positively about the overall experience.   
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CHAPTER VII 
 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
 The prior chapters have framed this study within the parameters of the extant 
literature and the context of current events, outlined the specific research questions and 
methodology guiding this study, and presented a thorough narrative of the results.  In 
Chapter Seven, I synthesize the previous chapters, briefly summarizing the results and 
discussing the contribution and implications for this study.  To begin, I present a 
summary of the results for each of my research questions.  I then situate the results from 
this study within the current literature, both with specific references to the theoretical 
frameworks that shepherded this study as well as the broader scholarship around 
policymaking in a democratic society.  Limitations of this study are addressed in the 
subsequent section.  The chapter concludes with implications for implementation and 
further research.   
 
Summary of Study Development 
 Education policymaking in a federalist system is complex.  The challenges 
presented by this form of governance include a struggle to allocate power among the 
various levels of government and the need to balance mandates with supports (Brady, 
2009; Cohen & Spillane, 1992).  Conversely, attention to an issue from multiple levels 
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can offer opportunities to leverage support for a policy (Manna, 2006).  The dominant 
preference for local control in education was heavily challenged by the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965.  Though best known for its efforts to equalize 
educational opportunities for all children, the funding the ESEA provided to states to 
build capacity for education reform at the state level was also important.  In the decades 
following ESEA, both the federal and state levels of government increased their role in 
education governance and shifted their focus from equality of opportunity to excellence 
in achievement (or from inputs to outputs).   
 Research on education reform during these years often emphasized the increasing 
role of the federal government and the impact on states.  A flurry of state-led initiatives 
also drew attention from scholars (see Brady, 2009; Furhman, 1987; McDermott, 2009; 
Pipho, 1986; Timpane & McNeil, 1991). Their research addressed the efforts states were 
making to ensure equitable school finance, strengthen curriculum standards, and regulate 
teacher qualifications.  Nevertheless, Mazzoni (1994) criticized the extant literature on 
state policymaking in education for its limitations, particularly pertaining to 
generalizability.  State politics in education remained a bit of a mystery.  Following the 
passage of No Child Left Behind, studies of state policymaking have tended to be 
replaced by research that explores the impact of the federal legislation on the states.   
 
Current context 
 Race to the Top is the first major education policy initiative advanced by the 
federal government in several years.  It departs from previous federal involvement in 
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several ways, most notably in that it is a competitive program that invites, rather than 
mandates, states’ participation.  And though the competition included specific 
parameters, states were expected to respond to these criteria in context-specific ways.  
This unusual policy environment offers an opportunity to return our attention to state-led 
education initiatives.  To that end, this study endeavored to analyze the policymaking 
process in one state, Tennessee, as it responded to this new policy instrument.  Because 
the state’s efforts did not end with its successful bid, this study also sought to understand 
how a committee of diverse stakeholders, symbolizing a new type of education 
governance, developed policy recommendations for the new statewide educator 
evaluation system.   
 
Study design 
 Both because case study methodology is strengthened when it is rooted in theory 
(Yin, 2009) and because of Fowler’s (2006) critique that the literature on state 
policymaking tends to be atheoretical, this study is undergirded by two political science 
frameworks: Mazzoni’s (1991) arena models and McDonnell’s (2009) policy feedback 
theorizing.  The first research question of this study asks how Race to the Top evolved 
politically in Tennessee, paying particular attention to the external forces that opened a 
window for policy innovation and how the political arena contributed to the legislation’s 
successful passage. Mazzoni’s (1991) model is particularly salient because it examines 
the influence of the site, or the arena, in policymaking, including the actors, bargaining 
strategies, and level of visibility present during the policy innovation process. My second 
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research question asks how the TEAC worked to implement the Tennessee legislation 
concerning annual evaluations for educators.  As the policy recommendations the 
committee developed were guided by the legislation, McDonnell’s (2009) policy 
feedback model provides a useful framework for exploring the politics created as new 
policies are generated from instigating policies, or (in short) the turned-on-its-head 
process of policy into politics.      
 This emphasis in this study on ‘how’ questions led to an emergent research design 
using qualitative methods.  The primary data for each component of this study were 
individual interviews supplemented by archival documents.  Study participants included 
21 state legislators, four former members of Governor Bredesen’s staff, two officials 
from the TEA, one Tennessee Department of Education official, and 12 of the 16 
members of the TEAC, along with one of the facilitators.  Data collection and analyses 
occurred simultaneously, facilitating revisions to my protocol and the inclusion of 
additional participants recommended during interviews.  My analytic strategy blended 
grounded theory and theory-driven approaches (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Patton, 2002) 
that allowed me to consider themes and patterns suggested by my data but not anticipated 
by theory.  I recorded my process through field notes and memos.  Conversations with 
my advisor helped guide my analysis and suggested additional areas of investigation.   
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Summary of Research Question One  
 
How did Race to the Top Evolve Politically in Tennessee? 
 Two decades of intermittent education policy innovation left the Volunteer State 
lagging behind other states, according to a report from the Institute for a Competitive 
Workforce (2007).    Governor Bredesen confronted Tennessee’s tribulations with a 
multifaceted approach: He joined forces with a national reform organization to increase 
Tennessee’s high school graduation rate; persuaded the State Board of Education to adopt 
new curriculum standards by holding meetings across the state that addressed the 
business community’s concerns regarding Tennessee’s schools; advanced legislation to 
increase the cap on charter schools; and reached out to traditional and non-traditional 
stakeholders.  The end result of this persistent attention to education was a statewide 
perspective that education reform was both imperative and incomplete.   
 Thus, the Race to the Top competition did not propel education reform onto the 
policy agenda in Tennessee, but rather provided an additional stimulus to further the 
state’s own pre-Race efforts.  Tennessee was well positioned to succeed in the 
competition because of its recent reform-mindedness, yet it lacked policies in three 
crucial areas: teacher evaluations, intervention in failing schools, and STEM priorities.  
Among these, removing the statutes that restricted the use of Tennessee’s longitudinal 
value-added data was the linchpin for the state’s application.  Compelled by a 
combination of factors, including a proactive and popular governor who brought 
prolonged attention to education; the introduction of new revenue, and the opportunity to 
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leverage license for innovation from other levels of government, Tennessee entered the 
Race.   
 The Bredesen administration began formally strategizing about how to win in the 
summer of 2009.  Initially, a kitchen cabinet comprised primarily of the governor’s staff 
outlined the necessary steps for the state to take in order to submit a competitive 
application.  Gradually though, other stakeholders were invited to join this group.  This 
strategy of maintaining low visibility while quietly expanding the inner circle of elite 
participants resulted in a strong cadre of support for the governor’s plan before it was 
publicly announced.  When the Special Session commenced in January 2010, proponents 
could claim the support of all school districts, an endorsement, albeit cautious, from 
TEA, and the backing of both Republican and Democratic leadership in the legislature.   
 The subsequent success of the First to the Top bill is characterized not only by its 
supporters, but by the lack of organized opposition.  This too, was strategic.  Although 
confident the legislation would pass regardless of TEA’s support, the governor’s team 
sought their cooperation to reduce the likelihood that organized opposition would disrupt 
the process.  What accounts for TEA’s support in Tennessee when unions in other states 
mounted such vehement opposition that it severely weakened applications?  Two factors: 
trust and political reality.   
Governor Bredesen’s reputation for reaching out to stakeholders and working to 
improve education created a positive relationship between the two parties.  Even then, the 
Association remained reluctant to endorse a plan requiring the annual evaluation of 
teachers and linking half of the criteria to student achievement data.  However, the 
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Association’s position believed the bill likely to pass and thought it better to work with 
the governor to protect their interests rather than oppose his plan and suffer the political 
fall-out.  In particular, TEA did not want to be viewed as the reason Tennessee lost out on 
an opportunity for money to improve education.   
It is reasonable to conclude that Tennessee’s successful enactment of the First to 
the Top legislation can be attributed to several factors: a proactive leader with access to 
additional resources, the closed venue in which the kitchen cabinet worked, widespread 
support for innovation, and lack of organized opposition.  Two other factors are notable: 
the nature of the Special Session (one of the governor’s resources) and the timing of the 
events.  Whereas study participants declared the decision to hold a Special Session to 
address the First to the Top bill was born more out of logistic necessity than strategy, its 
ability to focus lawmakers’ attention on one specific topic in a constrained amount of 
time cannot be underestimated.  Further, because of the competition deadline, legislators 
had barely a week to learn about the bill, including hearing from constituents and other 
stakeholders.  There just was not enough time to seriously challenge the legislation, and 
since opposing the bill in the face of so much support was politically risky, it would have 
been difficult to find legislators willing to speak against the bill.   Although a small 
number of lawmakers did vote against the act,   more noticeable was the overwhelming 
bipartisan support for ideals typically championed by Republicans but in this instance, 
initiated by a Democratic governor.  The legislation was enacted, and Tennessee saw its 
efforts realized just two months later when it was declared a winner in the Race to the 
Top competition.   
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Summary of Research Question Two 
 
 How did the Teacher Evaluation Advisory Committee work to implement the Tennessee 
legislation with regard to annual evaluations for educators? 
 The success of First to the Top was just the beginning of Tennessee’s education 
policy changes.  The legislation established a new form of education governance: a 
volunteer committee of 15 members to develop formal policy recommendations for the 
evaluation system.  The diverse backgrounds of the committee members (educators, 
legislators, and business leaders) reflected the overall desire to gather input from different 
stakeholders. Several conditions - establishing a representative committee, overwhelming 
support in the General Assembly, winning Race to the Top, and voluntary participants – 
forecast a successful outcome for the TEAC’s work.  Yet, ambiguity in the committee’s 
structure and rules threatened the goal of wanting to hear all voices. 
 According to the legislation, the commissioner of education would serve as the 
committee’s chair.  The commissioner also espoused the ideal of giving everyone a 
chance to speak, but he was criticized by some for this approach because it suggested a 
lack of leadership.  Two members on the committee who represented the business 
community in particular commented on this, and the commissioner also expressed regret 
for this decision.  This lack of clear leadership on the part of the first commissioner 
resulted in confusion and disagreement that was further exacerbated by the addition of 
Education First as facilitators for the TEAC and the subsequent “revolving door” of 
commissioners.   
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 The operational issues that vexed the committee cultivated misunderstandings 
about the mission of the TEAC.  Study participants described their attempts to distinguish 
between the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of policymaking and to define their role within these 
parameters.  Some members expected to address the ‘how’ component; this revealed 
misunderstandings about the distinct responsibilities of the committee, the State Board of 
Education, and the Tennessee Department of Education.  Other members spoke assuredly 
about their understanding that the TEAC was to focus on making recommendations (the 
‘what’) and leave to implementation decisions (the ‘how’) to the Department.   
 Another factor that impacted the TEAC’s work was their deadline for completion.  
The state had promised to fully implement this system at the beginning of the 2011-2012 
school year in its Race to the Top application. Consequently, it had just a little over a 
year to develop the recommendations, design a model from the policy, conduct a field 
test of the plan, and train educators across the state in how to use the model.  The effect 
of this strict time limit was that policy development and implementation occurred 
simultaneously.  Whereas typically implementation would follow policy, circumstances 
dictated that this was not the case in Tennessee, and this was disconcerting for some 
members.   
 Another structure of the committee that influenced their work was how they 
reached decisions.  For each aspect of the policy, members engaged in discussions among 
themselves as well as with invited speakers regarding different options.  At the 
conclusion of these conversations, members voted on their recommendation.  Portrayals 
of the TEAC’s work in several areas illustrate this decision-making process, and also 
show that input was not restricted to committee members and invited speakers. 
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 All meetings were open to the public, and again, in an attempt to gather input 
from a variety of stakeholders, the locations for the meetings also varied.  Local districts, 
education Foundations, and organizations representing teachers, principals, and school 
boards attended the meetings.  Audience members offered their opinions (at times, 
unsolicited) to the committee as they observed the proceedings.  A comparison of these 
opinions to the final policy recommendations indicates that some of their preferences are 
reflected in the new system, although the degree of influence the audience had is unclear.   
 The politics that developed from these conditions reflect a fragmented committee.  
However, the dissonance did not appear to divide members according to the stakeholders 
they represented. Agreement on certain details and policy decisions often came from a 
mix of educators, legislators, and business leaders.  In moments of disagreement, a 
perspective of one member could be contradicted by another member from the same 
association, political, or professional background.  In spite of the conflict that clouded 
this process, all but one member indicated they were pleased to have had the opportunity 
to participate.   
 
Situating this Study within the Literature 
The purpose of the first part of this study was to understand the change in 
education policy in Tennessee as the state prepared its application for Race to the Top.  I 
selected a political science framework about state policymaking to undergird this study.  
The arena model considers the role of the actors and the contextual influence of specific 
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sites in provoking major innovation (Mazzoni, 1991).  This study provided an 
opportunity to explore how well the arena model explains the events in Tennessee.   
 
Mazzoni’s arena in Tennessee 
In accordance with Mazzoni’s (1991) revised model, I find support for policy 
innovation initiated in the leadership arena.  Specifically, I find that the education policy 
environment in Tennessee had been dominated by the leadership arena for several years 
due to Governor Bredesen’s prolonged attention.  However, the new context presented by 
an invitational competition extended by the federal government also suggests 
implications for Mazzoni’s (1991) model.  Table 8 (p.165 ) summarizes the comparison 
of Mazzoni’s and Fowler’s (1994) findings to this study that I detail here.  
  
 
 
1
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Table 8.  Comparison of Arena Model According to Mazzoni, Fowler, and Finch
Sample Arenas Conditions Policy Innovation
Mazzoni's hypothesized 
model
Based on theory. Pressure: Crisis event, 
mass media & public 
opinion, policy 
entrepreneurs.
Revenue: 
Additional revenue 
source necessary.
Opportunity: N/A Subsystem
Macro
Mazzoni's revised model MN elected leaders and non-
elected policymakers, their 
staff, and representatives of 
interest groups. N=105.
Pressure: Includes 
original pressures and 
gives greater attention to 
role of organized elites.
Revenue: No 
change.
Opportunity: N/A Subsystem
Macro
Commission
Leadership
1) Leader with additional 
resources. 2) Low 
visibility. 3) Widespread 
support. 4) Weak 
opposition.
Leadership arena.
Fowler's critique OH elected leaders and non-
elected policymakers, their 
staff, and representatives of 
interest groups. N=20.
Pressure: Calls for 
expansion of this 
condition to include the 
role of national pressure 
sources.
Revenue: 
Additional revenue 
source not 
necessary.
Opportunity: N/A Subsystem
Macro
Commission
Leadership
Meets Mazzoni's 
conditions.  
Leadership arena.
Finch's findings TN elected leaders and non-
elected policymakers, their 
staff, and representatives of 
interest groups.  N=28
Pressure: Crisis event, 
protracted focus on 
education reform led by 
political elite (governor) 
with public support.
Revenue: 
Additional revenue 
source necessary, 
provided by Race 
to the Top.
Opportunity: Race to 
the Top criteria and 
local initiative offered 
opportunity to "borrow 
strength" (Manna, 2006) 
for policy innovation.  
Dominated for 
several years by 
Leadership arena.  
Meets Mazzoni's 
conditions.  Suggests an 
additional benefit of 
closed arena in 
competitive context.  
Adds Special Session to 
list of resources.
Leadership arena.
Environmental Stimuli for Innovation
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Mazzoni’s conceptualization of environmental factors that provoke policy change 
include pressures and additional revenue.  Like Mazzoni’s findings in Minnesota, the 
events in Tennessee suggest the presence of a crisis event that focused attention on 
education policy and was enhanced by the efforts of a political elite, the governor.   
Whereas Fowler (1994) does not find evidence that additional revenues are necessary 
precursors to innovation as the arena model suggests, my results indicate Race to the 
Top’s promise of money was important, particularly given the financial problems 
Tennessee was facing. 
The arena model assumes that pressure is primarily located within the state 
(Mazzoni, 1991), but Fowler (1991) argues for an expansion of this definition to include 
national pressure.  This study suggests another explanation.  Drawing from Manna’s 
(2006) theory of borrowing strength, external influence for policy change can take the 
form of opportunity rather than just pressure.  Governor Bredesen was able to use the 
Race to the Top competition, and specifically, its parameters regarding teacher 
evaluations, to advance an ambitious and controversial plan.  In addition to leveraging 
license from Race to the Top competition, he was also able to borrow strength from the 
local level by pointing to the efforts underway in Memphis to improve teacher 
effectiveness.  This implies a more interdependent dynamic between the state and other 
levels of government than Mazzoni (1991) allows.  From this perspective, state 
policymaking does not simply respond to pressure, but benefits from expanded license at 
other levels. 
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Mazzoni (1991) identifies four essential criteria for successful policy innovation 
in the leadership arena: proactive leader with additional resources, a closed venue that 
affords low visibility, unity among members within the arena, and weak opposition.  All 
four criteria were met in Tennessee.  In particular, the governor’s ability to call a Special 
Session proved to be a powerful way to focus legislators’ attention and expedite the 
policy process.  The low visibility of the leadership arena served a dual purpose in 
Tennessee: it allowed the kitchen cabinet to build support for the legislation without 
alerting opponents and, importantly, it kept the state’s plans hidden from competing 
states.  Accordingly, while Mazzoni’s model focuses on the within-state advantages of a 
closed venue, my study shows another political necessity given the current policy 
context.    
Finally, my study addresses an element not considered in the arena model 
(Mazzoni, 1991): the effect of time constraints on weakening opposition.  Because 
Tennessee (like other Race to the Top applicants) wanted to maintain a competitive 
advantage by keeping the details of the state’s plan confidential, Governor Bredesen did 
not announce the Special Session until December 2009.  Although the kitchen cabinet 
had been working on the state’s application, and importantly, building support for it, 
since the summer, opponents had less than two months to voice their objections.  Not 
only was it difficult to find dissenters among such widespread support, the deadline for 
the Special Session and the Race to the Top application further diminished the likelihood 
of blocking the legislation.   
In sum, this study generally provides support for Mazzoni’s (1991) revised arena 
model, which suggests a greater likelihood for policy innovation originating in the 
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leadership arena.  It also proposes a few revisions to the model by adding opportunity for 
change as an environmental factor, suggests an additional benefit to the closed venue of 
the leadership arena, and identifies an additional resource of a political elite.    In addition 
to this contribution, this study also takes its place among the scholarship regarding state 
policymaking, broadly, and specifically, among the literature that considers the role of 
the governor in state-led education reform.    
 
State policymaking and Tennessee 
Scholarship examining the role of the state in education reform typically focuses 
on the 1980s and early 1990s (Firestone & Fuhrman, 1991; Kirst, 1988; Pipho, 1986).  
During this time, a number of studies specifically examined the role of the governor in 
instigating major education policy change (e.g. Karper & Boyd, 1988; Fuhrman & 
Elmore, 1994; Mazzoni, 1989, 1991).  These studies identified the challenges governors 
faced and the advantages they enjoyed in successfully promoting school reforms.  Two of 
the advantages articulated in this literature which this study echoes are the strategic 
decision to hold a Special Session (Hatic & LaBrecque (1989) and the effect of a 
governor’s proactive leadership in reducing opposition by placing adversaries in a 
reactive and weakened position (Karper & Boyd, 1988).   
These studies explore the role of the state in a political climate very different from 
today.  During the Reagan administration, states were encouraged to take a more active 
role in education policy as the federal government reduced its role (Sunderman, 2009).  
Race to the Top also encourages state-led policymaking, but the federal government 
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retains its leadership by stipulating criteria for states to follow in order to receive funding.  
Thus, this study makes an initial contribution to a revised understanding of state 
policymaking when provoked by a federal competition.  It highlights changes to the 
policy environment that potentially alter theories of state policymaking.  In particular, it 
draws attention to the effects of competitive and invitational policy instruments.   
The first part of this study also offers an opportunity to compare the recent policy 
innovation in Tennessee with previous policymaking events.  In 1984, Tennessee passed 
the Comprehensive Education Reform Act.  Among other things, it established a career 
ladder for teachers, tying salary to performance evaluations.  At this time, the state, along 
with Florida, was considered a model for other states implementing career ladders (Pipho, 
1986).  Now, Tennessee is the first state to implement an annual evaluation system of 
educators.  
An analysis of the events in 1984 suggests there are other similarities between the 
two episodes (Achilles, Lansford & Payne, 1986).  Then-Governor Lamar Alexander, a 
Republican, emphasized the relationship between the state’s economy and school system, 
as did Governor Bredesen.  Alexander also reached out to Democrats and enjoyed 
bipartisan support in a Democratic-controlled legislature.  Further, Alexander’s staff was 
considered an important factor in the bill’s success (Achilles et al., 1986), as was 
Bredesen’s kitchen cabinet.  This analysis also makes note of the open communication 
between the governor and TEA (Achilles et al., 1986).  This tradition of collaboration 
between the state and the Association deepens our understanding of TEA’s 2009 decision 
to work with Governor Bredesen rather than to actively oppose his proposed changes.  
These factors notwithstanding, the analysis of the 1984 events concludes, as does this 
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study that, “it seems the energy and commitment of the governor provided the sparkplug 
to start and drive the machinery of education reform in Tennessee, (Achilles et al., 1986, 
p. 242).”   
 
McDonnell’s policy feedback and Tennessee 
The second part of this study examined how the Tennessee Evaluation Advisory 
Committee worked to develop policy recommendations for the statewide educator 
evaluation system.  Policy feedback (McDonnell, 2009) provides a useful tool for 
examining the political dynamics that permeated the TEAC’s work.  I adapted the model 
to better analyze the process begun by First to the Top and culminating in the new 
statewide educator evaluation system.  This framework offers a structure for examining 
how the characteristics of an instigating policy (First to the Top) forecasted the politics 
that emerge.  While McDonnell utilizes the framework to consider how a policy alters 
existing institutions, I analyze the institution created by First to the Top: the TEAC, and 
how the structures and rules of this institution also shaped the political dynamics.  
Finally, this framework permits an examination of how these factors interacted with 
committee members’ understanding of their mission and public input to produce the new 
evaluation policy.   
McDonnell (2009) argues that policy feedback analyses can inform subsequent 
policies through attention to the characteristics of an instigating policy and the 
institutional effects.  The policy context set by First to the Top forecasted positive 
conditions for the TEAC’s work.  However, a lack of clear leadership revealed discord 
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among the members as to the committee’s mission, and their voting decisions reflect this 
lack of consensus.  This suggests the importance of a leader who will unequivocally 
clarify a committee’s mission.  However, the intention of the legislation to gather input 
from a variety of stakeholders presents a formidable challenge to strong leadership.  How 
does one balance these two distinct approaches?  A partial answer lies in how the 
committee made decisions. 
For each aspect of the policy, the committee engaged in lengthy discussions.  
They heard from different stakeholders – invited and impromptu – and they considered a 
variety of options, including approaches being implemented in local districts.  A strong 
leader could have clarified the TEAC’s charge to concentrate on policy guidelines as 
opposed to designing the specific model for the system, and focused conversations 
around this goal.  This would have ensured that different stakeholders still had the 
opportunity to provide input, while focusing their suggestions in a constructive way.  
Allowing the committee members to vote on the policy recommendations did give them a 
sense of ownership in the process, and the chair’s nonparticipation in this element 
mitigated the appearance that he was leading the committee in a certain direction.   
The time constraints the committee faced also exacerbated the tension they 
encountered.  Policy feedback (McDonnell, 2009) illustrates how this deadline affected 
the policy development.  Because the evaluation system had to be operationalized so 
rapidly the work of the TEAC in developing the policy overlapped with the Department’s 
efforts at implementation.  This resulted in the perception among members that their role 
was curtailed and the evaluation system did not reflect their intentions.   
  
172 
 
Finally, although there were multiple opportunities for public input, committee 
members did not consider this helpful.  Although McDonnell (2009) suggests that how 
policy targets (in this case teachers and principals) respond to a policy influences the 
development of subsequent policies, this study cannot find strong support for this.  This is 
an area that deserves future attention because this structure for education governance 
aimed to include stakeholders’ voices as it developed these recommendations.   
To summarize, in applying policy feedback to this study, I illustrate how a 
fledgling political-science framework can help develop our understanding of an emerging 
form of education governance: policymaking by a volunteer committee of stakeholders.    
The conclusions from this research suggest that similar future policy contexts would 
benefit from a better balance between strong leadership and diverse representation.  
While this practical rationale for policy feedback is important, McDonnell (2009) also 
argues in favor of a more noble pursuit: democratic governance of education.  Thus, it is 
important to attend the contribution this study makes in that area as well.   
 
Democracy in Tennessee 
The education policy environment is often described as “turbulent” (Crowson, 
2003) due to the contentious struggle for authority amongst the various levels of 
government.  Embedded in this struggle, however, is another vital, and less considered, 
element: Who participates in governing education?  At all levels, bureaucracy, and the 
individuals who serve these institutions, plays a dominant role.  Education policies like 
No Child Left Behind and state assessment programs trickle down to the classroom, and 
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their implementation is often threatened because of the disconnect between those who 
develop them and those who implement them (Lipsky, 1976).  But, what if the people 
affected by the policy were invited to participate in its development? 
Who participates in education governance is the subject of Amy Guttman’s book 
Democratic Education.  In her view, the imperfections of democratic politics do not 
diminish its value because: 
Without the tumult of democratic politics, our education institutions would not be 
governed by common values.  We discover our common values partly through 
processes of democratic deliberation by which we agree upon the laws that govern 
our educational institutions.  Take away the educational institutions, and the 
processes that remain cannot function democratically.  (Guttman, 1987, p. 287) 
 
In Tennessee, the decisions to invite practitioners and business leaders to the 
policymaking table, to hold these meetings on stakeholders’ “home turf,” and make the 
meetings open to the public strengthened the notion of participatory democracy.  Though 
the process was marked by discord and, at times, dissatisfaction, the process was open to 
public scrutiny and its proceedings are archived in the meeting minutes.  This messiness 
is precisely what we should expect, what we should want, when people with diverse 
perspectives come together to make decisions.  All voices should be represented.  All 
voices deserve an opportunity to be heard.  Ultimately, one side will win but, according 
to one legislator, “that’s the way democracy is supposed to work.”  The result in 
Tennessee is an evaluation policy guided by many stakeholders, including practitioners.  
It is not a perfect system, but the process that created it aims at the heart of democratic 
ideals.   
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Limitations 
 The broad purpose of this study to explain the policymaking process in Tennessee 
should be kept in perspective.  It is not without limitations.  To begin with, the study 
relied primarily on interviews with key actors in this process.  Although the sampling 
methods employed were intended to allow me to reach saturation, “the point when all the 
concepts are well defined and explained” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 145), such data is 
subjective and could reflect the biases of the participants.  However, the corroboration 
among participants, particularly for the first part of the study, suggests that any biases are 
likely to be in the same direction.  Further, several participants made specific mention 
that their responses reflected their perspectives and they encouraged me to speak with 
others to see if there were differences or similarities.   
Second, this is a study of a single state and thus, generalizing to policymaking in 
other states is constrained.  Three factors temper this limitation.  With qualitative 
methods, the researcher should provide thick descriptions of both the methodology and 
results to allow others to determine the extent to which findings in similar contexts under 
similar conditions might correspond.  Throughout this study, I endeavored to provide a 
detailed account of my process.  Second, this study is guided by theoretical frameworks 
that have been applied in other contexts.  Adding to this literature strengthens external 
validity.  Finally, Tennessee was not the only state to make significant policy changes in 
response to Race to the Top, and many of the topics – teacher evaluations, use of student 
data, and failing schools – were addressed in other legislatures.  This study is an initial 
contribution to understanding recent state activity in education reform.  Future research 
will allow us to examine the parallels between Tennessee and other states. 
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Implications for Policy  
 Race to the Top has provoked robust activity in state policymaking, providing 
both financial support and license for furthering education reform.  Moreover, the strict 
deadlines states imposed in an effort to win the competition have presented additional 
challenges.  As such, implications for policy are not confined to Tennessee but have 
broader reach to education policymaking in an evolving federalist system   
 An immediate issue is the changing policy context in light of the new policy 
instrument introduced with Race to the Top.  While mandates are criticized for provoking 
only the  minimal response necessary, a competition elicits a different response: 
applicants want to do all they can to win.  Further, because states are not required to 
participate, this instrument is unlikely to exacerbate tensions between the federal and 
state levels.  In fact, by awarding points for LEA participation, an invitational 
competition seems to encourage cooperation across all levels of government and to 
ameliorate issues of will and capacity that frequently challenge policy implementation.   
The introduction of funding for some states but not others could restrict the 
exchange of ideas between states and result in more furtive policymaking at the state 
level.  If this is the case, it suggests a dominance of the leadership arena, at least for 
education policy innovation, both because of the low visibility this venue affords and the 
additional resources accessible only to the political elite.  Both of these conditions are 
necessary for states to maintain a competitive advantage over other states.  The extent to 
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which an invitational competition alters the policy environment over time remains to be 
seen, but if Tennessee is any indication, these changes seem likely.   
This study also suggests a renewed focus for state policymaking in education.  
Although the criteria for Race to the Top were prescriptive, states were encouraged to 
propose reforms that met their specific needs.  The effect of this design is a greater 
degree of standardization across participating states in several reform areas including 
curriculum standards, more frequent evaluations of teachers, use of student data, and state 
intervention in failing schools.  If their efforts prove to be successful in raising student 
achievement, non-participating states may feel pressure to adopt similar reforms.   
Additionally this study shows new participants in the policymaking process are 
emerging.  This expansion of educational governance to nontraditional policymakers 
adds yet another dimension to the “marble cake” (Bailey & Mosher, 1968) metaphor of a 
federalist system.  Other states have imitated Tennessee’s model of inviting a variety of 
stakeholders to help shape their own educator evaluation systems.  Although typically 
these committees are connected to either the State Board of Education or the Department 
of Education, their members are voluntarily serving in this capacity.  If the experience in 
Tennessee is any indication, these states are likely to encounter many of the same 
challenges.   
Finally, this study highlights the tensions that are likely to develop when policy 
development and implementation occur concurrently.  Particularly in contexts similar to 
Tennessee where stakeholders were invited to participate in the policymaking process, it 
is important to consider the consequences of this outcome. If the intention is to reduce 
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implementation challenges, including resistance to reforms by giving policy targets an 
opportunity to shape policy, then efforts should be made to ensure clear communication 
regarding the different responsibilities for all participants.   
 
Research Forward 
 This study aimed to make an initial contribution towards revitalizing scholarship 
on state policymaking.  The dynamic events of the past few years suggest many avenues 
for further research.  Below I present a few of the possibilities:   
1) A reconsideration of state policymaking theory to understand the extent to which 
revisions are necessary given this new policy environment.  Specifically, scholars 
should investigate the effect voluntary and competitive elements and strict 
deadlines have on the policymaking process.   
2) An exploration of trends in state education policy changes surrounding the Race 
to the Top competition.  Scholarship in this area could examine similarities and 
differences between the states’ approaches to the Race to the Top criteria.  It 
could also explore differences between states like Tennessee, that were successful 
in passing innovative legislation, and states like Colorado, where reforms initially 
failed. 
3) An investigation into the new participants in the policymaking process.  Such 
studies could identify states that have invited participation from nontraditional 
policymakers, the stakeholders they represent, differences among their 
perspectives, and the perceptions about the policymaking process.   
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4) Further applications of policy feedback to examine the extent to which policy 
targets directly influence policy development.   
5) An analysis of the connections between the policymaking process and 
implementation efforts.  Of particular interest here is understanding whether the 
context surrounding the policymaking process (consensus or contention) 
forecasted the trials or triumphs of implementation. 
6) Finally, Tennessee’s policy innovation is notable in part because of the high level 
of cooperation from TEA. More frequently, unions hampered states’ application 
efforts.  The 2012 legislative session challenged collective bargaining rights in 
many states, and in at least one state, union membership has fallen since Race to 
the Top (The Associated Press, 2011).  Scholars should explore this area to 
understand the extent to which this traditionally powerful organization finds its 
role changing.  To what extent are unions losing their voice in the education 
policymaking process?  And, importantly, what accounts for this loss of power?  
Is it a change in their own philosophy of protecting teachers or is it provoked by 
strong-armed elected leaders? 
 
Conclusion 
 This study examined the changes in one state’s education policy in response to 
Race to the Top.  Through interviews with a multitude of voices, I examined how 
Tennessee is striving to improve schools.  Though not without limitations, this study, 
guided by political science frameworks, makes an initial contribution to revising our 
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understanding of education governance in a federalist system.  It is hoped that results 
from this study will illuminate the role of the state in education reform, and 
particularly how new participants in this process are emerging.  This study suggests 
implications for policy and practice as states engage in implementing their ambitious 
policies.  Finally, this study sought to share a portrayal, however fleeting, of 
concerned citizens working in a democracy to make a better system for the youngest 
members of our society.    
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Appendix B 
Interview Protocol: Legislators 
 
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today.  As I explained to your assistant, I 
am a PhD student at Vanderbilt conducting a research project about how legislators 
gather information on proposed bills and legislation.  Today I’d like to talk with you 
about that process generally, and also specifically regarding the Tennessee First to the 
Top Act, HB7010/SB7005.  I would like to record the interview, and all information will 
remain confidential.  I will use pseudonyms when reporting my results.   
Speaking into recorder today is _____________________ and this is my interview with 
subject ___________. 
1. What kind of work did you do before becoming a legislator for 
______________________? 
a. Did you have any experience with the public schools or education policy? 
 
2. Do you have a specific role in education legislation? (involved in any committees, 
etc.) 
 
Information-gathering and decision-making in general 
3. If you aren’t familiar with proposed legislation, what do you do to gather 
information?  (listen for sequencing cues) 
 
a. Probe to see if any of the following people are involved in this process.  
(Ask about people not previously mentioned. Format should be yes/no 
answer.)  
i. Staffers 
ii. Lobbyists 
iii. Fellow legislators 
iv. Constituents  
v. Other _________________________ 
 
b. How would you characterize the nature of this process?  Formal/informal, 
what is the setting?  
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c. Of the different sources of information you’ve just mentioned, which are 
the top one or two upon whom you rely?  Why do you value those sources 
above others? 
 
4. Tell me about the decision-making process – after you’ve gathered information, 
what happens next? (listen for sequencing cues) 
 
5. Does research have a role in the information gathering process?  Why/why not? 
a. How? 
b. Which, if any, of these sources for education research do you rely on? 
(Ask all sources not previously mentioned.  Format should be yes/no 
answers. 
i. Databases 
ii. Journals 
iii. Researchers/Experts 
iv. Research Institutions 
v. Universities and colleges 
vi. Newspapers 
vii. NCSL, SREB, ALEC, ECS, Council of State Governments, etc. 
viii. Comptroller’s Reports 
ix. Information provided by legislature 
x. Other ___________________________ 
 
c. How do you decide which research is the best to use? 
 
Information-gathering and decision-making specific to HB7010/SB7005 
We’ve talked a little about the general process you use to gather information and learn 
about proposed legislation, now I’d like to talk more specifically about the recent Special 
Session where Tennessee First to the Top Act, HB7010/SB7005 was enacted.  I know the 
bill covered a variety of education topics including the establishment of an achievement 
school district and the procedure for restructuring schools, but I am primarily interested 
in the changes to teacher evaluations using student achievement data, so I’d like to focus 
our conversation around that piece. 
6. I understand that during Special Session, the only issue considered is the focus of 
the session; in January it was education.   
 
a.  What was your role in the January special session?  
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b. Did you attend any of the education committee meetings?  Why/why not? 
i. What is your role when you attend these meetings/purpose for 
going?   
 
7. What led you to vote _______________________? 
 
a. If relevant, ask if the section about teacher evaluations influenced the 
legislator’s vote? 
 
8. How much did you know about the pros, cons, and logistics, and rationale about 
linking teacher evaluations with student achievement?  
 
9. Did you use the information provided by the governor to learn about this issue?  
(Ask probes judiciously depending on answer to major question.) 
 
a. How would you characterize the nature of that information? 
 
b. How did you decide whether it was valuable information or not? 
 
10.  Did you seek out information other than what was provided to you by the 
governor? 
 
a. Probe to see if any of the following people are involved in this process.  
(Ask about people not previously mentioned. Format should be yes/no.) 
i. Staffers 
ii. Lobbyists 
iii. Fellow legislators 
iv. Constituents  
v. Other ________________________________________ 
 
b. Of the different sources of information you’ve just mentioned, which are 
the top one or two upon whom you relied for this session?  Why did you 
value those sources above others?  
 
11. Did you use education research to learn about this issue?  (Ask probes judiciously 
depending on answer to major question.) 
a. Which, if any, of these sources for education research do you rely on? 
(Ask all sources not previously mentioned.  Format should be yes/no 
answers. 
i. Databases 
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ii. Journals 
iii. Researchers/Experts 
iv. Research Institutions 
v. Universities and colleges 
vi. Newspapers 
vii. NCSL, ALEC, ECS, SREB, Council of State Governments 
viii. Comptroller’s Reports 
ix. Information provided by legislature 
x. Other ___________________________ 
 
b. How did you decide which research was the best to use? 
 
12. Did you receive unsolicited information in the mail, via email, phone calls, etc.?   
 
a. How did you use that information? 
 
13. In thinking about the part of the bill regarding teacher evaluations using student 
achievement data, how did the information you gathered impact your voting 
decision?   
 
14. Thinking back to all the information you used to make this decision, what was the 
most influential piece? The second most? 
 
Closing  
15. Why do you think this bill passed now? 
 
16.  Is there anything else about this process that we haven’t discussed that you feel is 
important for me to know? 
 
Thank you again for your time today.  I really appreciate your willingness to speak with 
me.  Can you suggest another legislator with whom I should meet? 
_________________________________ Would it be okay to mention your name when I 
contact their office? 
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Appendix C 
Interview Protocol: Individuals involved in First to the Top legislation (not legislators) 
 
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today.  As I explained in our previous 
conversation, I am a PhD student at Vanderbilt University working on my dissertation 
about how Race to the Top has affected education policy in Tennessee.  Today I’d like to 
talk with you about your role in the First to the Top legislative process.  I would like to 
record the interview, and all information will remain confidential.   
Explain consent form and ask participant to sign it.   
 I am going to ask you questions about the First to the Top legislation.  Please feel 
free to stop me at any time if you have any questions.   
Speaking into recorder: Today is __________________ and this is my interview with 
subject ____________. 
1.  Can you tell me a little about your career as _____________? 
 
2. Tell me about Race to the Top in Tennessee.   
(Possible probes if not mentioned by subject.) 
a. What do you remember about the process?   
 
b. Can you say more about _________________? (Could ask about people 
mentioned, particular aspects of process, etc.) 
 
3. What was your involvement in Race to the Top? 
 
a. If not mentioned, ask about specific involvement with First to the Top 
legislation. 
 
4. Why did Tennessee decide to pursue Race to the Top, and why was this 
legislation considered necessary? 
 
5. What/whose support did you have in promoting RTTT and the legislation? 
 
6. What challenges did you face?  From whom?   
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7. How was the final version of the bill different from the one originally proposed by 
the governor?   
 
a. What do you remember about the negotiations to the bill?  
i. Why were those aspects more objectionable than others? 
 
b. Who else participated in the revision process? 
 
c. Do you recall where these negotiations occurred? 
 
8. How did you gather support for the bill? 
 
a. Were any materials distributed to legislators or other individuals? 
i. What do you remember about them? 
 
b. Where were conversations about the bill likely to occur?  (Legislators’ 
offices, Governor’s office, committee meetings, etc.) 
 
9. How were the education committees in the legislature involved?   
 
10. How did the media give attention to RTTT and the legislation? 
 
11. Why do you think the legislation was successful? 
 
12. Is there anything else about this process we haven’t discussed that you feel is 
important for me to know?   
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Appendix D 
Interview Protocol: Follow up with selection of legislators 
 
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today.  As I explained in our previous 
conversation, I am a PhD student at Vanderbilt University working on my dissertation 
about how Race to the Top has affected education policy in Tennessee.  Today I’d like to 
talk with you about your role in the First to the Top legislative process.  I would like to 
record the interview, and all information will remain confidential.   
Explain consent form and ask participant to sign it.   
 I am going to ask you questions about the First to the Top legislation.  Please feel 
free to stop me at any time if you have any questions.   
Speaking into recorder: Today is __________________ and this is my interview with 
subject ____________. 
1.  According to my notes from last year, you told me that your involvement in the 
First to the Top legislative process was ________________________________.  
Is my understanding correct?  Is there anything you would change or add to that 
description?   
 
2. What else do you remember from the special session, when the First to the Top 
legislation was passed? 
 
a. Can you tell me more about _________________?  (Could ask about 
people mentioned, particular aspects of process, etc.) 
 
3. Why did Tennessee decide to pursue Race to the Top and why was this legislation 
considered necessary? 
 
4.  What/whose support did you have in promoting RTTT and the legislation?  
 
5. What challenges did you face?  From whom?  Who were the key figures in this 
process?  What were their roles? 
 
6. How was the final version of the bill different from the one originally proposed by 
the governor?   
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a. What do you remember about the negotiations to the bill?  
i. Why were those aspects more objectionable than others? 
 
b. Who else participated in the revision process? 
 
c. Do you recall where these negotiations occurred? 
 
7. How did you gather support for the bill? 
 
a. Were any materials distributed to legislators or other individuals? 
i. What do you remember about them? 
 
b. Where were conversations about the bill likely to occur?  (Legislators’ 
offices, Governor’s office, committee meetings, etc.) 
 
8. How were the education committees in the legislature involved?   
 
9. How did the media give attention to RTTT and the legislation? 
 
10. Is there anything else about this process we haven’t discussed that you feel is 
important for me to know?   
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Appendix E 
Interview Protocol: Teacher Educator Advisory Committee 
 
 Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today.  As I explained in our 
previous conversation, I am a PhD student at Vanderbilt University working on my 
dissertation about how Race to the Top has affected education policy in Tennessee.  
Today I’d like to talk with you about your role in the Teacher Evaluation Advisory 
Committee, specifically the development of the new educator evaluations.  I would like to 
record the interview, and all information will remain confidential.   
Explain consent form and ask participant to sign it. 
 I am going to ask you questions about the work you did to implement the educator 
evaluation system.  Please feel free to stop me at any time if you have questions. I want to 
let you know that in preparation for our meeting today, I have read the minutes and other 
materials from the advisory committee meetings, and I might have some specific 
questions about them.   
Speaking into recorder: Today is __________________ and this is my interview with 
subject ____________.  Subject is __________________ and was on 
________________________. 
1. Tell me a little about your work in education. 
 
2. How did you become involved with the Teacher Evaluation Advisory Committee? 
 
3. What did you know/think about evaluation linked to student achievement before 
you began working on the committee? 
 
4. What would you like me to know about the work of the committee? 
 
a. Was someone in charge at the meetings?  Did that stay the same at all 
meetings? 
 
b. Can you say more about ____________? (Could ask about people  
mentioned, specific aspects of process, etc.) 
 
5. What were the goals of the committee? 
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a. Committee was supposed to recommend guidelines, then what happened? 
 
b. From reading the minutes, it sounds as though there was some confusion 
about the level of specificity for the recommendations.  Can you tell me 
about that? 
 
6. The consulting agency, Education First, facilitated these meetings, how did they 
come to do this? 
 
7. What were the most enjoyable aspects of the work you did? 
 
a. Several components of TEAC’s work, was any of it easier? (35% growth, 
15% other, 50% teacher qualitative, principal evaluation. 
 
8. What challenges did you face? 
 
a. How did you deal with these challenges? 
 
b. How did the timeline affect the work? 
 
9. Did you have any priorities or special interests you wanted to see included in the 
recommendations? 
 
 
10. How did the committee reach decisions? 
 
a. Did the voting options represent ideas that TEAC generated or that 
Education First presented? 
 
11. Did the change in commissioners affect the work? 
 
12. Did the change in governor affect the work?  
 
13. At the April meeting, there was a conversation about the importance of getting 
public input, was the committee successful in doing that? 
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APPENDIX F 
Coding Frameworks 
Part 1: How did Race to the Top evolve politically in Tennessee in 2010? 
A. Emergent themes: 
1. Comparison between General Assembly in 2010 and 2011 
2. Remarks about evaluating teachers 
3. Precursors to Race to the Top in Tennessee 
4. Post-Special Session 
5. Tennessee policy and Race to the Top focal areas 
 
B.  Themes suggested by theory: 
1. Leadership arena 
 a. Participants 
 b. Resources 
2. Pressure for change 
 a. Competition 
 b. Borrowing strength 
3.  Additional resources 
4. Softening the system 
5. Supporters and opponents 
6. Policy innovation explained 
 a. Proactive leadership 
 b. Closed venue 
 c. Consensus 
 d. Lack of opposition 
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7. Politics 
8. Problems 
Part 2: How did the Teacher Evaluation Advisory Committee work to implement the 
Tennessee legislation with regard to annual evaluations for educators? 
A. Emergent Themes: 
1. Positive aspects of TEAC’s work 
2.  Communication among members 
3.  Concerns about evaluation system 
4. Relevant prior knowledge/experience 
5. Resources 
6. Subcommittees 
7. Thought about evaluating teachers 
 
B.  Themes suggested by theory: 
1.  Institutional structures and rules 
 a) Change in leadership 
 b) Committee formation 
 c) Timeframe 
 d) Leadership for TEAC 
2.  Mobilization of interests 
 a) Decision-making 
 b) Goals of committee 
3.  Interpretive effects 
 a) Public input 
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Appendix G 
Teacher Evaluation Advisory Committee Policy Recommendations 
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